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ABSTRACT 
 
Part A of this dissertation tells the story of The Coca-Cola Company‟s trademark 
registrations in Canada in order to illustrate the linguistic issues faced by trademark 
administrators. A trademark‟s registrability depends on its distinctiveness, which is its ability to 
can distinguish its trader‟s goods and services from those of another trader. Knowing how well a 
trademark will function to distinguish means ascertaining first what has already been registered, 
which is no easy task when the databases cannot administer foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized. Part A proposes the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized, so they can be filed/searched appropriately in databases.  
Part B of this dissertation tells the story of two competing Chinese bakeries in Canada in 
order to illustrate the linguistic struggles of the judiciary. These struggles are nothing new, as 
academics have noted that “[l]ong before the introduction of the registration system [by what 
was then England in 1875], owners of marks containing terms in foreign languages or scripts 
could in certain circumstances prevent their use by trade rivals” and that by 1905 English and 
North American case law “has been fruitful of conflicting holdings.” What is new in the 21st 
Century is the increasing frequency of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as the 
added complexity of foreign scripts makes it harder for courts to assess and compare trademarks 
that they cannot even read or sound out, much less understand. Part B proposes the solution of 
assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, so they can be assessed and 
compared appropriately in the case law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Law is a social construct that often features fictitious characters. Criminal law applies the 
standard of the reasonable person to establish criminal negligence.
1
 Civil law applies the same 
standard to establish tort liability for negligence.
2
 Intellectual property law also has its legal 
fictions. Patent law imagines a person skilled in the art to assess non-obviousness.
3
 Copyright 
law imagines a similar person or a lay person to assess copying,
4
 as well as the author to assess 
originality.
5
 Trademark law imagines the consumer to assess confusion.
6
 
The trademark consumer is split into further fictitious characters, which is where the 
social construct starts to fall apart because the fictitious characters are arbitrarily given 
contradictory personalities. Examples include the sovereign versus the fool;
7
 the passive 
                                                 
1
 R v Hill, [1986] 1 SCR 313 at 324-325 (“The criminal law is concerned among other things with fixing standards 
for human behavior. We seek to encourage conduct that complies with certain societal standards of reasonableness 
and responsibility. In doing this, the law quite logically employs the objective standard of the reasonable person.”). 
2
 Vaughan v Menlove, (1937) 132 ER 490 (CP) (“The care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid 
down; … Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of 
each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to 
the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.”). 
3
 Beloit Canada Ltd v Valmet Oy (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 at 294 (“The question to be asked is whether this mythical 
creature (the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in the light of the state of the art and of common 
general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution 
taught by the patent.”). 
4
 Cinar Corporation v Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, [2013] 3 SCR 1168 at para 51 (“However, the question remains 
whether a substantial part of the plaintiff‟s work was copied. This question should be answered from the perspective 
of a person whose senses and knowledge allow him or her to fully assess and appreciate all relevant aspects – patent 
and latent – of the works at issue. In some cases, it may be necessary to go beyond the perspective of a lay person in 
the intended audience for the work, and to call upon an expert to place the trial judge in the shoes of „someone 
reasonably versed in the relevant art or technology‟: Vaver, at p. 187.”) [Cinar]. 
5
 Jane Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law” (2003) Columbia Law School, Public 
Law Research Paper No 03-51 at 4 (“Many of the latter contend that copyright, or droit d’auteur, obsoletely relies 
on the Romantic figure – or perhaps fiction – of the genius “auteur.” But we know today, indeed we probably have 
always known, that this character is neither so virtuosic, nor so individual, as the “Romantic” vision suggests.”). 
6
 Frank Schechter, “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection” (1927) 40 Harv L Rev 813 at 818 (“The fact that 
through his trademark the manufacturer or importer may “reach over the shoulder of the retailer” and across the 
latter‟s counter straight to the consumer cannot be overemphasized, for therein lies the key to any effective scheme 
of trademark protection.”) [Schechter]. 
7
 Barton Beebe, “Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law” (2004) 103 Mich L Rev 2020 at 2025 (“The result is 
that trademark apologists – and plaintiffs – tend to adduce the sovereign when they speak of the basis of protection 
and the fool when they speak of the scope. Trademark restrictionists – and defendants – do the reverse. They adduce 
 2 
 
consumer versus the active co-creator of value;
8
 and, the illiterate consumer versus the fluent 
consumer.
9
 Although the courts may find fictitious characters helpful in explaining and deciding 
complex issues, it is important to develop such characters in a consistent manner or risk 
undermining the credibility of the social construct. 
I propose to look at the last aspect of trademark‟s fictitious character: what I call the 
illiterate consumer versus the fluent consumer (i.e., someone who does not understand the 
language used in the trademark being assessed versus someone who does). There is a gap in the 
literature when it comes to the linguistic knowledge of the trademark consumer. Most articles 
discussing the mind of the consumer make no mention of linguistic capability, as they focus on 
how a consumer perceives a mark,
10
 differentiates one mark from another mark,
11
 or participates 
in the development of a mark.
12
 The literature coupling linguistics and trademarks do not discuss 
foreign languages, as they centre on how trademarks communicate meaning,
13
 express ideas,
14
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the fool when they speak of the basis, and the sovereign when they speak of the scope. Both camps thus suffer from, 
at the same time that they seek to exploit, what amounts to a dialectic in trademark theory, in which information and 
persuasion each contain within themselves the countervailing force of the other.”) [Beebe]. 
8
 Alex Kozinski, “Trademarks Unplugged” (1993) 68 NYUL Rev 960 at 960 (“The originator must understand that 
the mark or symbol or image is no longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it also belongs to all those other 
minds who have received and integrated it.”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, “We Are Symbols and Inhibit Symbols, So Should 
We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity” (1996) 20 Colum J L & Arts 123 at 
129 (“At the least, the purveyor and the audience should be considered co-creators of the value. If rights are 
determined by the existence of value, then purveyors and audience should be treated as joint authors or co-
inventors.”); Jessica Litman, “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age” (1999) 108 Yale 
LJ 1717 at 1730 (“If that‟s so, however, Warner Brothers, Anheuser-Busch, R.J. Reynolds, and L‟Oréal can hardly 
take all the credit. They built up all the mystique with their customers‟ money and active collaboration.”). 
9
 Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd v Living Realty Inc (1999), [2000] 2 FCR 501, 1999 CanlII 9394 (FCTD) at paras 53-
54 (“Counsel for Cheung Kong was able to refer me to no decision holding that, in determining the question of 
confusion reasonably likely to be caused by a mark comprising foreign words or characters, the Registrar must 
consider the question from the perspective of an average consumer who understands the language in which the mark 
is expressed. Indeed, what authorities there are would seem to point in the opposite direction.”) [Cheung Kong]. 
10
 Lionel Bently, “From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as 
Property” (2007) University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No 07-31 in Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, 
eds, Trademarks Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2008) 3. 
11
 Beebe, supra note 7 at 2025. 
12
 Deborah Gerhardt, “Consumer Investment in Trademarks” (2010) 88:3 NCL Rev 427 [Gerhardt]. 
13
 Graeme Dinwoodie, “What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law” in Lionel Bently et al, eds, Trade Marks and 
Brands: An Interdisciplinary Critique (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
14
 Laura Heymann, “The Grammar of Trademarks” (2011) William & Mary Law School Research Paper No 09-67 
in 14:4 Lewis & Clark L Rev. 
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identify source or provide information.
15
 I propose to fill the gap regarding the linguistic 
knowledge of the trademark consumer in order to develop a workable model for assessing and 
comparing registered trademarks in a foreign language (i.e., any language that is not an official 
language of the country assessing the trademark). 
Part A of this dissertation tells the story of The Coca-Cola Company‟s trademark 
registrations in Canada in order to illustrate the linguistic issues faced by trademark 
administrators. A trademark‟s registrability depends on its distinctiveness, which is its ability to 
can distinguish its trader‟s goods and services from those of another trader.16 Knowing how well 
a trademark will function to distinguish means ascertaining first what has already been registered, 
which is no easy task when the databases cannot administer foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized. Part A proposes the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized, so they can be filed/searched appropriately in databases.  
Part B of this dissertation tells the story of two competing Chinese bakeries in Canada in 
order to illustrate the linguistic struggles of the judiciary. These struggles are nothing new, as 
academics have noted that “[l]ong before the introduction of the registration system [by what 
was then England in 1875], owners of marks containing terms in foreign languages or scripts 
could in certain circumstances prevent their use by trade rivals” and that by 1905 English and 
                                                 
15
 Ariel Katz, “Beyond Search Costs:  The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks” (2010) BYUL Rev 1555 
[Katz]. 
16
 This is different from sumptuary laws that distinguish a person‟s class, as the trader selling the goods owns the 
trademark on the goods whereas the person buying the goods does not. Having said that, the distinguishing function 
of trademarks can add social value not just to goods but also to persons according to Barton Beebe, “Intellectual 
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code” (2010) 123:4 Harvard L Rev 809 at 813-814 (“Sumptuary law did not 
disappear with industrialization and democratization, as is generally believed. Rather, it has taken on a new – though 
still quite eccentric – form: intellectual property law. … We are thus increasingly relying on intellectual property 
law not so much to enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve – or in Pierre Bourdieau‟s terminology, to 
„reproduce‟ – our system of consumption-based social distinction and the social structures and norms based upon 
it.”). 
 4 
 
North American case law “has been fruitful of conflicting holdings.”17 What is new in the 21st 
Century is the increasing frequency of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as the 
added complexity of foreign scripts makes it harder for courts to assess and compare trademarks 
that they cannot even read or sound out, much less understand. Part B proposes the solution of 
assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, so they can be assessed and 
compared appropriately in the case law. 
Readers may find it odd for a dissertation to start from the practical to the theoretical (or 
from specific to general), but this approach seemed best in order to address factual assumptions 
that might later impede an appreciation of the legal issues. This is why the discussion of case law 
blatantly ignores cases comparing two foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. First, I 
intentionally chose cases comparing “COCA-COLA to 可 口 可 樂” and “SAINT ANNA to 聖 
安 娜” in order to illustrate how foreign-language marks that are not Romanized relate to those 
that are. Second, I intentionally chose cases containing English-language marks in order to point 
out linguistic assumptions or judicial errors because such marks do not blind and paralyze us 
with their “foreign-ness”. This dissertation is replete with examples in order to familiarize a non-
Chinese reader
18
 with the language from as many angles as possible so that the non-Chinese 
reader may be informed enough to assess the solutions being proposed (and to make counter-
proposals).  
Readers may also notice that this dissertation focuses on registered trademarks. First, 
there is no discussion of common law rights for unregistered trademarks. This ranges from the 
                                                 
17
 Ellen Gredley, “Foreign-language Words as Trade Marks” in Norma Dawson & Alison Firth, eds, Trade marks 
retrospective (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 85 at 85-86 [Gredley]. 
18
 This dissertation apologizes in advance to any and all Chinese readers who are sure to criticize the examples by 
pointing out that Mandarin can have a fifth tone that is neutral, PinYin is not the only phonetic system that is 
Romanized, a generation name is not the same as a middle name technically, etc. Please understand that this 
dissertation generalizes the examples in order to minimize the time spent on factual issues (Chinese) in order to 
maximize the time for legal issues (trademarks). 
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tort of passing off and its statutory version in Canada‟s Trademarks Act19 to other torts that cause 
economic injury, even without deception or confusion, and their statutory versions in Canada‟s 
Competition Act.
20
 Second, there is no discussion of the copyright that may or may not be 
attached to trademarks. A simple example is the possibility of a copyright claim in respect of 
foreign-language marks that are automatically classified as design marks by the Canadian 
Trademarks Database.
21
 A more complex example is claiming copyright for dead and obscure 
languages that cannot be trademarked, just as copyright claims were made for constructed and 
invented languages such as computer programming
22
 and Klingon.
23
  
In conclusion, the proposed model for assessing and comparing registered trademarks in 
a foreign language should be consistent with the purpose of trademark law:   
“The purpose underlying any trademark statute was twofold. One was to protect 
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular 
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and 
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, 
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his 
investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark owner.”24 
 
                                                 
19
 Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [Trademarks Act]. 
20
 Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34. 
21
 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 
81 (“Even signatures such as Pablo Picasso‟s or those drawn or painted in Chinese or Japanese calligraphy may 
qualify, although most people write, rather than do art, when they sign.”) discussed cases recognizing copyright in 
Australian Chinese Newspapers Pty Ltd v Melbourne Chinese Pty Ltd, [2003] FCA 878 (Austl Fed Ct), aff‟d [2004] 
FCAFC 201 (Austl Full Fed Ct); Picasso, succession v PRC Inc, [1996] FCJ No 969; Anne Frank TM, [1998] RPC 
379 (UKTMO) [Vaver]. 
22
 Oracle America, Inc v Google Inc, 750 F (3d) 1339 (Fed Cir 2014) [Oracle]. 
23
 Paramount Pictures Corporation and CBS Studios Inc v Axanar Productions, Inc, Case No 2:15-cv-09938-RGK-
E, Document 1, Filed 12/29/15 [Paramount]. 
24
 United States Senate Report No 79-1333 at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 USCCAN 1274, 1277. 
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Therefore, the administrative and judicial solutions proposed in the following chapters 
are workable only to the extent that they support the paragraph quoted above. Their credibility 
depends on how well they serve the dual purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer 
from confusion and the trader from unfair competition.
25
 
  
                                                 
25
 Frank Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks (New York: Columbia 1925) at 
20-21 [Schechter on The Historical Foundations]. 
 7 
 
1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM 
 
It was 1975. The Internet did not exist. E-commerce was unheard of. The World Trade 
Organization had not been established. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights was inconceivable. It would be another four years before the restoration of 
Chinese-American foreign relations, when The Coca-Cola Company would became the first 
international business to re-enter China as a result.
26
 
 Yet, 1975 was when The Coca-Cola Company started trademarking the Chinese 
translations of its products. That was the year it filed Canadian applications for four trademarks 
in Chinese, all of which were registered shortly thereafter. Alas! Although the business world 
was ready to embrace the economic benefits of recognizing foreign languages, the administrative 
and judicial systems were slower to identify and resolve the challenges related to doing so. 
This chapter compares the trademark registrations in Canada for COCA-COLA and its 
Chinese equivalent in order to illustrate the administrative challenge of classifying foreign-
language marks (e.g., trademarks not in Canada‟s official languages of English or French) that 
are not Romanized. 
 
1.1 The Problem of Classifying Foreign-Language Marks that are not Romanized 
The Canadian Trademarks Database classifies trademarks as either word marks or design 
marks. Only trademarks consisting of letters, numerals, French accents and common punctuation 
                                                 
26 “Celebrating 35 Years of Coca-Cola in China”, The Coca-Cola Company (24 Nov 2014), online: 
<http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/celebrating-35-years-of-coca-cola-in-china>. Although The Coca-Cola 
Company signed its historic agreement with the Chinese government on December 13, 1978, its first shipment to 
China was not until January 1979 [“Celebrating 35 Years”]. 
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marks are classified as word marks.
27
 All other trademarks are classified automatically as design 
marks. This means any foreign-language mark that are not Romanized is deemed to be a design 
mark, even if the trademark is actually a word in the foreign language. For example, the English 
letters COCA-COLA would be considered a word mark, but the equivalent Chinese characters 
可 口 可 樂 would be considered a design mark. This automatic classification of all foreign-
language marks that are not Romanized as design marks has more than trivial administrative 
consequences. 
One serious consequence is how the automatic classification handicaps the protection of 
the trademark. Word marks are protected even where used in a different font, size, and colour 
from their registrations.
28
 The protection extended to design marks is more limited: they must be 
registered as used, and they must be used as registered. This means that “with every variation the 
owner of the trade mark is playing with fire. In the words of Maclean P., „the practice of 
departing from the precise form of a trademark as registered is objectionable, and is very 
dangerous to the registrant‟.” 29 Similarly, a competitor may use a design mark differently from 
the one registered and so not infringe the trader‟s rights – or at least have a better argument that 
he is not infringing those rights than in the comparable case of the use of a word mark.  
                                                 
27
 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Trademarks Examination Manual (Ottawa: Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development Canada, 20 October 2016) at 2 of 5, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03634.html#ii.3>. Section II.5.3 states, “A trademark is considered to be a word mark that is 
not in special form if it consists of: 
a. A word or words in upper case letter. 
b. A word of words including lower case letters. 
c. A word or words including numerals. 
d. A word or words including French accents. 
e. A word or words including any of the punctuation marks found on standard English or French keyboards.” 
28
 Bill C-31, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and 
other measures (Economic Action Plan 2014, No. 1), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, cl 339 (assented to June 19, 2014)  
(Sections 30 to 33 of the Act are replaced by the following: Standard characters – “31. An applicant who seeks 
to register a trademark that consists only of letters, numerals, punctuation marks, diacritics or typographical symbols, 
or any combination of them, without limiting the trademark to any particular font, size or colour shall …”) [Bill C-
31]. 
29
 Promafil Canada Ltée v Munsingwear Inc (1992), 44 CPR (3d) 59 at 70, [1992] FCJ No 611 (QL) (FCA). 
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The difference in protection afforded to word marks versus design marks is a handicap to 
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as many of them can be written in a variety of 
ways. For example, the chart below shows how Chinese can be written in different directions, 
different scripts, or different fonts. This leads to a discrepancy where the English letters COCA-
COLA need to be registered only once with minimal cost to receive full protection, but the 
equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂 need to be registered multiple times with increased 
costs to receive the equivalent protection. Failure to do so could lead to unfavourable findings of 
lack of use in expungement proceedings
30
 or lack of confusion in infringement proceedings.
31
 
 
1. Chinese was traditionally written in a vertical manner, 
and read from right to left. The English equivalent is: 
 
C 
O 
C 
A 
- 
C 
O 
L 
A 
 
 
 
2. Chinese can still be read from right to left, even after it 
became acceptable to write it in a horizontal manner. 
The English equivalent is: 
 
ALOC-ACOC 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 45(3) (Effect of non-use – “Where, by reason of the evidence furnished to the 
Registrar or the failure to furnish any evidence, it appears to the Registrar that a trade-mark, either with respect to all 
of the goods or services specified in the registration or with respect to any of those goods or services, was not used 
in Canada at any time during the three year period immediately preceding the date of the notice and that the absence 
of use has not been due to special circumstances that excuse the absence of use, the registration of the trade-mark is 
liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.”). 
31
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20(1) (Infringement – “The right of the owner of a registered trademark to its 
exclusive use is deemed to be infringed by any person who is not entitled to its use under this Act and who (a) sells, 
distributes or advertises any goods or services in association with a confusing trademark or trade-name; (b) 
manufactures, causes to be manufactured, posses, imports, exports or attempts to export any goods in association 
with a confusing trademark or trade-name, …”). 
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3. Chinese can now be read from left to right, in addition 
to it being acceptable to write it in a horizontal manner. 
The English equivalent is: 
 
COCA-COLA 
 
 
 
4. Chinese can also be written using traditional script or 
simplified script. The result is that many (but not all) 
Chinese characters can now be written in two ways. 
While not equivalent, an English example is: 
 
coca-cola 
 
English can be written in capital letters or non-capital 
letters. The result is that many (but not all) English 
letters can be written in two ways. A consumer with no 
understanding of English would not know that A=a or 
that L=l. 
 
可 口 可 樂 
(Traditional Script, as shown in 
the three pictures above) 
 
 
 
 
可 口 可 乐  
(Simplified Script, as shown in 
the picture below) 
5. Chinese can also be written using different fonts, in the 
same way that English is written using different fonts. 
 
This is a culture that writes auspicious Chinese 
characters such as “Blessing” or “Longevity” in 100 
different ways as a calligraphy exercise, and then 
presents it as a gift to an esteemed recipient. 
 
 
Another serious consequence is how the automatic classification impedes the 
filing/searching of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. A trademarks database 
provides the public with information as to “what sign is protected and in which commercial 
spheres it is to be protected” in order to reduce disputes and increase certainty for traders.32 
However, this requires that the filing/searching functions of the database enable traders to 
communicate the scope of their claims to the world, as “economic operators must, with clarity 
and precision, be able to find out about registrations or applications for registration made by their 
                                                 
32
 Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 
765 [Bently & Sherman]. 
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current or potential competitors and thus to receive relevant information about the rights of third 
parties.”33  
The Canadian database currently impedes the filing/searching foreign-language marks 
that are not Romanized. For example, a search for the English letters COCA-COLA produces the 
actual trademark along with other similarities. This enables The Coca-Cola Company to monitor 
for applications that may infringe its trademark. It also enables other trademark applicants to find 
out whether or not the English letters COCA-COLA are already claimed, by whom, since when, 
in association with what goods and services, etc., in order to assess whether what they plan to do 
may be legally objectionable and, if so, what alternative trademarks can be claimed instead. 
Contrast the scenario above with a search for the equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂. The 
Coca-Cola Company cannot monitor for applications without expertise or expense, as only an 
experienced searcher would know how to find trademarks that cannot be filed alphabetically. 
Other trademark applicants trying to find out whether or not the equivalent Chinese characters 可 
口 可 樂 are already claimed will find themselves searching for a needle in a haystack, unless 
they have the good fortune of narrowing the search by already knowing who might be the 
registrant or what might be the goods and services claimed. This is because all Chinese-language 
marks in the Canadian database are indexed under the unhelpful descriptive reference of 
“CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN”. 
The problem of classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized also impacts 
the discussion in Part B, as the test for confusion depends on the similarity between a registered 
trademark and a second trademark (instead of whether or not the second trader intended to create 
                                                 
33
 Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent-Und Markenamt, [2003] RCP 38 in NG-LOY Wee Loon, “The IP Chapter in the 
US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement” (2004) 16 Sing Ac LJ 42 at 50. 
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confusion between the two).
34
 Notwithstanding that the absence of intent is inconclusive, it 
increasingly appears that the presence of intent is persuasive.
35
 This is all the more reason why 
the second trader must exercise due diligence to avoid confusion with other trademarks by 
searching the trademarks database. The chapter below explains why this problem is best 
addressed with the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. 
 
1.2 The Problem is Widespread in Canada 
 Although this chapter compares the trademark registrations for COCA-COLA and its 
Chinese equivalent, it is important to remember that this is only one example to illustrate the 
administrative challenge of classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. The 
chart below illustrates how the problem is widespread in Canada, as Chinese is only one of many 
non-Romanized languages. 
Non-Romanized Languages Number of Trademark Filings 
 in the Canadian Trademarks Database 
 
Arabic
36
 549 
Chinese
37
 6,449 
                                                 
34
 Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd v Apotex Inc, [1992] 3 SCR 120, 1992 CanLII 33 (“… attention should be drawn to the 
fact that the passing off rule is founded upon the tort of deceit, and while the original requirement of an intent to 
deceive died out in the mid-1800‟s, there remains the requirement, at the very least, that confusion in the minds of 
the public be a likely consequence by reason of the sale, or proffering for sale, by the defendant of a product not that 
of the plaintiff‟s making, under the guise or implication that it was the plaintiff‟s product or the equivalent.”). And 
see Mattel Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc, 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 SCR 772 at para 90 (“Mens rea is of little relevance 
to the issue of confusion.”) [Mattel]. 
35
 Mattel, supra note 34 at para 90 (“If, as the appellant says, the respondent‟s activities have trespassed on the 
marketing territory fenced off by its BARBIE trade-marks, it would be no defence for the respondent that it did not 
intend to trespass. Equally, however, if the respondent‟s activities did not in fact trespass, evidence that it may have 
wished to do so does not constitute confusion: Fox, at p. 403. Historically, courts have been slow to conclude that a 
demonstrated piratical intent has failed to achieve its purpose …”). And see United Airlines, Inc v Cooperstock, 
2017 FC 616 at para 68 (“While intent is not determinative in that its absence is not a defence to trademark 
infringement, its presence can be a relevant factor …”). 
36
 “Search Criteria „Arabic‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
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Greek
38
 230 
Hebrew
39
 107 
Inuktitut
40
  
(as an example of an Aboriginal language) 
 
26 
Japanese
41
 1,204 
Korean
42
 344 
Russian
43
 126 
Sanskrit
44
 114 
 
Historically, Canada may not have felt the need to identify and resolve challenges arising 
from foreign-language marks since its economy was driven by auto and manufacturing with 
exports to the United States, its largest trading partner. Increasingly, however, Canada‟s 
economy is driven by energy and resources with exports to China and other non-American 
economies. Furthermore, Canada is doubling its visa offices in China in order to boost its 
economy by increasing Chinese tourists, students, and immigrants.
45
 With China as the world‟s 
largest spender in international tourism and the fastest-growing source of international students, 
                                                                                                                                                             
37
 “Search Criteria „Chinese‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
38
 “Search Criteria „Greek‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
39
 “Search Criteria „Hebrew‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
40
 “Search Criteria „Inuktitut‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
41
 “Search Criteria „Japanese‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
42
 “Search Criteria „Korean‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
43
 “Search Criteria „Russian‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
44
 “Search Criteria „Sanskrit‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
45
 Susana Mas, “Canada seeks to double visa offices in China to attract more high-skilled workers”, CBC News (10 
August 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-visa-offices-foreign-workers-1.3714991>. 
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Canada is looking to attract a larger share of the $102 billion that 83 million Chinese tourists 
spent in 2012 and to double the $8 billion that international students spent in 2010 by 2022.
46
 
And just as China was convinced in 1978 that it needed to offer COCA-COLA if it wanted to 
attract Western tourists,
47
 the West realizes now that it needs Chinese brands to attract Chinese 
consumers. Although brand extension
48
 or cross-branding
49
 in order to access new untapped 
markets is nothing new, what is new in the 21
st
 Century is for Western businesses to try the same 
with Chinese brands:
50
 
 In 1998, Torstar Corporation acquired an interest in Sing Tao. Canada‟s largest 
daily newspaper targeted the advertising dollars to be made from the Chinese 
readers. 
 In 2008, The Coca-Cola Company bid unsuccessfully to buy HuiYuan for $2.4 
billion American. The world‟s most valuable brand coveted China‟s leading pure 
juice brand. 
 In 2008, Hermès created Shang Xia. The French luxury brand hoped to pursue the 
fastest-growing group of billionaires and millionaires in the world. 
 In 2009, Loblaws bought T&T Supermarket for $225 million Canadian. Canada‟s 
largest grocery chain looked to expand into the country‟s fastest-growing market. 
                                                 
46
 Canada, Minister of International Trade, International Education: A Key Driver of Canada’s Future Prosperity 
(Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2012) at 4, online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/education/report-rapport/strategy-strategie/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>. 
47
 “Celebrating 35 Years”, supra note 26. The historic agreement signed with the Chinese government on December 
13, 1978 permitted The Coca-Cola Company to sell its products only to tourists in international hotels and foreign 
stores, but not to the local Chinese. 
48
 Brand extension is using the same trademark with new goods or services: The Coca-Cola Company decided to 
add health drinks to its carbonated sodas, Ikea expanded from selling home decorations to making prefabricated 
houses, and Oprah went from hosting a television talk show to publishing a lifestyle magazine. 
49
 Cross-branding is combining two trademarks: Dell uses INTEL chips in its computers, McDonald‟s includes 
DISNEY toys with its meals, and KFC sells PEPSI drinks in its combos. 
50
 It is possible that there was brand extension and cross-branding in Asia before the 21
st
 Century, and that the trend 
is spreading to the West only now. After all, cosmopolitan cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong have long had 
Chinese speakers mingling alongside English speakers. 
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 In 2010, AT&T collaborated on film projects with Wong Fu Productions. The 
American telecommunications giant aimed for the film company‟s then 2 million 
YouTube subscribers. 
 In 2011, the New York Knicks acquired Jeremy Lin. The move later led to sold-
out game tickets, increased merchandise sales, and higher stock prices due to the 
“Linsanity” effect. Since then, Jeremy Lin has gone on to file trademark 
applications for JLIN, JEREMY LIN, and LINSANITY in English and their 
Chinese equivalents. 
 In 2012, Heineken bought the Tiger beer brand for €4.7 billion. The Dutch 
brewing company paid top dollar for the Singaporean local beer because it 
believed there would be high returns on a premium Chinese market expected to 
grow by 12% annually through 2020. 
 In 2013, L‟Oréal bought Magic Holdings for $6.54 billion Hong Kong. The 
world‟s largest cosmetic company also paid handsomely for the Chinese beauty 
brand with double-digit annual growth. 
 In 2014, Canada Post partnered with China Post. The Canadian government learnt 
from the Royal Canadian Mint‟s success in marketing coins and stamps with 
auspicious Chinese words and zodiacs. 
 In 2015, Dentons merged with Dacheng. The merger established the world‟s 
largest law firm, with more than 6,500 lawyers in more than 50 countries. 
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1.3 The Problem is Widespread Internationally 
Although this chapter compares trademark registrations in Canada, it is important to 
remember that this is only one example to illustrate the administrative challenge of classifying 
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. The problem is just as widespread 
internationally, as illustrated by both Western and Asian countries with official languages that 
are only Romanized (the United States), both Romanized and not Romanized (the European 
Union and Singapore), and only not Romanized (China). 
The United States has only one official language: English. Similar to Canada, it also 
restricts word marks to the standard characters of letters, numerals, punctuation or diacritical 
marks.
51
 And just like Canada, the American database also requires translation and 
transliteration
52
 for foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, but neither specifies that the 
transliteration be based on international standards for consistency nor uses the transliteration as 
index headings for filing/searching.
53
  
                                                 
51
 Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 CFR §2.52 ((a) Standard character (typed) drawing –“Applicants 
who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular font style, 
size, or color must submit a standard character drawing that shows the mark in black on a white background. An 
applicant may submit a standard character drawing if: 
(1) The applicant includes a statement that the mark is in standard characters and no claim is made to any particular 
font style, size, or color; 
(2) The mark does not include a design element; 
(3) All letters and words in the mark are depicted in Latin characters; 
(4) All numbers in the mark are depicted in Roman or Arabic numerals; and 
(5) The marks includes only common punctuation or diacritical marks.”). 
52
 The Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed, sub verbo “Translation: The process of translating words or text from one 
language into another.” Transliteration is a specific type of translation, in that a transliteration is a phonetic 
translation based on sounds (instead of based on meaning). This dissertation will use the general term “translation” 
unless referring specifically to transliterations. 
53
 Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 CFR §2.32 (Requirements for a complete trademark or service 
mark application – (a) The application must be in English and include the following: … 
(8) If the mark is not in standard characters, a description of the mark; 
(9) If the mark includes non-English wording, an English translation of that wording; and  
(10) If the mark includes non-Latin characters, a transliteration of those characters; and either a translation of the 
transliterated term in English, or a statement that the transliterated term has no meaning in English.”). 
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The European Union currently represents 28 member countries
54
 and has 24 official 
languages.
55
 There are fewer languages because some member countries share the same official 
languages. Similar to Canada and the United States, the European Union also restricts word 
marks to trademarks consisting of letters, numerals, keyboard signs and punctuation marks in 
any official European Union language.
56
 And just like Canada and the United States, the 
European database also differentiates between words and designs in their protection.
57
 However, 
its ability to classify word marks in its official languages of Bulgarian and Greek (which are not 
Romanized) has not stopped it from classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized 
as design marks. This inequality has a simple explanation: the European Union can classify 
trademarks in non-Romanized languages properly as word marks only if the non-Romanized 
language is an official language, as only then would it already have examiners who can read and 
write the language.  
                                                 
54
 “Member countries of the EU”, European Union (7 June 2016), online:  
<https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en>. The 28 member countries are Austria 1995, Belgium 
1958, Bulgaria 2007, Croatia 2013, Cyprus 2004, Czech Republic 2004, Denmark 1973, Estonia 2004, Finland 1995, 
France 1958, Germany 1958, Greece 1981, Hungary 2004, Ireland 1973, Italy 1958, Latvia 2004, Lithuania 2004, 
Luxembourg 1958, Malta 2004, Netherlands 1958, Poland 2004, Portugal 1986, Romania 2007, Slovakia 2004, 
Slovenia 2004, Spain 1986, Sweden 1995, and the United Kingdom 1973. 
55
 “Official EU Languages”, European Commission (7 June 2016), online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/officiallanguages/index_en.htm>. The 24 official languages are 
Bulgarian 2007, Croatian 2013, Czech 2004, Danish 1973, Dutch 1958, English 1973, Estonian 2004, Finnish 1995, 
French 1958, German 1958, Greek 1981, Hungarian 2004, Irish 2007, Italian 1958, Latvian 2004, Lithuanian 2004, 
Maltese 2004, Polish 2004, Portuguese 1986, Romanian 2007, Slovak 2004, Slovenian 2004, Spanish 1986, and 
Swedish 1995. 
56
 Decision No EX-13-5 of the President of the Office of 4 December 2013 adopting the Guidelines for Examination 
in the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) on Community Trade Marks and 
on Registered Community Designs at para 9.1 (“A word mark is a typewritten mark with elements including letters 
(either lowercase or uppercase), words (either in lowercase or uppercase letters), numerals, keyboard signs or 
punctuation marks written across a single line. The Office accepts the alphabet from any official EU language as a 
word mark.”). 
57
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 
on the Community trade mark, Article 1, Rule 3(1) (“If the applicant does not wish to claim any special graphic 
feature or colour, the mark shall be reproduced in normal script, as for example, by typing the letters, numerals and 
signs in the application. The use of small letters and capital letters shall be permitted and shall be followed 
accordingly in publications of the mark and in the registration by the Office.”). 
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Singapore is similar to the European Union in that it has 4 official languages: Chinese, 
English, Malay and Tamil. The reason why Singapore can classify trademarks in Chinese and 
Tamil properly is the same as why the European Union can classify trademarks in Bulgarian and 
Greek as word marks: they already have examiners who understand those official languages, and 
their trademark databases are designed to accept those linguistic inputs. However, the 
Singaporean database will not accept inputs in Bulgarian or Greek any more than the European 
database will accept inputs in Chinese or Tamil. 
China is similar to the United States in that it has only one official language: Chinese. 
However, its special characteristic as a country with an official language that is not Romanized 
has not resulted in it classifying foreign-language marks that are Romanized as design marks. So 
why is it that China can classify English-language marks properly while the Western databases 
above cannot reciprocate by classifying Chinese-language marks in the same manner? This 
inequality has a simple explanation: a Chinese speaker who does not understand English only 
needs to learn the 26 letters of the alphabet in order to file/search for such marks. However, it is 
not as easy for Westerners who do not understand Chinese. The Chinese language breaks each 
Chinese character down into components made up of radicals and strokes. For example, a search 
for C-O-C-A C-O-L-A requires learning a simple alphabet system, but a search for a Chinese 
character requires learning a complicated radical and stroke system. The pictures
58
 below 
illustrate the strokes for the second character (which only has one component, as the character 
itself is a radical) in 可 口 可 樂: 
                                                 
58
 Michael Hurwitz, “Top 9 Funniest Chinese Homophones”, YoYo Chinese Taught in Plain English (4 May, 2015), 
online: <http://www.yoyochinese.com/blog/Top-9-Funniest-Chinese-Homophones-0>. 
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Suffice it to say, China‟s ability to classify foreign-language marks that are Romanized 
does not help it with respect to foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. This means that 
China has the same administrative challenges as the Singaporean database has with Bulgarian or 
Greek, and as the European database has with Tamil. 
It is clear from this chapter that the trademark registrations in Canada for COCA-COLA 
and its Chinese equivalent illustrate an administrative challenge of classifying foreign-language 
marks that affect all countries with respect to all non-Romanized languages. 
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2 ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION 
 
This chapter explains why the problem of classifying foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks. Although the solution 
is illustrated through the specific example of trademark registrations in Canada for COCA-
COLA and its Chinese equivalent, the general principle can be applied in other countries and to 
other non-Romanized languages. 
 
2.1 The Solution of Transcribing Foreign-Language Marks that are not Romanized 
The Canadian Trademarks Database can easily classify foreign-language marks as word 
marks where appropriate. All it has to do is transcribe foreign-language marks that are not 
Romanized, and use what is transcribed to file/search for them in the same manner as English-
language marks. Transcribing foreign-language marks that are not Romanized can be done by 
using the official phonetic system provided by the International Organization for 
Standardization.
59
 For example, the official phonetic system adopted in 1982 for transcribing 
Chinese would Romanize 可 口 可 樂 as KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4. Even though an English speaker 
still cannot understand or pronounce the word mark, at least the person can now read and write 
the letters and numerals in order to file/search for the word mark.  
The section below will replicate three selected portions of the trademark registrations in 
order to illustrate how this is all that the public needs in order to find out whether or not a 
trademark is claimed already, by whom, since when, in association with what goods and services, 
                                                 
59
 “Standards Catalogue, 01.140.10: Writing and Transliteration”, International Organization for Standardization 
(undated), online:  
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_ics_browse.htm?ICS1=1&ICS2=140&ICS3=10>. 
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etc., in order to assess whether what they plan to do may be legally objectionable and, if so, what 
alternative trademarks can be claimed instead. 
 
2.2 The Solution as Illustrated by the Foreign-Language Marks for COCA-COLA 
 The first thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of 
resemblance in appearance. The chart below shows how the trademark application in 1932 for 
COCA-COLA already had the standard font, whereas the trademark application in 1975 for its 
Chinese equivalent still failed to exemplify any such requirement. While this does not matter 
when comparing COCA-COLA to its Chinese equivalent, it makes an important difference when 
comparing two Chinese-language marks. Someone who does not understand Chinese can still 
compare two Chinese-language marks for appearance in the same way he would have compared 
two drawings of Disney‟s signature, but only if the comparisons were based on the same script 
and font. 
 It is understandable that lawyers with little exposure to foreign languages might be 
unaware that cellphones and computers can provide a standard font for the foreign characters. 
The technology to do so already exists even with cellphones and computers that only have 
English-language keyboards with QWERTY layouts. It is also reasonable for traders with little 
understanding of the law to fail to realize the negative ramifications of registering a hand 
scribble on a paper scrap. The Canadian database, however, can resolve this solicitor-client 
miscommunication by requiring that foreign-language marks that are not Romanized be provided 
in a standard font. 
In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company is becoming savvier, as its two latest trademark 
applications in 2013 for additional Chinese-language marks have evolved from hand scribbles to 
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standard fonts. The Canadian database, however, continues to classify them automatically as 
design marks.  
TRADE MARK (Word): 
COCA-COLA 
TRADE MARK (Design): 
 
 
The above is replicated and amended below in 
order to match the standard font used for 
English-language marks, such COCA-COLA 
on the left. This amendment will make it easier 
to compare for any resemblance in appearance. 
 
TRADE MARK (Word): 
可 口 可 乐  
 
 
 The second thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of 
resemblance in sound. The chart below shows how the trademark application for COCA-COLA 
already had index headings to “identify all word components of the trademark”,60 which enabled 
English-language marks to be filed/searched for alphabetically; whereas, the trademark 
application for its Chinese equivalent only had the descriptive reference of “CHINESE 
CHARACTER DESIGN”, which was how Chinese-language marks were filed and why 
searching for them were difficult.  
 Kaley Cuoco is an American actress who is popular with Asian fans. She had the Chinese 
word for “faith” tattooed on her lower back. Imagine that she also decides to adopt a Chinese 
name and to register it as a trademark for merchandise licensing. If she were to follow the 
Chinese tradition of having the surname precede the given name, she would look for the Chinese 
                                                 
60
 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Searchable Fields – Index Headings” (Ottawa: Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development Canada, 16 December 2015), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03106.html#ind>. 
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equivalent of CUOCO KALEY. One possibility is 口 口 可 樂, which sounds similar to the 
English given its pronunciation of KOU3 KOU3 KE3 LE4. But how can this actress and her 
lawyer exercise due diligence to avoid confusion with other trademarks when all Chinese-
language marks are given the unhelpful descriptive reference of “CHINESE CHARACTER 
DESIGN”? It would be better if Chinese-language marks were indexed based on the official 
phonetic system. Then a search for KOU3 KOU3 KE3 LE4 would bring up the similar-sounding 
KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4, which would alert this actress to the existence of the Chinese-language 
marks for COCA-COLA. 
 The reason for the numerals is that the Chinese language is spoken usually with four 
standard tones: flat –, rising /, dipping \/, and falling \ (and there could be additional tones for 
some dialects). Since the Canadian database is not set up to depict this, the four standard tones 
can also be transcribed into numerals: 1, 2, 3, and 4. While non-Chinese speakers cannot 
differentiate the tones, just as non-English speakers cannot hear the nuances between the names 
JON, JONE/JOAN, or JOANNE, the multiple tones are significant because they result in giving 
one sound multiple meanings. For example, KOU1 means “to dig”, KOU2 does not refer to any 
character and has no meaning, KOU3 refers to the second character in 可 口 可 樂 and means 
“mouth”, and KOU4 means “to knock”. It is recommended to transcribe both the sounds and the 
tones in order to provide as much information as possible in order to compare trademarks for 
their resemblance in sound. And it is recommended to require audio files for all foreign-language 
marks in order to make the database as useful as possible. On the other hand, Canada might 
decide that there is no need for too many details at the administrative level, as there will always 
be an opportunity for opposing counsel and linguistic experts to provide detailed evidence if and 
when there are opposition, expungement, or infringement proceedings. 
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In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company‟s two latest trademark applications in 2013 have 
evolved to the more helpful descriptive references of “PULPY ORANGE in Chinese” and 
“MINUTE MAID in Chinese”. The good news is that the applications provided the transcribed 
sounds, but the bad news is that the Canadian database still filed them under their translations 
instead. Although it is understandable for the Canadian database to rely on the English 
translations because they are more meaningful to an English speaker, such reliance is unwise 
given that the English translations can be arbitrary and manipulated in order to avoid detection of 
confusion. It would be more helpful to file/search for Chinese-language marks based on their 
unique and immutable sounds instead of their multiple and variable translations. This is because 
using the official phonetic system will result in consistent searches to catch confusing trademarks. 
However, it is important to remember that the transcribed sounds are only being used as index 
headings and that they are not being registered. Therefore, a trademark registration for 可 口 可 
樂  is not the same thing as a trademark registration for KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4, even if a 
trademark application for the former includes the latter for informational purposes. 
TRADE MARK (Word): 
COCA-COLA 
TRADE MARK (Design): 
 
 
INDEX HEADINGS: 
COCA-COLA 
MARK DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCE: 
CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN 
 
 
The above is replicated and amended below in 
order to match the alphabetization used for 
English-language marks, such as COCA-
COLA on the left. This amendment will make 
it easier to compare for any resemblance in 
sound.  
 
INDEX HEADINGS: 
KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4 
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 The third thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of 
resemblance in the ideas suggested by them. The chart below shows how the meaning of COCA-
COLA is understood inherently, whereas its Chinese equivalent needs to be translated. The 
problem is that translations can vary, which means the resulting comparisons can differ. 
 If Kaley Cuoco were to translate her Chinese name 口 口 可 樂 literally as “mouth mouth 
possible happy”, then it would obviously resemble Coca-Cola‟s literal translation for 可 口 可 樂 
as “possible mouth possible happy”. This would be like finding a resemblance between JON and 
JOHN as male names. Alternatively, if she were to translate it instead colloquially as “happiness 
with every word” in reference to her bubbly personality as a comedian, then it would have less 
resemblance to the soda‟s meaning of “delicious happiness”. This would be akin to 
differentiating between JONATHAN and JACK, which a non-English speaker would not know 
culturally refers to JON and JOHN respectively. Finally, she could argue there is no resemblance 
in the meanings whatsoever by pointing out that her Chinese-language mark translates as 
CUOCO KALEY while the other is the standard translation for COCA-COLA. The same 
argument can be made that there is no resemblance between JON and JOHN, as the former has 
the standard meaning of “God has given or a gift from God”, whereas the latter means “God is 
gracious” or is slang for “a toilet or a prostitute‟s client”.61 
It is recommended to provide both the literal translation of each character and the adopted 
translation of the combined characters in order to provide as much information as possible in 
order to compare trademarks for their resemblance in the ideas suggested by them. And it is 
                                                 
61
 Although this argument seems unlikely in the abstract – but may be more likely depending on the nature of goods 
or services with which the marks are associated – the point is that Chinese names can give rise to various literal, 
colloquial, or cultural meanings in the same manner as English names can. 
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recommended to require the simplified script if the trademark uses traditional script (or vice 
versa) in order to make the database as useful as possible. On the other hand, Canada might 
decide that there is no need to detail the adopted translation at the administrative level if 
translations can be arbitrary and manipulated in order to avoid detection of confusion.
62
 This 
would be a mistake because the trademark application stage provides a better opportunity to 
obtain direct and honest translations than during the opposition, expungement, or infringement 
proceedings.  
 In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company‟s applications for “PULPY ORANGE in 
Chinese” and “MINUTE MAID in Chinese” have improved by providing both literal and 
adopted translations. These translations are relied upon to decide issues such as distinctiveness
63
 
and confusion
64
 when assessing trademark registrability. However, such reliance is useless if the 
Chinese font and the English translations can be arbitrary and manipulated. Requiring trademark 
applicants to provide the literal translation of each character, the adopted translation of the 
combined characters, as well as the simplified script if the trademark uses traditional script (or 
vice versa) will help when it comes to considering the degree of resemblance between the 
trademarks in the ideas suggested by them. 
 
                                                 
62
 Vaver, supra note 21 at 678 (“The courts have meanwhile told the TMO not to waste time initially by examining 
applications too closely anyway.”) And see Canadian Parking Equipment Ltd v Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks) 
(1990), 34 CPR (3d) 154 at 160-161 (FCTD). 
63
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 2 (Interpretation – “distinctive, in relation to a trade-mark, means a trade-
mark that actually distinguishes the goods or services in association with which it is used by its owner from the 
goods or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them; … trade-mark means (a) a mark that is used by a 
person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish goods or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or 
performed by him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by others, …”). Readers who are 
unimpressed with this definition of “distinctive” can rest assured that Chapters 5 and 7 will shed more light through 
their respective discussions on “Assessing for Distinctiveness” and  the “Distinctiveness of Trademarks”. 
64
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 6(1) (When mark or name confusing – “(1) For the purposes of this Act, a 
trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first mentioned trade-
mark or trade-name would cause confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and 
circumstances described in this section.”). 
 27 
 
TRADE MARK (Word): 
COCA-COLA 
TRADE MARK (Design): 
 
 
INDEX HEADINGS: 
COCA-COLA 
MARK DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCE: 
CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN 
 
N/A 
 
FOREIGN CHARACTER TRANSLATION: 
The translation of the Chinese characters is the 
English words Possible Mouth Possible Happy.  
 
 
The above is replicated and amended below in 
order to match the meanings inherently 
understood for English-language marks, such 
as COCA-COLA on the left. This amendment 
will make it easier to compare for any 
resemblance in the ideas suggested by them.  
 
FOREIGN CHARACTER TRANSLATION: 
The literal translation of the first Chinese 
character 可 is “possible”. 
The literal translation of the second Chinese 
character 口 is “mouth”. 
The literal translation of the third Chinese 
character 可 is “possible”. 
The literal translation of the fourth Chinese 
character 乐 is “happy”.  
 
The adopted translation of the combined 
Chinese characters is “COCA-COLA”. 
 
The trademark uses simplified script, which can 
also be written in traditional script: 可 口 可 樂. 
 
 
It is clear from this chapter that the Canadian database can be improved in order 
to assist in comparing trademarks for the degree of resemblance in their appearance, 
sound, or in the ideas suggested by them. This improvement is essential to any database‟s 
searchability “by the public and, in particular traders, for the purpose of obtaining 
relevant information about the rights of the trade mark registered proprietors, as well as 
by the competent authority (the Registrar of trade marks) for the purpose of fulfilling its 
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duty of examining trade mark applications. It is very important that an inspection of the 
register, without more, will reveal to the public and to the competent authority 
immediately the precise subject-matter of protection afforded by the registered mark to its 
proprietor.”65  
  
                                                 
65
 NG-LOY Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual Property of Singapore (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2008) at para 
[21.1.9] [NG-LOY]. 
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3 ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES 
 
This chapter explains several alternatives to the problem of classifying foreign-language 
marks that are not Romanized. Each alternative is explored and its challenges are explained in 
order to reinforce why the problem is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks. 
 
3.1 Classify as Design Marks Because not in an Official Language 
 The first alternative is to differentiate between official languages and foreign languages. 
This will enable the Canadian database to classify COCA-COLA as a word mark while 
classifying its Chinese equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark. 
 One challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts itself by first 
classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized as design marks, and then requiring 
translations and transliterations for them as if they were word marks with meanings and to be 
pronounced.
66
 The Canadian database needs to make up its mind whether foreign-language 
marks that are not Romanized are inarticulate designs, or whether such marks are meaningful 
words to be read and sounded out. Resolving this contradiction is important because the 
Canadian database should benefit all members of the public, and not just those with the means to 
use it. The current contradiction adversely affects ordinary individuals, small businesses, as well 
                                                 
66
 Trade-marks Regulations, SOR/96-195, s 29 (“The Registrar may require an applicant for the registration of a 
trade-mark to furnish to the Registrar, as applicable (a) a translation into English or French of any words in any 
other language contained in the trademark, (b) where the trademark contains matter expressed in characters other 
than Latin characters or in numerals other than Arabic or Roman numerals, a transliteration of the matter in Latin 
characters and Arabic numerals, and (c) a specimen of the trademark as used.”). 
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as more than 170,000 charities and non-profit organizations currently operating in Canada.
67
 This 
voluntary sector is such a major contributor to Canada‟s economic activity that it employs almost 
as many full-time workers as Canada‟s entire manufacturing industry and, when measured as a 
share of the economically active population, it is the second largest in the world after the 
Netherlands.
68
 These organizations are traders just as much as for-profit businesses. Gone are the 
days of $1 bake sales or $20 donation requests. Instead, these organizations fund their activities 
nowadays by licensing their trademarks. Unfortunately, many of these organizations cannot 
afford the additional costs of protecting their trademarks in a foreign language. Even 
organizations that are generously funded have difficulty justifying such legal expenses to their 
donors because it means fewer dollars for their core activities. It is more palatable to the donors 
if an organization can show that it minimized the costs by conducting free searches for direct hits 
to eliminate as many trademark variations as possible before ordering paid searches for 
trademarks that are likely available for registration. Donors are more accepting of paid searches 
for trademarks that are filed because it is the industry standard to use searches to prove due 
diligence in the future event of trademark oppositions. In this regard, resolving this contradiction 
                                                 
67
 “Pre-Budget Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance – Budget 2015”, The Calgary Chamber of 
Voluntary Organizations (6 August 2014) at 1, online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/412/FINA/WebDoc/WD6615327/412_FINA_PBC2014_Briefs/C
algaryChamberOfVoluntaryOrganizations-e.pdf>. These include organizations that raise funds and awareness for 
culture and recreation (media and communications, art and architecture, historical and literary societies, museums, 
zoos and aquariums, sports, recreation and social clubs, etc.); education and research (vocational/technical schools, 
adult/continuing education, etc.); health (hospitals, nursing homes, mental health treatment, etc.); social services 
(income support and emergency relief for the handicapped, children, seniors, etc.); environment (pollution 
abatement, natural resources conservation, animal protection, etc.); development and housing (community and 
neighbourhood organizations, job training programs, etc.); law, advocacy and politics (civil rights associations, 
victim support, consumer protection associations, etc.); philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion 
(corporate foundations, lotteries, etc.); international (cultural programs, disaster relief, human rights, etc.); religion 
(churches, monasteries, mosques, seminaries, shrines, synagogues, temples, etc.); as well as business and 
professional associations such as unions, according to Statistics Canada, “The International Classification of Non-
profit Organizations” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 27 November 2015), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-
015-x/2009000/sect13-eng.htm>. 
68
 Michael Hall et al, The Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: Imagine 
Canada, 2005) at 7-9. 
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matters to charities and non-profit organizations trying to meet the “heavy burden upon [their] 
directors to ensure that all assets of the organization are properly identified, protected and 
applied in fulfilment of the organization‟s objects, particularly if it is a charity. The assets of an 
organization in this regard include the organization‟s intellectual property.”69 Examples include 
the registrations of Chinese-language marks in Canada by an American charity responsible for 
Chinese orphanages (Half The Sky Foundation) and by the largest Taiwanese humanitarian 
organization (Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation). Canada‟s own Yee Hong 
Centre for Geriatric Care must protect its marks from those trying to profit unfairly from the 
stellar government review it receives annually for its nursing homes, the long list of seniors 
waiting for its residences, and the large Dragon Ball fundraiser it hosts annually in Toronto.
70
 
Another challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts the 
recent development in the case law that recognizes foreign-language marks as meaningful words 
instead of as inarticulate designs. Can a database classify a foreign-language mark as a design 
mark when assessing for registrability, only to have a court later treat the foreign-language mark 
as word mark when assessing for infringement (to be discussed in Part B)? Since both the 
administrative and judicial findings are based on common issues such as distinctiveness and 
confusion, how can they treat the same foreign-language mark inconsistently? Surely it would 
not do to have an administrative assessment of distinctiveness for a “design mark” contradicted 
by a judicial assessment of non-distinctiveness for a “word mark”. This contradiction is even 
more serious in common law countries that usually have a first-to-use system for recognizing 
trademark rights. First, it will be harder for a registered foreign-language mark to establish 
confusion with, and freeze the geographical boundaries and association rights of, an unregistered 
                                                 
69
 Terrance Carter & Shen Goh, Branding and Copyright for Charities and Non-Profit Organizations, 2nd ed 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2014) at 5. 
70
 Yee Hong Centre for Geriatric Care v Grace Christian Chapel, 2006 FC 650, 50 CPR (4th) 165 [Yee Hong]. 
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foreign-language mark. The registered mark‟s classification as an inarticulate design means that 
a competitor may use a different design mark from the one registered and so not infringe the 
trader‟s rights – or at least have a better argument that he is not infringing those rights than in the 
comparable case of the use of a word mark. Conversely, it will be easier for an unregistered 
foreign-language mark to establish similarity to, and claim prior use over, a registered foreign-
language mark. The registered mark will no longer have the certainty of national protection, as 
its risk of being limited by the prior use of the unregistered mark increases when the latter is 
recognized as meaningful words.  
 
3.2 Classify as Design Marks Because not in a Romanized Language 
 The second alternative is to differentiate between foreign languages that are Romanized 
versus those that are not. This will enable the Canadian database to classify COCA-COLA in 
Romanized languages such as German and Spanish as a word mark while classifying its Chinese 
equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark. 
The challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts international 
trade principles. International trade law aims to remove protectionist practices (quotas, tariffs, 
subsidies, anti-dumping legislation, administrative barriers, etc.) in order to provide a level 
playing-field for both local and foreign goods and services. And this aim is accomplished also 
with international trade agreements that detail trademark registrability
71
 and rights.
72
 But this aim 
                                                 
71
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), (1994) 25 IIC 209, art. 15 
(Protectable Subject Matter – “1. Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark. Such 
signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of 
colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as trademarks. Where signs are not 
inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may make registrability depend on 
distinctiveness acquired through use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually 
perceptible.”) [TRIPS]. 
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is frustrated when the Canadian database permits and promotes differential treatment between 
languages that are Romanized versus those that are not, as it affects the registrability and rights 
of foreign-language marks. 
First, the most-favoured nation principle requires that “[w]ith regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the 
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nations 
of all other Members.”73  This principle prohibits a country from discriminating between its 
trading partners by requiring it to extend automatically whatever privilege it grants one trading 
party to all other parties without their having to negotiate for the privilege. The scenarios below 
seem to violate this principle by classifying intellectual property from China less favourably than 
intellectual property from the United States. This not only makes it difficult for international 
businesses to manage their trademark portfolio globally, but also makes it difficult for them to 
acquire foreign brands. Imagine that The Coca-Cola Company had succeeded in its attempt to 
buy China‟s largest juice brand for $2.4 billion in 2008. The differential treatment that COCA-
COLA‟s Chinese translation had suffered would have been repeated with the Chinese brand 
hypothetically acquired, since Chinese-language marks are classified automatically as design 
marks while English-language marks are recognized as word marks, with the improved legal 
protection that registration as a word mark brings over a design mark registration. 
                                                                                                                                                             
72
 TRIPS, supra note 71 at art. 16 (Rights Conferred – “1. The owner of a registered trademark shall have the 
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner‟s consent from using in the course of trade identical 
or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is 
registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for 
identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not 
prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the 
basis of use.”). 
73
 TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 4. This principle has similar wording in Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, as well as Article 2 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
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Second, the national treatment principle requires that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the 
national of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, …”74 This principle prohibits a country 
from discriminating against its trading partners by requiring it to extend automatically whatever 
privilege it grants domestic goods and services to those of its trading partners without their 
having to negotiate for the privilege. The scenarios below also seem to violate this principle by 
classifying intellectual property from China less favourably than intellectual property in the 
Canada. This creates a strange situation where an international business will find the same brand 
receiving different protection depending on its language. For example, there is a strange 
phenomenon in China where identical COCA-COLA products are sold side-by-side; one in 
Chinese and the other in English. The juxtaposition does not cannibalize sales, but actually 
creates a higher-paying clientele for “foreign” products in China. Although COCA-COLA 
products by their nature are foreign since they are American, they can be made even more 
foreign by being in English. The bizarre reason is that consumers are willing to pay a premium 
for a “foreign” experience in China, which has resulted in everything from a “rent-a-foreigner” 
business for birthday parties and commercial advertisements to a real estate bubble hyped by 
promises of being the next international city where one can live next to “foreigners”.75 This is 
fine in China, which classifies trademarks in Chinese and English equally, but the same 
phenomenon would be problematic in Canada. Imagine if The Coca-Cola Company were to label 
its drinks in different languages in Canada in order to promote its global image of community, 
for the same reason that its 1971 television commercial featured a multi-racial group singing “I‟d 
                                                 
74
 TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 3. This principle has similar wording in Article 3 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, as well as Article 17 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
75
 David Borenstein, “Chinese Dreamland”, CBC The Passionate Eye (16 July 2016), online:  
<http://www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/episodes/chinese-dreamland>. 
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Like To Teach The World To Sing” and its 2014 Super Bowl advertisement had a multi-lingual 
rendition of “America The Beautiful”. The Canadian database would classify COCA-COLA in 
Romanized languages such as German and Spanish as a word mark while classifying its Chinese 
equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark. 
And although Canada is still in the process of becoming a member,
76
 the United States, 
the European Union, Singapore, and China are already members of The Madrid Protocol: an 
international trademark system which allows a trademark registered in one member country to 
extend that registration to any or all of the other member countries. So imagine a trader‟s 
surprise when a trademark classified as a word mark in one member country is re-classified as a 
design mark in other member countries. For example, if The Coca-Cola Company were to 
register the English letters COCA-COLA in the United States and extend the registration to 
Canada, the same trademark is classified as a word mark in all countries. However, if The Coca-
Cola Company were to register the equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂 in China and 
extend that to Canada, the same trademark would be classified as a word mark by the Chinese 
database and re-classified as a design mark by the Canadian database. And if The Coca-Cola 
Company were to try to avoid this inconsistency by registering first with Canada and extending 
the registration to China, the trademark could end up equally limited by being classified as a 
design mark in all countries. This is because, even though the Chinese database can classify the 
Chinese translation properly as a word mark, it would not do to provide the Chinese registration 
with more protection than the Canadian registration upon which it is based. 
Some may argue that there are no inconsistencies with international trade principles 
because there is no differential treatment among countries, only languages; therefore, all 
                                                 
76
 “Members of the Madrid Union”, World Intellectual Property Organization (30 August 2016), online:  
<http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/members/>.  There are 97 members, covering 113 countries. 
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countries are treated equally with respect to those languages. This argument is overly simplistic 
in light of the fact that some languages are known to have specific national or ethnic (and, 
therefore, geographical) origins,
77
 and ignores the reality that indirect discrimination can have 
the same effect as direct discrimination.
78
 Some may argue that the believability of a country 
suing for language-based discriminatory trade practices is unfathomable when there is neither 
authoritative writing nor precedential cases to support this possibility. But who would have 
fathomed, much less believed, that Canada would find two Chinese trademarks to be distinctive 
in a 1992 decision, only to contradict itself in a 2011 decision by finding the same two Chinese 
trademarks to be confusing (to be discussed in Part B)? 
 
3.3 Classify as Word Marks by Transcribing Every Dialect 
The third alternative is to transcribe a Chinese-language mark into every dialect, instead 
of basing the transcribing only in Mandarin (which is what was done throughout this 
dissertation). This will promote equality by advocating cultural respect for and equal recognition 
of all classical and natural languages, including minority dialects. Although this alternative is 
illustrated through the specific example of Chinese dialects, the general principle can be applied 
to other foreign languages such as Punjabi, which is written usually in one script by Muslims and 
another script by Sikhs and Hindus.  
                                                 
77
 Both the highest courts of the United States and of Canada have linked language to prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in Lau v Nichols, 414 US 563 (1974) and Forget v AG Quebec, [1988] 
2 SCR 90 respectively. And see how language is linked to race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, 
ethnic origin in Welen v Gladmer Developments Ltd, 11 CHRR D/348 (Sask 1990); Gajecki v 
Surrey School District, 11 CHRR D/326 (BC 1990); Cornejo v Opus Building Corp, 14 CHRR 
D/167 (BC 1991); and Grewal v Fletcher Challenge Canada Ltd, 14 CHRR D/161 (BC 1991). 
And see Scassa, supra note 271. 
78
 Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) v Simpson Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 1985 CanLII 18. 
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The challenge with transcribing the Chinese language into every dialect is that it is 
unnecessary and impractical to do so. Unnecessary because none of the Chinese databases in 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan currently distinguish between dialects, so why must 
the Canadian database? Impractical because the purpose of transcribing foreign-language marks 
that are not Romanized in the first place is to assist in filing/searching for them. Transcribing in 
different dialects makes it impossible to find the actual Chinese characters that are the subject 
matter of the registration. For example, searching the Canadian database for HO2 HAU2 HO2 
LOK6 (based on the Cantonese dialect) will not produce the trademark registration for 可 口 可 
樂 that is filed under KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4 (based on Mandarin). Once a search for KE3 KOU3 
KE3 LE4 produces the trademark registration for 可 口 可 樂, the interested parties can explain 
through evidence to the examiner that this trademark is actually being used in a different dialect, 
which results in a different pronunciation and meaning unique to that dialect. The reality is that 
something needs to be the standard and Mandarin is an official language in Singapore, as well as 
the sole official language of Taiwan and China (to which Hong Kong was repatriated).
79
 All this 
makes it the most common language in the world, with twice the number of speakers of the 
second most common language (Spanish), and almost three times the number of speakers of the 
third most common language (English).
80
 It naturally make sense for the Canadian database to 
use Mandarin, as Canadian diplomats are already learning Mandarin on account of its being one 
of the six official languages of the United Nations.  
                                                 
79
 After Hong Kong was colonized by the United Kingdom in 1842, it had no official language laws and English was 
the sole language used in the colonial government. It was not until the 1974 Official Languages Ordinance that the 
colonial government recognized English and Chinese as official languages, which finally enabled the people of 
Hong Kong to access government communications and court proceedings in a language they understood. However, 
this recognition was not of a specific dialect, but of “the Chinese language” in general. This meant that Cantonese 
became a de facto official language because it was the most popular dialect in Hong Kong, but it also means that 
Cantonese may be replaced with Mandarin due to Hong Kong‟s repatriation to China. 
80
 “People and Society: WORLD”, Central Intelligence Agency (undated), online: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html>. 
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The third alternative can also be rephrased from the aspect of transcribing the Chinese 
language into every phonetic system, instead of basing the transcribing only in the PinYin 
phonetic system (which is what was done throughout this dissertation). So why did the 
International Organization for Standardization choose Mandarin and adopt PinYin as the official 
phonetic system in 1982 for transcribing Chinese?  
The challenge with transcribing the Chinese language into every phonetic system can be 
illustrated with just one example. Taiwan uses a phonetic system called ZhuYin, which sounds 
out Chinese characters by using another set of 37 linguistic symbols. This phonetic system 
deciphers 可 口 可 樂 as “ㄎㄜˇㄎㄡˇㄎ is ㄜˇㄌㄜˋ”. This would be akin to sounding out 
English words by using another set of linguistic symbols. For example, the dictionary deciphers 
COCA-COLA as “kəʊkəˈkəʊlə”. 81  Suffice it to say, this phonetic system is unhelpful to 
someone who is unfamiliar with the language. This is why PinYin is more helpful, as its phonetic 
system is Romanized. And although there were other phonetic systems that were Romanized, 
PinYin became the most popular one. But why didn‟t the International Organization for 
Standardization choose alternative phonetic systems that are even more helpful than PinYin? 
Consider the alternative of designing a trademark database that recognizes most 
languages in the world by using The Unicode Standard.
82
 Unicode is the official system for 
implementing the International Organization of Standardization‟s encoding of languages.83 It 
assigns a specific number to every character, which can be used for all languages available in 
computer programs, operating systems, modern browsers, etc. This is why Microsoft‟s word 
processing software already has capabilities for reading and writing most languages in the world. 
                                                 
81
 The Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed, sub verbo “Coca-Cola”. 
82
 “About the Unicode® Standard: Characters for the World”, The Unicode Consortium (8 March, 2017), online:  
<http://www.unicode.org/standard/standard.html>. 
83
 “Standards Catalogue, 35.040.10: Coding of character sets”, International Organization for Standardization 
(undated), online: <https://www.iso.org/ics/35.040.10/x/>. 
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Unicode would decipher 可 口 可 樂 as a set of numbers, in the same manner that it deciphers 
COCA-COLA as “0043-004F-0043-0041 (the hyphen is 002D) 0043-004F-004C-0041”. 84 
Although some might consider this the most comprehensive solution, which nears perfection 
when augmented by an audio filing system, this system is too technical for someone who is 
unfamiliar with “the language” of computer coding. In fact, this solution complicates matters by 
creating a two-step process that requires knowledge of the language used in the trademark and an 
understanding of computer coding. This would be as impractical as requiring someone to know 
not only the title of a book but also the numbers assigned to it under the Dewey Decimal 
Classification understood by librarians.
85
 The less-than-perfect PinYin phonetic system is still a 
better solution because it requires only the first step. 
 
3.4 Classify as Word Marks by Having Fluent Examiners 
The fourth alternative is to have a fluent examiner for every foreign language, instead of 
an English-speaking examiner who must rely on transcribing for non-Romanized languages. This 
will promote equality by advocating cultural respect for and equal recognition of all classical and 
natural languages. 
One challenge with this alternative is that having fluent examiners does not help the 
illiterate lawyers or illiterate traders trying to search the Canadian database.  
Another challenge with this alternative is that being fluent in a language is not the same 
thing as being qualified to translate the language. Instead of expecting examiners to be fluent or 
to act as translators, the burden should remain on trademark applicants to communicate the scope 
                                                 
84
 “Unicode® character table”, The Unicode Consortium (undated), online:  
<https://unicode-table.com/en/#control-character>. 
85
 “Organize your materials with the world‟s most widely used library classification system”, Online Computer 
Library Centre (2017), online: <http://www.oclc.org/en/dewey.html>. 
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of their claims to the world. The reality is that we cannot assume what the translation for a 
foreign-language mark is supposed to be. In fact, we cannot even assume that a foreign-language 
mark is intended to be translated: 
“… there is abundant evidence that American manufacturers are themselves 
unaware of the linguistic issues involved. Chevrolet‟s South American fiasco with 
an automobile named NOVA (translated: “it will not go”) is a poignant example, 
as was Ford‟s problem with its PINTO in Brazil (translated: “tiny male genitals”). 
And one can only imagine what English speakers thought when they saw 
advertisements for Japan‟s KINKI Nippon Tourist Company, the Cypriot soft 
drink called ZIT, the Swedish toilet paper called KRAPP, the Finnish product for 
unfreezing car doors called SUPER PISS …”86 
 
The quote above illustrate that translations are independent of foreign-language marks. 
For example, COCA-COLA is a combination of two words with meanings. COCA referred to 
the leaf extracts which had the botanical term 古 柯 (GU3 KE1), while COLA originally referred 
to the bean extracts which had the botanical term 可 拉 (KE3 LA1) and later referred to any 
carbonated drink which had the equivalent term 汽 水 (QI4 SHUI3 means “air water”). But 
neither lackluster translation was adopted for the trademark. One reason was because The Coca-
Cola Company did not bother in 1927 to translate its trademark when it opened its first bottling 
plant in China.
87
 Another reason was because Chinese locals did not understand English and 
were translating the trademark into Chinese based on the sound (instead of the meaning) of 
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 Roger Shuy, Linguistic Battles in Trademark Disputes (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002) at 35-36 [Shuy]. 
And see Graeme Dinwoodie et al, eds, International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Newark, NJ: 
LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2008) at 115 [Dinwoodie, International IP]. 
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 Philip Mooney, “Bite the Wax Tadpole?”, The Coca-Cola Company (6 March 2008), online: <http://www.coca-
colaconversations.com/2008/03/bite-the-wax-ta.html> [“Bite the Wax Tadpole?”]. 
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COCA-COLA, which resulted in random Chinese meanings such as “female horse stuffed with 
wax” or “bite the wax tadpole”.88 Before such unflattering translations caught on or, even worse, 
before a desirable translation was claimed by a Chinese local, The Coca-Cola Company held an 
international competition in 1933 and awarded Professor Chiang Yee from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for the winning translation: 可 口 可 樂 
(KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4).
89
 The meaning of “possible mouth possible happy” is a branding dream 
because the specific combination of Chinese characters suggests that the product is “delicious 
happiness” or “happiness in the mouth”. Perhaps it was fortuitous that Chinese locals did not 
understand English, or they might have translated COCA-COLA literally, and the world would 
now be using the lacklustre translation of “coca – air water” instead of a creative translation. The 
catchy rhythm of this translation was an instant success that others would try to copy but never 
successfully duplicate. For example, the translation of PEPSI-COLA is 百 事 可 樂 (BAI3 SHI3 
KE3 LE4). The meaning “hundred things possible happy” suggests the consumer is “happy with 
everything”, but the translation lacks a reference to the taste and has no memorable sound 
repetition. The power of a catchy translation cannot be underestimated. 
 The reality that translations are independent of foreign-language marks becomes even 
more obvious when we consider the number of traders who continued to use the same translation 
even after changing their trademarks. PEPSI-COLA did not shorten its translation 百 事 可 樂 
(BAI3 SHI3 KE3 LE4) when shortening its name to PEPSI. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN 
translated only the first word in its name as 肯 德 基 (KEN3 DE2 JI1), and did not change the 
                                                 
88“Bite the Wax Tadpole?”, supra note 88. 
89
 Amcham Shainghai, “Coca-Cola in Chinese – A Perfect Translation”, INSIGHT The Voice of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (20 April, 2015), online: <http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/coca-cola-in-
chinese-a-perfect-translation/>. And see “Chiang Yee, A Chinese Artist in the English Lake District”, English Lakes 
Hotels Ltd (undated), online: <http://englishlakes.co.uk/chinese/chiang-yee/>. 
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translation when abbreviating its name to KFC. The reverse can also happen: MCDONALD‟S 
continued to use the same trademark even after changing its translations from 麥 當 勞 (MAI4 
DANG1 LAO2) to 金 供 门 (JIN1 GONG1 MEN2). The former translation was based on the 
sound of MCDONALD‟S, whereas the latter translation was based on the meaning of the 
“Golden Arches”. This is confusing and leave consumers wondering what translation should 
refer to the “Golden Arches” when the latter translation is referring instead to MCDONALD‟S. 
Even though translations are independent of foreign-language marks, a translation that 
catches on is priceless and likely to fall victim to trademark squatters. For example, VIAGRA 
became known in China as 偉 哥 (WEI3 GE1) after the public dubbed it so based on its sound 
(since VIAGRA has no meaning). The Chinese meaning of “great brother” is an ego boost. The 
fun-and-cheeky translation became widespread and was registered by a pharmaceutical company 
in China. Failing to cancel the registration in China, Pfizer had to settle for an alternative 
translation which nobody remembers. Canada‟s anticipated removal of use90 as a requirement to 
apply for trademark registration will open the door for the same type of trademark squatting to 
happen in Canada. This will increase the frequency with which traders need to oppose 
applications or cancel registrations for translations of their trademarks in Canada. Canadian 
traders looking to protect themselves can thank a recent development in the case law that 
recognizes foreign-language marks as meaningful words instead of as inarticulate designs, which 
will help them to prove the association between a translation and their trademarks (to be 
discussed in Part B). Time will tell whether this solution to trademark squatting will result in a 
problem with trademark monopoly: will traders rush to register any and all translations of their 
                                                 
90
 Bill C-31, supra note 28 (Sections 30 to 33 of the Act are replaced by the following: Requirements for 
applications – “30. (1) A person may file with the Registrar an application for the registration of a trademark in 
respect of goods or services if they are using or propose to use, and are entitled to use, the trademark in Canada in 
association with those goods or services.”). Clause 339 of Bill C-31 goes on to list the “Contents of application”, 
which removes the current requirement for a date of use or an affidavit of use. 
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trademarks, resulting in their monopolizing trademarks in both official and foreign languages? 
Consider how The Coca-Cola Company has filed over 1,000 trademark applications in China, 
some of which are multiple translations based on the sound of the same trademark: 芬 搭 (FEN1 
DA2) and 芬 达 (FEN1 DA2) and 发 达 (FA1 DA2) for FANTA. 
It is clear from this chapter that there are several alternatives to the problem of classifying 
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. However, the challenges associated with each 
alternative means that the problem is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks. 
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4 JUDICIAL PROBLEM 
 
It was 1992. The Federal Court of Canada had specifically rejected the American doctrine 
of foreign equivalents. That meant refusing to affirm that a trader could use a trademark 
registration for an English word to exclude others from registering its translations. The four 
Chinese-language marks that were registered in Canada by The Coca-Cola Company were up for 
renewal. 
 Yet, 1992 was when The Coca-Cola Company abandoned the Chinese translations of its 
products. That was the year it failed to renew all four registrations for its Chinese-language 
marks in Canada. Why? Although the business world was ready to embrace the economic 
benefits of recognizing foreign languages, the administrative and judicial systems were sending 
it the message that trademark registrations were not necessary to do so. 
This chapter reviews a set of trademark cases in Canada involving two Chinese bakeries 
in order to illustrate the judicial challenge of proving linguistic knowledge for foreign-language 
marks. 
 
4.1 The Problem as Illustrated by Two Chinese Bakeries in Canada 
There are at least 16 Canadian court cases involving Chinese-language marks to date, 11 
of which were decide in the 21
st
 Century.
91
 As cases involving Chinese-language marks are 
                                                 
91
 Pacific Produce Co Ltd v Metro Trading Co (1986), 15 CPR (3d) 44, 1986 CanLII 1244 (BC SC) (TIENTSIN is 
an English-language mark used by the defendant‟s Chinese-language importer); Coin Stars Ltd v KK Court Chili & 
Pepper Restaurant Ltd (1990), 33 CPR 3(d) 186, 1990 CanLII 684 (BC SC); Lookin Trading Co Ltd v Honey House 
Beddings & Housewares Ltd (1997), 72 CPR (3d) 297, 1997 CanLII 2050 (BC SC); Pagolac Restaurants Ltd v 
404305 Alberta Ltd, 1999 ABQB 423; Cheung Kong, supra note 9; Ten Ren Tea Co v Van Cheong Tea Inc, 2003 
FC 819; The House of Kwong Sang Hong International Ltd v Gervais, 2004 FC 554; Telus Corp v Orange Personal 
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expected to increase in the future in Canada, it is important to develop a workable model now for 
assessing the notional consumer in cases of confusion involving foreign-language marks. This 
need is illustrated by a protracted trademark dispute between two Chinese bakeries in Canada. 
As far back as 1974, Cheung‟s Bakery had a bakery in the City of Vancouver. Although 
it used an English-Chinese trademark with the words ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE, it was most 
definitely a Chinese bakery where the owner spoke Chinese and sold coconut buns, egg tarts and 
moon cakes. It was nothing like the typical local bakery, where consumers expected to speak 
English and bought bread, cookies and muffins. Little thought was given to registering foreign-
language marks in those days, so Cheung‟s Bakery registered only its English-language marks 
(see the left side of the chart below) and did not register its Chinese-language mark (see the right 
side of the chart below). 
Trademarks registered  
by Cheung’s Bakery 
(“English-language marks”) 
 
Trademark used but not registered  
by Cheung’s Bakery 
(“Chinese-language mark”) 
 
ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE92 
93
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Communications Services Ltd, 2005 FC 590; Brilliant Trading Inc v Wong, 2005 FC 1214; Yee Hong, supra note 70; 
Café do Brasil SPA v Walong Marketing Inc, 2006 FC 1063; College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners 
and Acupuncturists of British Columbia v Council of Natural Medicine College of Canada, 2009 FC 1110; Pioko 
International Imports Inc v BOT International Ltd, 2009 CanLII 64819, [2009] CarswellOnt 7247 (QL) (ON SC) 
(COTTON GINNY is an English-language mark used by the defendant‟s Chinese-language manufacturer); Target 
Event Production Ltd v Paul Cheung and Lions Communications Inc, 2010 FC 27, rev‟d in part 2010 FCA 225; JAG 
Flocomponents NA v Archmetal Industries Corporation, 2010 FC 627; Cheah v McDonald’s Corporation, 2013 FC 
774 (MACDIMSUM is an English-language mark reproduced by the defendant‟s Chinese-language restaurant); 
Saint Honore Cake Shop Limited v Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd, 2013 FC 935, aff‟d 2015 FCA 12 [Saint Honore]; 
Council of Natural Medicine College of Canada v College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and 
Acupuncturists of British Columbia, 2013 FC 287; Source Media Group Corp v Black Press Group Ltd, 2014 FC 
2014 (NEW HOME LIVING is an English-language mark reproduced by the defendant‟s Chinese-language 
magazine); and Times Group Corporation v Time Development Group Inc, 2016 FC 1075. 
92
 Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE, Registered, 0598133, TMA354194  
93
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506  
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94
 
N/A 
 
 
In 1988, Saint Anna Bakery applied to register a competing trademark on the basis of 
proposed use. Although it had not used the trademark, it was setting itself up as a competing 
bakery in the City of Toronto by incorporating the word ANNA and all four Chinese characters 
from the English-Chinese trademark of Cheung‟s Bakery. This competition between a bakery in 
Toronto and the bakery in Vancouver may seem hypothetical until we realize how lucrative the 
Chinese pastry business can be:
95
 pastries are consumed daily; specific pastries are required for 
important holidays such as Autumn Moon Festival and Chinese New Year; and specialized 
pastries are required for formal occasions such as wedding announcements. This is a community 
that has payment plans for moon cakes (the way Canada has mortgage plans for houses), and 
asks friends and relatives to bring wedding pastries back to Toronto from Vancouver (the way 
Canada orders products online from the United States). Saint Anna Bakery applied to register the 
Competing Mark (see the left side of the chart below), and Cheung‟s Bakery responded by 
finally applying to register the Original Mark (see the right side of the chart below). 
Trademark applied for  
by Saint Anna Bakery 
(“Competing Mark”) 
 
Trademark applied for 
by Cheung’s Bakery 
(“Original Mark”) 
                                                 
94
 Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & DESIGN, Registered, 0598131, TMA354193  
95
 This background information does not appear in the cases themselves but would be common knowledge within 
the Chinese community. 
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96
 
97
 
 
The result was that the two parties ended up opposing each other‟s trademark 
applications. The Trademarks Opposition Board decided in both oppositions that the trademarks 
were not confusing and, therefore, were both registrable.
98
 How could this be when the 
Competing Mark incorporated all four Chinese characters from the Original Mark? The answer 
lies in the fact that the test for confusion did not consider the linguistic knowledge of the 
consumer. 
Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion by providing that consideration 
must be given to “all the surrounding circumstances including: 
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trademarks or trade names and the extent to 
which they have become known; 
(b) the length of time the trademarks or trade names have been in use; 
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business; 
(d) the nature of the trade; and 
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trademarks or trade names in 
appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.”99 
                                                 
96
 Trademarks: SAINT ANNA BAKERY LTD. & DESIGN, Expunged, 0614373, TMA493100  
97
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506  
98
 Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Anna Bakery Ltd (1992), 46 CPR (3d) 261 (TMOB) [Saint Anna TMOB] 
and Saint Anna Bakery Ltd v Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd 1996 CanLII 11366 (TMOB). 
99
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 6(5). This test applies to both opposition proceedings and trademark 
infringements, and the onus remains on whoever is in petitorio. Opposition proceedings require applicants to prove 
there is no likelihood of confusion, according to Mattel, supra note 34 at para 6 (“In opposition proceedings, 
trademark law will afford protection that transcends the traditional product lines unless the applicant shows the 
likelihood that registration of its mark will not create confusion in the marketplace within the meaning of s. 6 of the 
Trademarks Act.”). Infringement claims require plaintiffs to prove that there is likelihood of confusion, according to 
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 SCR 824 at para 14 (“Whether or not 
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The Supreme Court of Canada applies the test for confusion as a matter of first 
impression and imperfect recollection: 
“The test to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual 
consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees the [mark], at a time when he or she has 
no more than an imperfect recollection of the [previous] trademarks, and does not 
pause to give the matter any detailed consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine 
closely the similarities and differences between the marks.”100 
 
The Trademarks Opposition Board interpreted the quote above – and applied the test for 
confusion accordingly in 1992 – by imagining the illiterate consumer when considering all the 
surrounding circumstances. I use the term “illiterate” not to mean that the consumer cannot read 
or write in any language, but rather that the consumer does not understand the foreign language 
used in the trademark in question. While the term “illiterate” may be a pejorative adjective, it 
sums up how consumers feel when their linguistic knowledge is not considered to be relevant: 
“In my view, the average Canadian would not, as a matter of first impression and 
imperfect recollection, recognize that the [Original Mark] appears in the 
[Competing Mark], especially when the Chinese characters in the [Competing 
                                                                                                                                                             
there exists a likelihood of confusion is largely a question of fact. As this is an infringement claim (rather than an 
opposition proceeding before the Trademarks Opposition Board), the onus is on the appellant to prove such 
likelihood on a balance of probabilities.”) [Veuve Clicquot]. The fact that the test for confusion was identical for 
both registration and infringement was confirmed in an expungement case in Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles 
Inc, 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 SCR 387 at para 33 (“Whether in assessing trademark infringement under s. 19 or 
entitlement under s. 16, the test for likelihood of confusion is the same.”) [Masterpiece]. The fact that there is a 
pragmatic element for placing the onus on whoever is in petitorio was explained in a copyright case in Harmony 
Consulting Ltd v GA Foss Transport Ltd, 2012 FCA 226 at para 32 (“Burden of proof rules allocate the costs and 
risks of gathering and presenting evidence, and help filter good cases from the bad. They should not be “impractical 
and unduly burdensome” on plaintiffs and should advance the purposes of the law involved. … [See] David Vaver, 
“Consent or No Consent: The Burden of Proof in Intellectual Property Infringement Suits”, (2001) 23 IPJ 147 at 
148-149.”).   
100
 Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 40.  
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Mark] run together and appear in a stylized form. The average Canadian would 
focus on the English language components of the [Competing Mark], but might 
guess from the Chinese script that the baked goods sold under the mark were in 
some type of Chinese style. I can take judicial notice that there are some 
Canadians who would be fluent in Chinese, and who would immediately 
recognize the [Original Mark] as a component of the [Competing Mark]. However, 
in the absence of any evidence on point, I cannot conclude that the number of 
Canadians fluent in Chinese would be significant … ”101 [emphasis added] 
 
The Trademarks Opposition Board decided that there was no confusion, “especially when 
the Chinese characters in the [Competing Mark] run together and appear in a stylized form.” This 
would not have been an acceptable argument if the trademark in question had been COCA-
COLA. Since the Original Mark is filed in standard font, just as COCA-COLA was registered in 
standard font, it should have been designated as a word mark that bars competitors from using it 
in a different font, size, and colour. Instead, its designation as a design mark enabled a 
competitor to avoid infringement simply by changing its “stylized form”, which was the very 
argument made when assessing COCA-COLA as a design mark.
102
 
However, the Trademarks Opposition Board‟s focus on the Supreme Court of Canada‟s 
explanation of how a consumer perceives a trademark (as a matter of first impression and 
imperfect recollection) seems to ignore the Federal Court of Canada‟s explanation below as to 
                                                 
101
 Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268. 
102
 Coca-Cola Company of Canada Limited v Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Limited, [1942] 1 All ER 615 at 618 
(“If it be viewed as a design mark, the same result follows. The only resemblance lies in the fact that both contain 
the word “Cola”, and neither is written in block letters, but in script with flourishes. The letters and flourishes in fact 
differ very considerably, notwithstanding the tendency of words written in script with flourishes to bear a general 
resemblance to each other.”) [emphasis added] [Pepsi-Cola]. 
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who the consumer is (the target consumer of the product, instead of the general public), even 
though the two explanations do not contradict each other and both are relevant to the test for 
confusion: 
“To determine whether two trademarks are confusing one with the other it is the 
persons who are likely to buy the wares who are to be considered, that is those 
persons who normally comprise the market, the ultimate consumer.”103 
 
Perhaps it was a coincidence, but the year that the Trademarks Opposition Board issued 
its decision was the same year that The Coca-Cola Company decided to abandon the Chinese 
translations of its products. All four Chinese-language marks that had been applied for in 1975 
were not renewed in 1992. The business world got the message that trademark registrations were 
not necessary in order to embrace the economic benefits of recognizing foreign languages. 
 
4.2 The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge 
The Trademarks Opposition Board‟s decision resulted in both trademarks being 
registered in 1997-1998. To avoid what it still considered confusion nonetheless, Cheung‟s 
Bakery purchased the Competing Mark from Saint Anna Bakery so that there would only be one 
source of the Competing and Original Marks.
104
 Then to avoid having its Original Mark diluted, 
Cheung‟s Bakery ignored the Competing Mark it had purchased and continued to use its Original 
                                                 
103
 Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd v Canada’s Manitoba Distillery Ltd (1975), 25 CPR (2d) 1 at 5 (FCTD). 
104
 Instead of purchasing the Competing Mark, Cheung‟s Bakery could have appealed and brought further evidence 
of the widespread use of the Chinese language on the theory that the test for confusion requires “all” circumstances 
to be considered. This means that linguistic knowledge or anything else that creates likely confusion is a relevant 
circumstance to consider. Perhaps Cheung‟s Bakery did not do so because the Trademarks Opposition Board‟s 
decision on November 30, 1992 was rendered after and consistent with the earlier Federal Court of Canada‟s 
decision on October 27, 1992 in Krazy Glue, Inc v Grupo Cyanomex, SA de CV (1992), (sub nom B Jadow and Sons, 
Inc v Grupo Cyanomex, SA de CV) 45 CPR (3d) 161, [1992] FCJ No 957 (QL) (FCTD) [Krazy Glue]. 
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Mark only. Finally, it seemed that the pastry world was restored to its original position with the 
Original Mark in use and the Competing Mark hidden away. 
Unfortunately, peace was not to last in the pastry world. Upon realizing that Cheung‟s 
Bakery had abandoned the Competing Mark it had purchased, Saint Anna Bakery had the 
Competing Mark expunged for lack of use in 2004.
105
 This did not concern Cheung‟s Bakery. 
But it did become concerned when Saint Anna Bakery re-named itself Saint Honore Cake Shop 
and, once again, applied to register competing trademarks on the basis of proposed use in 2006. 
Why didn‟t the solicitor for Cheung‟s Bakery insert a non-competition clause into the purchase 
agreement to prevent the expungement and the re-naming? It is understandable that lawyers with 
little exposure to foreign languages might be unaware of the linguistic issues discussed in Part A 
and, as a result, might assume erroneously that there is only one translation for the Original 
Marks. It is also reasonable for a trader with little understanding of the law to fail to draw such 
linguistic facts to the lawyer‟s attention. Why didn‟t Saint Honore also change its Chinese name 
when it changed its English name? This persistence in retaining the same Chinese name may 
seem strange, especially to a non-Chinese speaker, until we realize that the Chinese name is as 
well-known in the Chinese community as TIM HORTONS is in Canada or STARBUCKS is in 
the United States. Saint Honore applied to register the SAINT HONORE marks (see the left side 
of the chart below), which Cheung‟s Bakery opposed on the basis of its two registrations for the 
ANNA marks (see the right side of the chart below). 
 
                                                 
105
 Since it purchased the Competing Mark from Saint Anna Bakery, Cheung‟s Bakery could have argued that 
“[Saint Anna Bakery], having assigned the trade marks to [Cheung‟s Bakery], cannot derogate from its own grants 
and is, therefore, estopped as between itself and [Cheung‟s Bakery] from disputing the validity of the trade marks;” 
based on Cheerio Toys & Games Ltd v Dubiner, [1966] SCR 206, 48 CPR 266 at para 33. The rationale for an 
invalidation by the court under section 18(1) of the Trademarks Act could have worked for an expungement by the 
Registrar under section 45(3) of the Trademarks Act. 
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Trademarks applied for  
by Saint Honore Cake Shop 
(“SAINT HONORE marks”) 
 
Trademarks registered already 
by Cheung’s Bakery 
(“ANNA marks”) 
106
 107
 
108
 
 
109
 
 
 
 
This time, however, the Trademarks Opposition Board decided in both oppositions to the 
SAINT HONORE marks that they were confusing and, therefore, were not registrable.
110
 What 
led to this inconsistency from the previous decisions? The answer lies in the fact that, by then, 
the Trademarks Opposition Board interpreted the case law – and applied the test for confusion 
differently as a result in 2011 – by imagining the fluent consumer when considering all the 
surrounding circumstances. Although there is a spectrum from illiteracy to fluency in a language, 
I use the term “fluent” to mean a complete understanding of the foreign language in the same 
way that it is assumed for English or French: 
“The Opponent submits, and I agree for the reasons that follow, that this is a 
situation in which it would be appropriate to consider the impression of the 
                                                 
106
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN, Opposed, 1329118 
107
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506  
108
 Trademarks: SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP LIMITED & CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Opposed, 
1329117 
109
 Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & Chinese Characters Design, Registered, 1235030, TMA667403  
110
 Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 94 (with minor correction in 
Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd ,2011 TMOB 152) and Cheung’s Bakery Products 
Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 95 (with minor correction in Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint 
Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 153), aff‟d 2013 FC 935, aff‟d 2015 FCA 12 [Saint Honore TMOB]. 
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average Canadian consumer who can read and understand Chinese characters 
when determining the likelihood of confusion between the parties‟ marks.”111 
 
Perhaps the Trademarks Opposition Board could have – and should have – imagined the 
fluent consumer when the parties first appeared before it in its 1992 decision, instead of waiting 
until its 2011 decision to do so. Although this time period coincided with the 1997 handover of 
Hong Kong from Britain to China, which resulted in a huge influx of Chinese immigrants to 
Canada, there is no evidence that the bakeries were marketing to the general public in 1992 and 
had restricted their marketing to Chinese-Canadians by 2011. Nor is there evidence that the 
average Canadian consumer of these bakeries were mostly non-Chinese in 1992 and mostly 
Chinese in 2011. Thus, it is unclear what change in circumstances led to the statement above that 
this is an appropriate situation to consider the average Canadian consumer who understands 
Chinese. It would appear that this inconsistency from the previous decisions was due not to any 
change in facts, but due to the Federal Court of Canada‟s decision in 2000 in the Cheung Kong 
case.
112
 
In the Cheung Kong case, the court valiantly tries to reconcile past administrative and 
judicial cases that had ignored prior judicial explanation of who the consumer is – the target 
consumer of the product, instead of the general public – in their application of the test for 
confusion to foreign-language marks. First, a past decision had held that the Spanish language 
mark KOLA LOKA was not confusing with the English-language mark KRAZY GLUE, even 
though “kola loka” in Spanish means “crazy glue” in English, because less than 1% of the 
                                                 
111
 Saint Honore TMOB, supra note 110 at para 85. 
112
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9. 
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Canadian population understood Spanish.
113
 Cheung Kong explained that this was referring to 
the fact that the product seemed to be marketed on a national scale.
114
 Second, another past 
decision had held that the German language mark BLAUPUNKT was not confusing with the 
English-language mark BLUE POINT, even though “blaupunkt” in German means “blue point” 
in English, because there was no evidence that any Canadians understood German.
115
 Cheung 
Kong explained that this was referring to the fact that the average consumer of the product did 
not understand German.
116
 Third, the 1992 decision involving the two Chinese bakeries had held 
that the Competing Mark was not confusing with the Original Mark because there was no 
evidence to conclude that the number of consumers fluent in Chinese would be significant. This 
means that linguistic knowledge could be deemed to be irrelevant not just when comparing a 
foreign-language mark with an English-language mark, but even when comparing two 
trademarks in the same foreign language.
117
 Cheung Kong explained that this was referring to the 
fact that the average consumer of the product would not recognize the similarity in the Chinese-
                                                 
113
 Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 171 (“However, I have found as a fact that only a minimal proportion of the 
Canadian population speaks Spanish as a mother tongue or understands Spanish sufficiently to be capable of making 
the translation. I therefore conclude, on the basis of the facts established by the evidence, that the average consumer, 
having a vague or imperfect recollection of the registered trade mark KRAZY GLUE, would find no degree of 
resemblance whatsoever in the ideas suggested by KOLA LOKA and KRAZY GLUE.”). 
114
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 55 (On closer examination of this passage, however, I do not think that 
McGillis J. is categorically ruling out the possibility that, on the appropriate evidence, the existence of a substantial 
number of Spanish speakers among the consumers of the ware could not displace the linguistic knowledge that can 
be attributed to the population as a whole. She had adopted the finding of the Registrar that less than 1% of the 
population understands Spanish, and there was no indication that the applicant‟s product was not marketed on a 
national scale. Thus, the facts of the case did not justify departing from the normal rule about the linguistic 
knowledge of the „average consumer‟.”). 
115
 Robert Bosch GmbH v Grupo Bler de Mexico, SA de CV (1997), 76 CPR (3d) 397 (TMOB) at 403 (“The 
opponent argues that the average person would either know, or guess, that [BLUE POINT] is the translation of 
BLAUPUNKT. However, no evidence has been presented to show that any Canadians understand German and no 
evidence such as survey evidence has been presented to substantiate the claim that the average consumer would 
guess at the meaning.”) [Blaupunkt]. 
116
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 60, 68 (“Like the Krazy Glue case, supra, the Blaupunkt decision also 
appears to turn on the absence of any evidence that the average consumer of the wares concerned had any 
knowledge of German. … Both turned ultimately on the absence of evidence about the number of consumers able to 
translate the foreign language marks into English.”). 
117
 Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268 (“I can take judicial notice that there are some Canadian who would be 
fluent in Chinese, and who would immediately recognize the opponent‟s CHINESE CHARACTERS mark as a 
component of the applied-for mark. However, in the absence of any evidence on point, I cannot conclude that the 
number of Canadians fluent in Chinese would be significant.”). 
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language marks. In doing so, it confirmed that the prior judicial explanation of who the consumer 
is – the target consumer of the product, instead of the general public – remains the same whether 
the court is applying the test for confusion generally or with respect to foreign-language marks 
specifically: 
“I do not think that the Registrar is saying that, for the purpose of determining the 
likelihood of confusion, the “average Canadian” could never be a person who 
understood the relevant foreign language and that as a matter of law the language 
understood by the “average consumer” of particular wares or services is not 
capable of being one of the “surrounding circumstances” to which the Registrar 
must have regard. … Thus, in Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd. v. Canada‟s 
Manitoba Distillery Ltd. (1975), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.) Cattanach J. said (at 
page 5): “To determine whether two trademarks are confusing one with the other 
it is the persons who are likely to buy the wares who are to be considered, that is 
those persons who normally comprise the market, the ultimate consumer.” A 
similar proposition can be found in McDonald‟s Corp. v. Coffee Hut Stores Ltd. 
(1994), 55 C.P.R. (3d) 463 (F.C.T.D.), at page 475; affd by (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d) 
168 (F.C.A.), where it was said that the likelihood of confusion should be 
assessed, not from the perspective of the “average person, but from that of the 
“average person” who is likely to consume the wares or services in question”.”118 
 
                                                 
118
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 62, 64. The Federal Court of Appeal recently confirmed this in MC Imports 
Inc v AFOD Ltd, 2016 FCA 60 at paras 59, 61 (“Further, where such an inquiry is necessary, the relevant ordinary 
consumer from whose perspective this question ought to be considered is the ordinary consumer of the products or 
services with which the Mark is associated. … I note that even authorities citing Parma have tended not to adopt the 
view that the “general public” is the relevant consumer perspective, referring instead to the ordinary consumer of the 
wares or services with which the trademark is used”). MC Imports also emphasized at para 76 that even evidence of 
secondary meaning must be “from the perspective of the relevant public – that is, people who actually use the 
product or service in question –”). 
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Therefore, linguistic knowledge is considered a relevant circumstance if there is evidence 
to prove that the target consumer of the product understands the foreign language used in the 
trademark.
119
 The leading case of Cheung Kong found proof of linguistic knowledge because the 
business targeted the Chinese community in Toronto, where a substantial number of consumers 
understood the Chinese-language mark.
120
 And the succeeding case of Saint Honore found proof 
of linguistic knowledge because the business targeted the Chinese community in Vancouver, 
where a substantial portion of the target consumers understood the Chinese language.
121
 It is 
important to note that the last two cases do not mean that the test for confusion can be applied 
regionally. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the test for confusion needs to be 
                                                 
119
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 65 (“An application of this principle to the particular issue in dispute in this 
case would indicate that, if it could be inferred from the evidence that a significant portion of the likely consumers 
of Living Realty‟s clients were familiar with Chinese characters, the Registrar should take this into consideration as 
part of the “surrounding circumstances” when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion with Cheung 
Kong‟s mark.”). 
120
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 57-58 (“Indeed, the facts suggest that a substantial number of consumers of 
Living Realty‟s service understand the meaning of the Chinese characters that comprise its proposed mark. First, 
Living Realty‟s business has been centred on the sale of real estate in Toronto, although it has also included 
properties in the surrounding area. I am prepared to take judicial notice of the existence of a significant Chinese 
community in Greater Toronto. Second, Mr. Chan stated that Living Realty “targeted” the Chinese community, 
although not to the exclusion of non-Chinese clients. In the light of these facts, it would be hard to maintain that a 
substantial number of actual consumers were not reasonably likely to confuse Living Realty‟s mark with Cheung 
Kong‟s as a result of the identical and distinctive nature of the idea conveyed by the mark, particularly given the 
similarities of the services offered by the parties.”). 
121
 Saint Honore, supra note 91 at paras 47-48 (“In the present case, the Court is of the opinion that it was open to 
the Board to find that a substantial portion of the respondent‟s actual consumers would be able to read and 
understand Chinese characters. As noted by the Board, the Cheung Jr. and Sr. affidavits establish that the 
respondents target the Chinese community in the Greater Vancouver area. The respondent has prominently 
displayed the Chinese characters of its trademarks for decades in the Greater Vancouver area, including in the 
exterior signage of the bakeries of the respondent and its licensee, as well as in letterhead, envelopes, business cards, 
promotional wedding pastry cards, and an entry with a directory of businesses listed under their Chinese character 
names. The Cheung Jr. affidavit also demonstrates that the Chinese characters of the respondent‟s trademarks are 
displayed prominently on its cake boxes, plastic bags and disposable paper pastry cup used to package the bakery 
products. The fact that the respondent uses Chinese characters consistently and in so many of its materials suggests 
that it believes many of its customers will be able to read and understand them (see Cheung Kong, above at para 77). 
Moreover, the 2012 Cheung Jr. affidavit mentions a 2010 survey conducted by the respondent in June and July 2010 
in which the respondent distributed customer survey forms available either in English or in Chinese. The respondent 
received 2,259 survey forms in return, of which 1,905 were in Chinese and 354 were in English. The fact that 84% 
of the customers who filled out a survey could read and understand written Chinese lends further support to the 
Board‟s finding that a substantial portion of the respondent‟s actual customers would be able to read and understand 
Chinese characters.”). 
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applied nationally because trademark registration is nationwide.
122
 The last two cases only took 
the linguistic demographics of specific geographic territories into account because such evidence 
proved the linguistic knowledge of the target market, which happened to be limited to Toronto 
and Vancouver. 
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge as a relevant circumstance is a purposive 
interpretation that is valid statutorily. Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion by 
requiring that “all” circumstances that are relevant to the issue of confusion be considered, not 
just those specified in the non-exhaustive list. More importantly, linguistic knowledge is not just 
relevant to the general issue of confusion but is also relevant to the specific factor of 
resemblance.
123
 Not only was the Federal Court of Canada‟s interpretation correct in 2000 in the 
Cheung Kong case, the wisdom of such an interpretation became clear in 2011 in the Saint 
Honore case. Applying the test for confusion to foreign-language marks by imagining the fluent 
consumer resulted in the SAINT HONORE marks being declared to be confusing. Failing to do 
so would have allowed a competitor to continue copying the Original Mark ad infinitum by 
adding a different English translation each time. Once again, it seemed that the pastry world was 
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 Masterpiece, supra note 99 at paras 30-31, 33 (“It is immediately apparent from these words, “if the use of 
both … in the same area”, that the test for confusion is based upon the hypothetical assumption that both trade-
names and trademarks are used “in the same area”, irrespective of whether this is actually the case. As a result, 
geographical separation of otherwise confusingly similar trade-names and trademarks does not play a role in this 
hypothetical test. This must be the case, because, pursuant to s. 19, subject to exceptions not relevant here, 
registration gives the owner the exclusive right to the use of the trademark throughout Canada. In order for the 
owner of a registered trademark to have exclusive use of the trademark throughout Canada, there cannot be a 
likelihood of confusion with another trademark anywhere in the country. … Whether in assessing trademark 
infringement under s. 19 or entitlement under s. 16, the test for likelihood of confusion is the same. The application 
of the hypothetical test reflects the legislative intent to provide a national scope of protection for registered 
trademarks in Canada (see David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks (2nd ed 2011) 
at 526.”). 
123
 Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 49 (“As Professor Vaver points out, if the marks or names do not resemble 
one another, it is unlikely that even a strong finding on the remaining factors would lead to a likelihood of confusion. 
The other factors become significant only once the marks are found to be identical or very similar (Vaver, at p. 532). 
As a result, it has been suggested that a consideration of resemblance is where most confusion analyses should start 
(Vaver, at p. 532).”). 
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restored to its original position with the ANNA marks registered and the SAINT HONORE 
marks denied registration.  
 
4.3 The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge Creates Inequality in Canada 
Since the test for confusion originally ignored the linguistic knowledge of the consumer, 
all foreign-language marks were equally ignored with respect to their meanings. Now that the 
test for confusion considers linguistic knowledge as part of the surrounding circumstances, the 
result is a discrepancy in the treatment of different foreign-language marks. For example, the 
Spanish language mark KOLA LOKA was not confusing with the English-language mark 
because less than 1% of the Canadian population being targeted understood Spanish. It is not 
clear what percentage will be deemed to be significant, but 4.8% has been the lowest cited to 
date for a trademark confusion case.
124
 Nor is it clear what the actual number is behind the 
phrase “less than 1%”. But an estimate of 30 million for the Canadian population back then 
might have meant a Spanish linguistic population of around 300,000, which is a significant 
number of people to ignore. Contrast that with the two cases involving Chinese-language marks 
where confusion was found because judicial notice was taken of the existence of significant 
Chinese communities in the Toronto and Vancouver cities being targeted. A discrepancy in the 
treatment of different foreign-language marks in Canada is undesirable for two reasons. 
First, it is inconsistent with equality principles reflected in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and other human rights legislation.
125
 While the test for confusion is to be 
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 Diageo Canada Inc v Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc, 2017 FC 571 at para 94 (“Indeed, the rate of confusion Courts 
have previously found to be sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion ranges from: 4.8% to 8.2% in Walt 
Disney Productions v Triple Five Corp, 1994 ABCA 120 …; 11% in New Balance Athletic Shoes Inc v Matthews, 
[1992] TMOB No 358 …; and 13.5% in Kirkbi AG v Ritvik Holdings Inc, 2002 FC 585 [affirmed by the FCA and 
the SCC without any discussion of the percentage issue].”) [Diageo]. 
125
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15 (Equality Rights – “Every individual is equal before and under the law without 
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applauded for recognizing the linguistic diversity of Canada, it should lead to equality for all and 
not favouritism for some (e.g., the economic clout, political influence, or simple visibility of 
Chinese consumers). Canada has a multicultural population that uses many foreign languages, 
including all six official languages of the United Nations: English, French, Spanish, Chinese, 
Russian, and Arabic. It is incongruous that the first Romanized three languages receive more 
protection than the last three non-Romanized languages. In the same manner, the test for 
confusion must not take judicial notice of linguistic knowledge for Chinese-language marks 
while continuing to treat other foreign-language marks as inarticulate designs. This is because 
the decision to recognize the Chinese language is supported by the statistical evidence rather than 
the commitment to substantive equality, which would not require such evidence to assess the 
relative worth of a language. The emphasis on statistics and the “reality” of Chinese consumers 
vis-à-vis other foreign-language consumers does not adequately reflect the multicultural values 
of Canadian society. The resulting stratified system is unacceptable in light of the fact that 
reliance on these statistics is arbitrary: there is neither statutory authority nor a judicial basis for 
why the linguistic populations for the Spanish-language mark KOLA LOKA and the German-
language mark BLAUPUNKT are insufficient, while the linguistic population for Chinese-
language marks is worthy of recognition. Such a system gives the impression that some linguistic 
populations have more value than others. The courts should not be encouraging a two-tier system 
that could perpetuate an injustice,
126
 as such a system is contrary to Charter values based on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability.”). Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 3(1) (Prohibited grounds 
of discrimination – “For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for 
an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.”). 
There are similar legislation at the provincial level [Charter]. 
126
 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2 at para 5 
(“The Court did not seek to create a parallel system of legal aid or a court-managed comprehensive program to 
supplement any of the other programs designed to assist various groups in taking legal action, and its decision 
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speculative assessment of linguistic knowledge. Even if a perfect assessment were created, with 
accurate statistics and clear percentages as to when a linguistic population is deserving of 
protection, the courts should still question the equality of relying on such evidence and should 
also attempt to remedy the differential treatment. Failing to identify the existence and 
undesirability of the status quo casts doubt on the commitment to substantive equality and to 
ensuring that the common law reflects Charter values.
127
 
Second, it ignores Aboriginal linguistic populations. With the certainty that less than 1% 
of the Canadian population is insignificant, and the uncertainty of knowing what percentage will 
be deemed to be significant, Canada‟s Aboriginal people may never be able to prove the 
significance of their linguistic populations in their home and native land. For example, Statistics 
Canada indicates that the entire Aboriginal population (1,400,685) makes up 4.3% of the total 
Canadian population. Even if all Aboriginals shared the same language, and even if every 
Aboriginal understood that common language, the entire Aboriginal percentage of the population 
is still lower than 4.8%, the lowest percentage cited to date for a trademark confusion case.
128
 
The entire Aboriginal population can be broken down into the following groups: the Inuit 
population (59,445) represents 0.2% of the Canadian population; the Métis population (451,795) 
represents 1.4% of the total Canadian population; and the First Nations population (851,560) 
represents 2.6% of the total Canadian population. Depending on how we define a language, these 
                                                                                                                                                             
should not be used to do so. The decision did not introduce a new financing method for self-appointed 
representatives of the public interest. This Court‟s ratio in Okanagan applies only to those few situations where a 
court would be participating in an injustice – against the litigant personally and against the public generally – if it 
did not order advance costs to allow the litigant to proceed.”). Although this was about the SCC allowing 
alternatives in order to avoid an injustice, an argument can be made that the principle equally applies in that the SCC 
should not allow alternatives that perpetuate an injustice. 
127
 Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-
Specific Contingencies” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 309 at 342 (“Whitmann J.A., speaking for a unanimous court, 
acknowledged the suggestion of the Supreme Court of Canada that the common law, and therefore tort law, must be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Charter values.”). 
128
 Diageo, supra note 124 at para 94. 
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groups can be broken down again into different linguistic populations, which will only further 
reduce their percentage and their significance according to the test for confusion.
129
 Requiring 
evidence of linguistic knowledge of the target consumers may seem to support substantive 
equality; however, it shows that such judicial notice is based on statistics rather than a desire for 
substantive equality. Although the evidence required for judicial notice may appear to rely on 
statistics and reflect “reality”, this approach perpetuates racial and ethnic inequalities. The 
court‟s discretionary acceptance of evidence not only maintains these disparities, but also carries 
them into the future. To ignore Aboriginal linguistic populations on the principle of de minimis 
non curat lex would be contrary to the frequency and intensity with which the law has meddled 
historically in their lives.
130
 This is unacceptable in light of the fact that Aboriginal linguistic 
populations were reduced significantly due to a Canadian policy of forced assimilation for nearly 
200 years
131
 through cultural genocide and language prohibition,
132
 whereby residential schools 
“regularly reported on their success in suppressing Aboriginal languages”133 even though many 
of the students were originally “fluent in an Aboriginal language, with little or no understanding 
of French or English.”134 Until Aboriginal language rights are acknowledged in the same manner 
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 Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Metis and Inuit, Catalogue No 99-011-X 
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 8 May 2013), online: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/99-
011-x2011001-eng.cfm>. 
130
 In addition to at least 10 Acts for which it shares responsibility with a provincial government, Parliament has the 
sole responsibility for at least 78 Acts. The fact is that Parliament busies itself with governing Aboriginal peoples in 
areas including, but not limited to, condominium, water, family homes and matrimonial interests, commercial and 
industrial development, financial transparency, fiscal management, education, land management, minerals revenue 
sharing, gender equity, soldier settlement, and even elections and self-government! See Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada, “List of Acts, 27 June 2017), online: <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032317/1100100032318>. 
131
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of 
the Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services of Canada, 23 July 2015) at 134, online: 
<http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2
015.pdf> [TRC Report]. 
132
 TRC Report, supra note 131 at 1. 
133
 TRC Report, supra note 131 at 83. 
134
 TRC Report, supra note 131 at 85. 
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that Aboriginal rights
135
 are acknowledged in the Charter of the French Language,
136
 or 
Aboriginal languages are recognized in an Aboriginal Languages Act
137
 in the same way that the 
Inuit language is recognized in the Consolidation of Inuit Language Protection Act,
138
 the current 
application of the test for confusion means that Aboriginal people will continue to receive less 
protection for their language in their own country than an American company has always 
received for its English-language marks –  and a Chinese company now receives for its Chinese-
language marks – in Canada. At a minimum, Aboriginal businesses should not be worse off than 
foreign businesses from the United States or China. Even though the two statutes above must 
receive judicial notice, they are still insufficient because their recognition of Aboriginal rights in 
Quebec or the Inuit language in the Nunavut does not guarantee recognition of an Aboriginal-
language mark that targets a national or international market. 
Perhaps it appears reasonable in theory that the case law should continue to require proof 
of linguistic knowledge for foreign-language marks, but it is not realistic in practice. One 
example is COCA-COLA commercials with Olympic greetings or Christmas wishes. These 
commercials display COCA-COLA in multiple languages and are advertised to the American-
Canadian public at large during Olympic games or Christmas movies.
139
 In such a situation, it 
would be difficult to prove that the ordinary purchaser understood the foreign-language marks 
since no average consumer would understand so many languages. While an easy solution would 
be to customize the commercials for specific linguistic groups and advertise only in specific 
                                                 
135
 TRC Report, supra note 131 at 202. 
136
 Charter of the French Language, CQLR c C-11. 
137
 TRC Report, supra note 131 at 204. 
138
 Consolidation of Inuit Language Protection Act, SNu 2008, c 17 [Inuit Act]. A territory‟s statute must receive 
judicial notice. 
139
 Dinwoodie, International IP, supra note 86 at 113 (“By developing its ads for global consumption, Coca-Cola 
has acknowledged that it is targeting the world market, where it dominates Pepsi, rather than the United States, 
where it still heatedly competes with its rival. Over the past decade, Coke has made an aggressive push 
overseas …”). 
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target markets, doing so would defeat the global spirit of community which the multilingual 
commercials sought to foster. Just as the common law is developed to accommodate new 
reasonable commercial practice, why should statutory interpretation not mirror such a 
development where the statute is capable of bearing such a construction (because of the canon of 
statutory interpretation that the law is always speaking)?
140
 At the opposite end of the spectrum 
is the example of small start-ups like Aboriginal businesses that become successful enough to 
expand from a local market to a national or international market. Given their small linguistic 
populations, such businesses will lose the ability to prove that a significant number or percentage 
of their expanded market understand their Aboriginal-language marks.
141
 In other words, any 
economic gains for Aboriginal businesses would mean linguistic losses for Aboriginal-language 
marks. Such examples will only increase as businesses continue to engage in brand extension or 
cross-branding with foreign-language marks in order to access new untapped markets. 
It is important to note that this dissertation is advocating cultural respect for and equal 
recognition of classical and natural languages only, including obscure languages such as 
Aboriginal languages. We must remember the historical example of how Hebrew became an 
obscure language around the 2
nd
 Century, only to be revived for regular usage around the 19
th
 
Century and to become a national language with the creation of Israel in 1948.
142
 This 
dissertation is not advocating on behalf of constructed and invented languages such as Dothraki 
                                                 
140
 Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 10 (Law always speaking – “The law shall be considered as always 
speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as 
they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.”). 
141
 Canada found that a 1986 census of Spanish-speaking population of 83,130 was insufficient evidence of 
linguistic knowledge in Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 4. Australia found likewise with a 2001 census of Italian-
speaking population of 350,000 in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd, [2014] HCA 48 at paras 75-
76, 103 [Cantarella]. 
142
 Angel Saenz-Badillos, A History of the Hebrew Language, translated by John Elwolde (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) at 170-171, 267-269. See Michael Mandel, The Jewish Hour: The Golden Age of a Toronto 
Yiddish Radio Show and Newspaper (Toronto: Now and Then Books, 2016) at 14, 211, and 265 for how Yiddish 
and Ladino (the Jewish languages spoken by the Polish and Spanish Jews respectively) declined after “the deliberate 
murder of two-thirds of the Jews of Europe, ninety per cent of the Jews of Poland and about one-third of the Jews of 
the whole world” during the Second World War. 
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from Games of Throne, Elvin from Lord of the Rings, Klingon from Star Trek, and Na‟v from 
Avatar. This is notwithstanding the fact that the number of speakers and dollars for obscure 
languages are miniscule compared to those for languages popularized by television series and 
movies. For example, CBS and Paramount are currently suing a fan who raised one million 
dollars to film a documentary based on Star Trek.
143
 The lawsuit claims copyright infringement 
on the basis that Klingon was created for the television series and, therefore, copyrightable in the 
same manner as computer programming.
144
 Canada‟s world reputation historically has been one 
of peaceful pluralism, ranging from Prime Minister Lester Pearson‟s creation of peacekeepers 
(awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957) to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau‟s creation of the 
Multiculturalism Act (passed in 1988). Canada can promote this multicultural heritage by 
reforming its trademark law to recognize foreign- and aboriginal-language marks in a way that 
eliminates disparities by valuing all languages equally. While other countries seek to harmonize 
international trademark laws, expand protection for well-known marks, and create new rights for 
unconventional marks for the benefit of corporations, Canada ought first to recognize the 
languages and cultures of its people. 
 
4.4 The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge Lacks Statutory Basis in Canada 
Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion without making any reference to 
languages: it neither differentiates between official languages and foreign languages nor requires 
evidence as to the existence of a linguistic population in order to assess foreign-language marks. 
So how did these differentiation and requirement appear in the Canadian case law? They first 
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 Paramount, supra note 23. 
144
 Oracle, supra note 22. 
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appeared in 1992, when the court rejected and proposed its own alternative to the American 
doctrine of foreign equivalents: 
“In relation to the enumerated circumstances in s. 6(5) of the Act, the main issue 
to be determined on this appeal is the degree of resemblance in the ideas 
suggested by the two trade-marks. Even accepting the evidence of the appellant 
that “kola loka” is the phonetic equivalent of “cola loca” which means “crazy glue” 
in Spanish, it would be necessary for the average consumer, having a vague or 
imperfect recollection of the registered trade-mark KRAZY GLUE, to be capable 
of making this translation from Spanish to English in order to be confused by the 
ideas suggested by KRAZY GLUE and KOLA LOKA. However, I have found as 
a fact that only a minimal proportion of the Canadian population speaks Spanish 
as a mother tongue or understands Spanish sufficiently to be capable of making 
the translation. I therefore conclude, on the basis of the facts, as established by 
the evidence, that the average consumer, having a vague or imperfect recollection 
of the registered trade-mark KRAZY GLUE, would find no degree of 
resemblance whatsoever in the ideas suggested by KOLA LOKA and KRAZY 
GLUE.”145 [emphasis added] 
 
These differentiation and requirement were repeated in the succeeding Trademarks 
Opposition Board decisions involving the BLAUPUNKT and SAINT ANNA marks, which 
found respectively that “no evidence has been presented to show that any Canadians understand 
German”146 and “I cannot conclude that the number of Canadians fluent in Chinese would be 
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 Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 171. 
146
 Blaupunkt, supra note 115 at 403. 
 66 
 
significant”. 147  Although the later court decisions on the CHEUNG KONG and SAINT 
HONORE marks clarified that the test for confusion focuses on the target consumer of the 
product, and not the general public, they still continued to perpetuate these differentiation and 
requirement: 
“If [the examiner] based his conclusion on the fact that the “average Canadian” 
cannot read Chinese characters, without regard to whether the evidence in this 
case indicated that a significant number of the actual consumers of Living 
Realty’s services were likely to transliterate the first two characters of the 
proposed mark into CHEUNG KONG, or translate it into “long river”, then with 
respect I think he erred in law. Neither KRAZY GLUE, supra, nor the 
BLAUPUNKT case, supra, goes this far. Both turned ultimately on the absence of 
evidence about the number of consumers able to translate the foreign language 
marks into English.”148 [emphasis added] 
 
More important than the question of origin is the question of correctness. Just because 
these differentiation and requirement appear in the Canadian case law do not mean that they 
should be there. On the contrary, they incorrectly read into and improperly add a layer of 
complexity that was never in Canada‟s Trademarks Act. The statutory permission to prove the 
confusion arising from linguistic knowledge cannot necessarily be interpreted as a statutory 
requirement to prove the existence of linguistic knowledge. There is a difference between simply 
considering linguistic knowledge while assessing how a consumer perceives a trademark and 
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 Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268. 
148
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 67-68. And see Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 47 (“In the present case, 
the Court is of the opinion that it is open to the Board to find that a substantial portion of the respondent‟s actual 
consumers would be able to read and understand Chinese characters.”). 
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actually requiring evidence of linguistic knowledge before assessing a consumer‟s perception of 
a trademark. 
It is clear from this chapter that the trademark litigation involving two Chinese bakeries 
in Canada illustrate a judicial challenge of proving linguistic knowledge for foreign-language 
marks affect traders and consumers from all countries with respect to all foreign languages. 
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5 JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
 
 
This chapter explains why the problem of proving linguistic knowledge is best addressed 
with the solution of assuming such knowledge, as the evidence required to prove linguistic 
knowledge changes constantly depending on international trade, multicultural consumers, brand 
extension and cross-branding in order to access untapped markets. Although the solution is 
illustrated through the specific example of a set of trademark cases in Canada involving two 
Chinese bakeries, the general issue is also relevant in other countries and to other foreign 
languages. 
 
5.1 The Solution of Assuming Linguistic Knowledge 
It is questionable whether the case law should continue to require proof of linguistic 
knowledge for foreign-language marks, instead of assuming it so that their distinctiveness and 
confusion can be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in English or French.
149
  
Even with English-language marks containing antique or rare words, or with French-
language marks in areas of Canada where no French is spoken, it is never considered that the 
Canadian consumer might have little cultural exposure, limited vocabulary, no French skills, etc. 
For example, linguistic knowledge is assumed even with novel use of French words such as 
MAISON. The word was found to be descriptive of orange juice since MAISON had acquired a 
new meaning in France of “that which is made at home” or “of good quality”. The fact that the 
average French Canadian had not caught on to this new meaning did not change the court‟s 
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 Gredley, supra note 17 at 85 (“No English trade marks statute has ever made specific provision for marks in 
languages other than English, which have always been subject to the same legal principles as any others.”). 
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assumption of linguistic knowledge.
150
  Likewise, an Australian court assumed linguistic 
knowledge even with uncommon English words such as EUTECTIC. The word was found to be 
descriptive of goods for welding, soldering and brazing because EUTECTIC meant “melting at 
low temperature” or “melting readily”. The fact that “most users of the applicant‟s goods did not 
know, or had forgotten its meaning” did not change the court‟s opinion that the technical term 
should remain in the public domain.
151
 
Of course, the difference between foreign-language marks and those trademarks lies in 
the fact that English and French have official language status in Canada. There is no reason why 
this difference should matter. Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion without 
making any reference to languages: it does not differentiate between official languages and 
foreign languages. This means that there is no statutory authority for why linguistic knowledge 
needs to be proven instead of being assumed for foreign languages, just as there is no judicial 
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 Home Juice Co v Orange Maison Ltée, [1970] SCR 942 at 944-945 (“Respondent has contended that the current 
meaning in France is not to be considered, that regard must be had only to the meaning current in Canada … . This 
contention would have serious consequences if it was accepted. One result would be that a shrewd trader could 
monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a trade mark as soon as it started being used in France or in 
another French-speaking country and before it could be shown to have begun being used in Canada. In my opinion, 
the wording of s. 12 does not authorize such a distinction.”) [Home Juice]. And see Re an Application by La 
Marquise Footwear Inc’s Application (1947) 64 RPC 27 at 31 (“I think it would be an affectation to say that a word 
which has gained any currency as an American slang word ought to be treated in these islands, in the absence of any 
evidence one way or the other, as a foreign word.”) [Re La Marquise]. Contrast that with Re Application No 81899, 
(sub nom Milk Link Ltd v Almighty Marketing Ltd) (2005), O/149/05, aff‟d O/341/06 at para 5 (“He summarised his 
findings with reference to the evidence in the following terms: … Most of the evidence has dealt with American 
usage. American and British English do diverge; they may use the same words meaning different things. In such 
cases it may be necessary to view the languages as being different languages. Such is the case here. There is no 
indication that the British public has been exposed to the phrase MOO JUICE in such a manner that it will have seen 
it as a synonym for milk. The best that Link can muster to support its case is one incidence in one television 
programme.”). 
151
 Cantarella, supra note 141 at para 91, discussing Eutectic Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks, (1980) 32 
ALR 211 (“It was not in ordinary use by members of the community; most users of the applicant‟s goods did not 
know, or had forgotten its meaning; and there was no evidence of its use by other traders. It was, however, “a basic 
term used in metallurgy”, peculiarly appropriate to convey readiness to melt as a basic property of alloy. Refusing to 
conclude that EUTECTIC was inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant‟s goods, and citing Clark Equipment, 
Rogers J said that „[w]hilstsoever there remains a need and use for the word by other traders in an honest description 
of their goods and the word retains its primary and technical meaning, it should remain free in the public domain‟.”). 
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basis for why official-language marks are more deserving of protection than foreign-language 
marks. 
The subsections below illustrate how the test for confusion can be applied consistently to 
all trademarks, regardless of the languages in which they are expressed, if linguistic knowledge 
were assumed for foreign-language marks. 
 
5.1.1 Assessing for Distinctiveness 
Since an English-language mark is registrable only if it is distinctive or capable of 
becoming so,
 
it follows that foreign-language marks that are generic or clearly descriptive should 
not be registrable.
152
 
Generic marks are prohibited without any differentiation between official languages and 
foreign languages because their unregistrability applies to “the name in any language of any of 
the goods or services”.153 In this regard, Chapter 6 discusses how the American doctrine of 
foreign equivalents protests the registration in foreign countries of product names in English, as 
well as prohibits the registration in the United States of generic words in a foreign language.
154
 
Descriptive marks, however, are prohibited differently because their unregistrability is 
restricted to those which are “clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or 
French language of the character or quality of the goods or services”.155 The restriction to the 
                                                 
152
 Genericism is an absolute bar to registration, whereas descriptiveness is a relative bar to registration that can be 
overcome by acquiring distinctiveness, according to Vaver, supra note 21 at 479, 486. Contrast that with the 
European Union, which treats both genericness and descriptiveness as absolute grounds for refusal, according to 
Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, [2009] OJ, L 78/1 at 7 
(Absolute grounds for refusal – “1. The following shall not be registered: (b) trade marks which are devoid of any 
distinctive character; (c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to 
designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or the time of production of the 
goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service;”) [(EC) No 207/2009]. 
153
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 12(1)(c). 
154
 Re Le Sorbet, Inc, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 27 at *9 (TTAB 1985) [Re Le Sorbet]. 
155
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 12(1)(b). 
 71 
 
English or French language is so specific that language combinations that are not translations 
may be clearly descriptive and still registrable:
156
 LE JUICE for fruit juices is permitted even 
though the individual words are descriptive,
157
 and WOLAINE for textile and fabric is permitted 
because the combination as a whole is not the name of anything in either language.
158
 This 
restriction to the English or French language also means that a foreign-language mark may also 
be clearly descriptive: TAM TAM for crackers and biscuits is permitted even though the 
Hebrew-language mark means “tasty”,159 both MORINDA and TAHITIAN NONI are permitted 
for skin products and dietary supplements derived from trees with the Polynesian names 
“morinda” and “noni”.160 Canada‟s Trademarks Act should remove the restriction to the English 
or French language, and apply the prohibition to any language, for two reasons. 
First, Home Juice suggests that the purpose of prohibiting clearly descriptive marks is to 
ensure that “a shrewd trader [does not] monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a 
trade mark as soon as it started being used in France or in another French-speaking country and 
                                                 
156
 Canadian Dental Hygienists’ Association/L’Association canadienne des hygienists dentaires v Canadian Dental 
Association/L’Associaton Dentaire Canadienne, 2011 TMOB 7 at paras 40, 48 and 2011 TMOB 8 at paras 41, 49 
(“However, the present case is not a situation where the Applicant has telescoped two descriptive terms to create an 
invented word. Neither is it a situation where the combination of two languages has been taken together to formulate 
the trademark. Instead, in the present case, the Applicant has joined a clearly descriptive English mark with its 
equivalent clearly descriptive French mark in order to produce a mark which would be clearly descriptive in both 
languages to the bilingual consumer; the English and French portions are merely translations of each other. … In my 
view, Parliament could not have intended that a mark which is clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in 
one of Canada‟s official languages could be registrable as long as its equivalent translations in Canada‟s other 
official language was also part of the mark.”). 
157
 Coca-Cola Co v Cliffstar Corp (1993), 49 CPR (3d) 358 (TMOB) at 361 (“The applicant‟s proposed mark is 
comprised of the French word “le” and the ordinary English word “juice”. The former word is a definite article in 
the French language. The latter word is clearly descriptive in the English language of the character of the wares 
“fruit juices” and the applicant has conceded this by including a disclaimer in its application. The combination of the 
two words, however, does not offend the provisions of s. 12(1)(b) of the Act.”). 
158
 Wool Bureau of Canada Ltd v Bruck Mills Ltd (1980), 61 CPR (2d) 108 (TMOB) at 113 (“In the case of the trade 
mark WOLAINE, I do not consider that the average person in Canada would attribute to the trade mark the meaning 
which one might arrive at by dissecting the mark into its component parts considering its derivation from the words 
„wool + laine‟.”) 
159
 Gula v Manischewitz Co (1947), 8 CPR 103. Contrast that with the American doctrine of foreign equivalents, 
which prohibited the registration of SAPORITO for sausages because the Italian-language mark means “tasty”, 
according to Re Geo A Hormel & Co, 227 USPQ 813 (TTAB 1985). 
160
 Primalda Industries Corp v Morinda, Inc, 2004 CanLII 71775. 
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before it could be shown to have begun being used in Canada.”161 This purpose is important 
enough for the courts to extend the prohibition even to clearly descriptive words used as a 
compound mark, as an ellipse, or with corrupted spelling.
162
 Therefore, this rationale should also 
apply to foreign-language marks now that the courts include linguistic knowledge in the test for 
confusion. It is important that traders be prohibited from doing in a foreign language what they 
cannot do in the English or French language; namely, monopolize common words and prohibit 
others from their generic or clearly descriptive use.
163
 
Second, Canada‟s abandonment of the use requirement for trademark applications will 
open the door for trademark squatting in Canada. Trademark applicants may try to circumvent 
the prohibition against registering a mark which is clearly descriptive in English or French by 
adding a Chinese translation of the trademark, just as a Chinese bakery kept trying to circumvent 
its competitor‟s Chinese-language mark by copying it and adding a different English translation 
each time.
164
 This danger is real now that the courts have taken judicial notice of linguistic 
knowledge for Chinese-language marks, as China is suspected of being the largest nation of 
trademark squatters in the world.
165
 Removing the restriction to the English or French language 
                                                 
161
 Home Juice, supra note 150 at 944-945. 
162
 English-language marks are unregistrable in Canada even if the clearly descriptive word is used in a compound 
mark (COCA-COLA for “soda drinks” in Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102; as an ellipse (OFF! for “insect repellent” in 
SC Johnson & Son Ltd v Marketing Int’l Ltd, [1980] 1 SCR 99; FRIGIDAIRE for “refrigerators” in General Motors 
Corp v Bellows, [1949] SCR 678; O CEDAR for “polishing oil” in Channel Co v Rombough, [1924] SCR 600); or 
with corrupted spelling (SHUR-ON and STAY-ZON for “eye-glass frames” in Kirstein Sons & Co v Cohen Bros 
(1907), 39 SCR 286). 
163
 Cantarella, supra note 141 at para 44 (“The requirement that a proposed trade mark be examined from the point 
of view of the possible impairment of the rights of honest traders to do that which, apart from the grant of a 
monopoly, would be their natural mode of conducting business …, and from the wider point of view of the public …, 
has been applied to words proposed as trade marks for at least a century, irrespective of whether the words are 
English or foreign.”). The High Court of Australia, however, went on to find that ORO and CINQUE STELLE 
(Italian for “gold” and “five stars” respectively) were not descriptive of coffee products because at least 350,000 
Italian speakers in Australia were insufficient to prove linguistic knowledge. 
164
 Saint Honore TMOB, supra note 110. 
165
 Daniel Chow, “Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks Doctrine in China” (2014) 47:1 Geo 
Wash Intl L Rev 57 at 60 (“The prevalence of trademark squatting in China has led to the accusation that China is 
among the largest, if not the largest, nation of squatters.”). 
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will enable Canada to follow other countries in prohibiting foreign-language marks that are 
clearly descriptive even if they are used in a varied form, as slang, or with phonetic spelling.
166
 
The chart below shows that the prohibition against generic and descriptive marks should 
apply not just to foreign words but also to their English transliterations, which can become 
standardized and accepted English words. This is why it is necessary for trademark applications 
to require translations of foreign-language marks, in order to determine whether the equivalent 
English-language marks would be registrable, so as to avoid accidentally registering generic or 
clearly descriptive words in other languages. Therefore, foreign-language marks should be 
assessed for distinctiveness based on their translation(s) into the official language(s) of the 
country assessing the trademark (which would include French in Canada). 
Foreign Words English Transliterations that became 
standardized and accepted English words 
 
مل ع رب ج لا  
Arabic for “reunion of broken parts” 
 
ALGEBRA 
豆  腐  
Chinese for “bean curd” 
 
TOFU 
Αγορά  
Greek for “gathering place” 
 
AGORA 
ןמא 
Hebrew for “verily” or “so be it” 
 
AMEN 
Pronounced “ka-na-ta”  
Huron-Iroquois for “village” or “settlement” 
 
CANADA 
                                                 
166
 Foreign-language marks are unregistrable in other countries even if used in a varied form (DIABOLO from the 
Italian DIAVOLO for a type of game called “the devil on two sticks” in Philippart v William Whiteley Ltd, [1908] 2 
Ch 274); as a slang (CHUPA in Spanish for “lollipop” in Enrique Bernat F SA v Guadalajara, Inc, 210 F (3d) 439 
(5th Cir 2000) [Enrique Bernat]; or with phonetic spelling (SHORINJI KEMPO from the Japanese characters for a 
type of “martial arts” such as Judo, Karate and TaeKwonDo in British Shorinji Kempo Fed v Shorinji Kempo Unity, 
[2014] EWHC 285 (Ch)). 
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カラオケ  
Japanese for “empty orchestra” 
 
KARAOKE 
김  치  
Korean for “soaked vegetable” 
 
KIMCHI 
Кремль  
Russian for “castle” or “fortress” 
 
KREMLIN 
योग  
Sanskrit for “to unite” 
 
YOGA 
 
 
5.1.2 Comparing for Confusion 
Contrary to assessing for distinctiveness, foreign-language marks should not be compared 
for confusion based only on their translations. Since English-language marks are compared for 
confusion by considering the target consumers of the goods and services, it follows that the 
foreign-language marks should not be compared for confusion by considering only the general 
public.
167
 
Confusing marks are prohibited without making any reference to languages.
168
 This is 
consistent with how the test for confusion does not differentiate between official languages and 
foreign languages. In this regard, judicial application of the test for confusion initially errs in 
requiring evidence of linguistic knowledge instead of assuming it, and further errs (and 
                                                 
167
 Confusion is an absolute bar to registration according to Vaver, supra note 21 at 479. Contrast that with the 
European Union, which treats confusion as a relative ground for refusal, according to (EC) No 207/2009, supra note 
152 at 8 (Relative grounds for refusal – “1. Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade 
mark applied for shall not be registered: (b) if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and 
the identity or similarity of the goods and services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion 
on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected, the likelihood of confusion 
includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark;”). 
168
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 12(1)(d). 
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contradicts itself) in basing the comparison on the English translation instead of on the foreign-
language mark for two reasons. 
First, consumers who understand the foreign language used in the trademark have no 
need to translate it into English. The translation problems discussed in Chapter 3 – the 
unflattering translations for COLA-COLA; as well as the name changes for PEPSI, KFC, and 
MCDONALD‟S without corresponding changes in the translations – all suggest that courts 
cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the translation 
will be. It is only Canadian examiners and the judiciary who need to translate the trademarks in 
order to understand and discuss the ideas suggested by the trademarks, but it is misleading then 
to base the comparison on the translation instead of the foreign-language mark in question.
169
 An 
example is how COLA lacked distinctiveness since it meant “carbonated drink, soft drink, soda, 
or pop”. If it had been translated based on its meaning, then its Chinese equivalent would have 
been 氣 水 (QI4 SHUI3 means “air water”). However, it was translated based on its sound 
instead as 可 樂 (KE3 LE4 was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933). This meant 
that although PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA in English,
170
 百 
事 可 樂 would have been confusing with and should have been stopped by the previous use of 
可 口 可 樂 in Chinese. This was not done and, as a result, 可 樂 became a generic word in the 
Chinese lexicon (just like COLA in English). Another example of how comparing for confusion 
in different languages could produce different results comes from the discussion earlier of how 
Canada found two Chinese trademarks to be distinctive in a 1992 decision, only to contradict 
itself in a 2011 decision by finding the same two Chinese trademarks to be confusing. 
                                                 
169
 This becomes even more obvious when we remember that even if particular examincers or judges were to know 
the language, they may not be entitled to take judicial knowledge of this specialization because other examiners or 
judges cannot be assumed to have it. 
170
 Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102 at 617-618. 
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Comparing only the English translations in the 1992 decision resulted in no confusion between 
ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE and SAINT ANNA BAKERY, but comparing the actual Chinese-
language marks in the 2011 decision resulted in confusion even with the attached English 
translations of ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE and SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP.171 Failing to 
assume linguistic knowledge would have allowed competitors to copy the Chinese-language 
mark ad infinitum by adding a different English translation each time. 
Second, consumers who do not understand the foreign language in the trademark would 
simply see it as a design and could still be confused (or not), just as with any other design. In this 
regard, Canadian examiner and the judiciary wrongly assume that a finding of linguistic 
knowledge (or lack thereof) results in a finding of confusion (or lack thereof) when the two 
issues are actually independent of each other. This is why the test for confusion should not 
require the additional evidence of linguistic knowledge but should remain focused on the original 
evidence of confusion, regardless of whether the said confusion arose from fluent consumers 
confused by the actual foreign “words” or from illiterate consumers confused by what they see 
as “designs”. 
Therefore, a foreign-language mark should not be compared for confusion based only on 
its translation. This applies whether comparing with another trademark in the same foreign 
language, with another trademark in a different foreign language, or with another trademark in an 
official language of the country doing the assessment. The principles set out herein also apply to 
the subsections below, which are more specific illustrations of the same. The subsections below 
may seem counterintuitive at first, as they take the position that COCA-COLA should not bar 
competitors from registering the translation 可 口 可 樂 or the pronunciation KE3 KOU3 KE3 
                                                 
171
 Saint Honore, supra note 91. 
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LE4. Before we assume that the right to COCA-COLA also means a right to its foreign-language 
equivalents, we should remember that not even CLICQUOT had an automatic right to the 99% 
similar CLIQUOT for clothing, and not even BARBIE could stop the 100% similar BARBIE for 
restaurants.
172
 If consumers can differentiate such similar English-language marks in order to 
associate them with different goods and services, then surely they can distinguish between an 
English-language mark and its foreign-language equivalents in order to correlate them with 
different traders.  
 
5.1.2A Comparing for Confusion with Translations 
Since a claim in an English-language mark does not necessarily mean a monopoly on its 
synonyms,
173
 subject to evidence of confusion,
174
 it follows that a claim for a foreign-language 
mark should not encompass claims for its translations without similar evidence.  
                                                 
172
 Veuve Clicquot, supra note 99. Mattel, supra note 99. 
173
 Synonyms include everything ranging from slang and nicknames (COKE for COCA-COLA worldwide; 
MACCA‟S for MCDONALD‟S in Australia) to acronyms and abbreviations (KFC for KENTUCKY FRIED 
CHICKEN and IBM for INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES; MAC for MCDONALD‟S hamburger or 
MACTINOSH computers). 
174
 No confusion was found between DAWN and DAYLIGHT for donuts in Dawn Donut Co v Day, 450 F (2d) 332 
(10th Cir 1971); or HEAVEN and CELESTE for orbs and pendants in Orb Factory, Ltd v Design Science Toys, Ltd, 
6 F Supp2d 203 (SDNY 1998). Confusion, however, was found between TORNADO and CYCLONE for wire 
fencing in Hancock v American Steel & Wire Co of New Jersey, 203 F (2d) 737 (CCPA 1953); PLEDGE and 
PROMISE for cleaning products in SC Johnson & Son, Inc v Drop Dead Co, 326 F (2d) 87 (9th Cir 1963); ALPINE 
and MOUNTAIN for artificial Christmas trees in Masterpiece of Pennsylvania, Inc v Consolidated Novelty Co, 368 
F Supp 550 (SDNY 1973); ROACH MOTEL and ROACH INN for pest products in Am Home Product Corp v 
Johnson Chemical Co, 589 F (2d) 103 (2d Cir 1978); as well as SLICKCRAFT and SLEEKCRAFT for boats in 
AMF Inc v Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F (2d) 341 (9th Cir 1979). And see Mary LaFrance, “Initial Impressions: 
Trademark Protection for Abbreviations of Generic or Descriptive Terms” (2012) 45:201 Akron L Rev at 202, 239 
(comparing the different approaches of the federal courts and discussing the inconsistency across the circuits in the 
United States). Contrast that with Bayuk Cigars, Inc v Schwartz, DC, 1 F Supp 283 (DNJ 1932) (finding no 
confusion between two cigar companies using PHILLIES because the public nickname did not enure to anyone) 
with Coca-Cola Co v Busch, 44 F Supp 405 (ED Pa 1942) (finding confusion between KOKE and COKE because 
the latter was a public nickname that enured to the plaintiff) [Coca-Cola v Busch]. Oddly, both the United States and 
Canada are consistent in holding confectionary-related names to be confusing. And see Jellibeans Inc v Skating 
Clubs of Georgia Inc, 716 F (2d) 833 (11th Cir 1983) at paras 20-21 (finding that JELLIBEANS and LOLLIPOPS, 
though not synonymous, were confusing for skating rinks) and Rowntree Co Ltd v Paulin Chambers Co Ltd et al, 
[1968] SCR 134 at 137, 139 (finding that SMARTIES and SMOOTHIES were synonymous and confusing for 
candy). 
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For example, a review of the SAINT HONORE and ANNA marks indicates that at issue 
was the confusion between the three Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 in one party‟s marks and the 
same two Chinese characters 安 娜 in the other party‟s marks. One party asserted that the ideas 
suggested by the trademarks are different because it translated the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 as 
SAINT HONORE while the other party translated the same Chinese characters 安  娜 as 
ANNA.
175
 The court said nothing in response directly, but indirectly seemed to agree when it 
stated that the Chinese characters 安 娜 translated as ANNA gave one party‟s marks a greater 
degree of inherent distinctiveness than the other party‟s marks.176 This is a mistake because both 
marks included the same Chinese characters and were translated arbitrarily by traders, which has 
no bearing on how consumers would translate them. Consumers who translate one party‟s marks 
as SAINT HONORE will do the same for the other party‟s marks, and vice versa for consumers 
who translate them as ANNA. This means that consumers who translate the Chinese characters
聖 安 娜 as SAINT HONORE will also translate the Chinese characters 安 娜 as HONORE, and 
consumers who translate the Chinese characters 安 娜 as ANNA will also translate the Chinese 
characters 聖 安 娜 as SAINT ANNA. Consumers are not going to switch translation from one 
mark to another mark, and the court should have explained and decided that the ideas suggested 
by the trademarks are the same. This becomes even more obvious when we remember that Saint 
Honore Cake Shop used to be called Saint Anna Bakery, and that a previous translation of the 
SAINT HONORE mark (see the left side of the chart below) used to be called the SAINT 
ANNA mark (see the left side of the chart below). The chart below also provides another 
example of how the same Chinese characters can be translated arbitrarily by traders, which has 
                                                 
175
 Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 35. 
176
 Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 49. 
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no bearing on how consumers would translate them: the last two Chinese characters literally 
mean “cake house” (the translation used by Cheung‟s Bakery), which were interpreted as “cake 
shop” or “bakery” (the two translations used by Saint Honore Cake Shop). 
Trademark for  
Current name of Saint Honore Cake Shop 
Trademark for  
Previous name of Saint Anna Bakery 
 
177
 
178
 
 
An example of this mistake using English is the acronym LOL. A new acquaintance may 
think LOL translates as “laughing out loud” and send you the message: “Wasn‟t yesterday‟s 
party hilarious? LOL!” Meanwhile, a best friend may think LOL translates as “lots of love” and 
send you the message: “Is it true you‟re in the hospital? LOL!” What either sender of the 
messages thinks LOL means has no bearing on the ideas suggested by the texts, as that actually 
depends on what the receiver thinks LOL means. If you translate LOL as “laughing out loud”, 
you will do the same for both messages and think the best friend is inappropriately mean. If you 
translate LOL as “lots of love”, you will also do the same for both messages and think the new 
acquaintance is inappropriately forward. Since the court correctly concluded that the trademarks 
were confusing based on other elements, this linguistic mistake did not affect the outcome in the 
end. Nonetheless, such a linguistic mistake must be avoided in future cases in order to remain 
consistent with the consumer imagined by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court 
of Canada. Whether it be a matter of first impression and imperfect recollection, or the average 
consumer of the product, both courts are clear that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of 
                                                 
177
 Trademarks: SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP LIMITED & CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Opposed, 
1329117 
178
 Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & Chinese Characters Design, Registered, 1235030, TMA667403  
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the consumer (the receiver of the message) and not the mind of the trader (the sender of the 
message). It is a mystery why the linguistic mistakes were not drawn to the attention of the court. 
The court could not be expected to know that the same Chinese characters would have multiple 
translations, especially if the parties do not challenge the arbitrariness of the translations. 
As a general rule, without evidence connecting the two, it is dangerous to equate a 
foreign-language mark with a translation because translations can be multiple and arbitrary. For 
example, SAINT HONORE could also have meant SAINT ANNA. To allow a foreign-language 
mark to expand into claims for translations is to go beyond the metes and bounds of the 
registration, in light of the fact that a foreign-language mark can mean different things literally, 
colloquially, or culturally. 
Therefore, a trader who chooses a specific English-language mark (COCA-COLA) must 
accept the consequences of the scope of its claim, which will not necessarily include other 
meanings (COCA-POP, COCA-SODA, etc.). Any such inclusion should first require evidence 
that there is likelihood of confusion. The same rationale should apply to traders who choose a 
specific Chinese-language mark, instead of its possible translations, as consumers may not find 
that the Chinese-language mark is meaningfully interchangeable with its translations.  
 
5.1.2B Comparing for Confusion with Transliterations 
The arguments against equating foreign-language marks to translations also apply to 
transliterations.  Since a claim in an English-language mark does not automatically expand into 
claims for its homophones,
179
 subject to evidence of confusion,
180
 it follows that a claim for a 
foreign-language mark should not include claims for its transliterations without similar evidence.  
                                                 
179
 Homophones share the same pronunciation but different spelling: BEAU – BOW and BOUGH – BOW; 
DESSERT – DESERT; LED – LEAD; WHINED – WINED – WIND. Conversely, homographs share the same 
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For example, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited has been using the English-language 
mark CHEUNG KONG and the Chinese-language mark 長 江 since the 1950‟s in Hong Kong 
and the 1980‟s in Toronto for real estate services. Due to a series of events leading up to 1984, it 
retained the English-language mark and a Toronto competitor ended up with the Chinese-
language mark. It registered the English-language mark, which it used as the basis to oppose the 
Toronto competitor‟s application for the Chinese-language mark. The Federal Court of Canada 
took judicial notice of the existence of a significant Chinese community as the potential target 
market and, as a result, found that the Chinese-language mark was confusing with the English-
language mark. This was strange in light of the fact that the registration for CHEUNG KONG 
gave the impression that it was an invented English term, as it failed to mention that it was a 
transliteration for certain Chinese characters.
181
 This meant that it had no evidence to connect to 
and, thereby, oppose the competing application for 長 江.182 Fortunately for the registration, the 
application implicated itself by mentioning that its transliteration was CHEUNG KONG.  
                                                                                                                                                             
spelling but different pronunciation: If you BOW when picking up the BOWS, we will DESERT you in the 
DESERT and you will have to rely on a piece of LEAD to LEAD you back, unless you wish to WIND up forgotten 
and blowing in the WIND. Homonyms are both homophones and homographs simultaneously: Please ADDRESS 
everyone at this street ADDRESS as to why their dogs BARK at the tree BARK, and ask if they CAN remove the 
garbage CAN by noon. 
180
 No confusion was found in between BREWSKY‟S bars and BREWSKI BROTHERS clothing in Brewski Beer 
Co v Brewski Brothers, Inc, 47 USPQ2d 1281 (TTAB 1998); or PHIFTY-50 music albums and 50-50 movie titles in 
Eastland Music Group, LLC v Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc, Appeal No 12-2928 (7th Cir 2013), presumably because of the 
differences in goods and services. Confusion, however, was found between ESSO and SO for petroleum products in 
Esso, Inc v Standard Oil Co, 98 F (2d) 1 (8th Cir 1938); COMSAT for a satellite communications system and 
COMCET for computer communications engineering technology in Communications Satellite Corp v Comcet, Inc, 
429 F (2d) 1245 (4th Cir 1970); as well as AUXIGRO and OXYGROW for fertilizer products in Emerald 
Bioagriculture Corp v Biosafe Systems, LLC, Cancellation No 92042503 (TTAB Feb 9, 2006). Contrast that with 
Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd v AG of Canada, [1980] 1 SCR 914 at 928 (stating in the dictum of a constitutional 
case that SPECIAL LITE would likely be mistaken for LIGHT BEER, as defined then under the repealed Food & 
Drug Act, RSC 1970, c F-27, s 6). 
181
 Trademarks: CHEUNG KONG, Expunged, 0618425, TMA385395; and Trademarks: CHEUNG KONG, 
Registered, 1052787, TMA605043. 
182
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS; DESIGN, Expunged, 0530067, TMA310471; Trademarks: CHINESE 
CHARACTERS & DESIGN, Expunged, 0683560, TMA433298; and Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS & 
DESIGN, Refused - Section 38(8), 0692232. 
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As a general rule, unless there is evidence to support connecting the two, it is inadvisable 
to equate a foreign-language mark with a transliteration as transliterations can be multiple and 
arbitrary. For example, the transliteration CHEUNG KONG can also be spelled CHEON GONE, 
CHIONG KUNG, etc. To allow a foreign-language mark to expand into claims for 
transliterations could quickly turn into a “grabfest”, especially when we remember that a 
Chinese-language mark can be read in many dialects with different pronunciations. The two 
transliterations above were based on how the Cantonese dialect pronounces the Chinese 
characters, whereas Mandarin pronounces the same Chinese characters as CHANG2 JIANG1.
183
 
Given that transliterations can be arbitrary in the same way that spellings can be varied, it is 
important that Western databases adopt the official phonetic system in order to ensure that 
transliterations are consistent in order to be compared. 
Therefore, a trader who chooses to spell an English-language mark a specific way 
(COCA-COLA) cannot rely upon the law to act automatically as an insurer against other 
spellings that were not chosen (KOKAH KOLAH, GO GA GOAL AH, etc.). Any such reliance 
should first require evidence that there is likelihood of confusion. The same rationale should 
apply to traders who decide to use a specific Chinese-language mark, instead of its possible 
transliterations, as consumers may not intuitively correlate the Chinese-language mark with its 
transliterations. 
A concluding reason to hold traders to their chosen translation (or transliteration) is 
simply the fact that the trademark application stage provides a better opportunity to obtain direct 
and honest translations (or transliterations) than during the opposition, expungement, or 
                                                 
183
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0748168, TMA554984 contained the Chinese 
characters 長 江, which it transliterated as CHANG JIANG and translated as CHEUNG KONG. The latter illustrates 
that traders are unaware of what is required for a translation, as CHEUNG KONG is not a translation. It also 
illustrates that lawyers and examiners are unaware of what to ask in order to obtain a proper translation, as they 
probably assume that “Cheung Kong” is akin to the English words “Chop Suey” or “Chow Mein”. 
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infringement proceedings. Consider how the registration for CHEUNG KONG was used 
successfully to oppose the competing application for 長  江 . Despite their difference in 
appearance, the Federal Court of Canada found that they were similar in sound and in the ideas 
suggested by them since they both meant “long river”.184 This finding could not have been based 
on the registration for CHEUNG KONG, which gave the impression that it was an invented 
English term by failing to mention that it was a transliteration for Chinese characters that mean 
“long river”. Instead, this finding was based on the competing application for 長 江, which 
implicated itself by mentioning that its transliteration was CHEUNG KONG and its meaning 
was “long river”. If the competing application had not been so direct and honest, it could have 
argued conveniently at trial that its transliteration was CHANG2 JIANG1 (instead of CHEUNG 
KONG) and its meaning was the “Yangtze River” (instead of “long river”).185 
What is interesting to note is that neither the registration nor the competing application 
mentions that both are standard references to the “Yanztze River”: Asia‟s longest river is to 
China what South America‟s Amazon is to Brazil, or Africa‟s Nile is to Egypt. This means that 
neither have helpful evidence to oppose future competing applications for YANGTZE, the 
cultural subject of Chinese diaspora‟s nostalgia and a popular song that became an anthem of 
Chinese pride.
186
 This result is desirable because it is likely that both traders failed to provide the 
colloquial translation in order to avoid a descriptiveness objection from the Canadian examiner. 
Although both terms had been in use since the 1950‟s in Hong Kong and the 1980‟s in Toronto 
                                                 
184
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9. 
185
 Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0748168, TMA554984 contained the Chinese 
characters 長 江, which it transliterated as CHANG JIANG and translated as CHEUNG KONG. The latter illustrates 
that traders are unaware of what is required for a translation, which should have been “long river” and “Yangtze 
River”. It also illustrates that lawyers and examiners are unaware of what to ask in order to obtain a proper 
translation, due to the blinding and paralyzing fear of what is “foreign”. 
186
 Jonathan Stock, “Four recurring themes in histories of Chinese music” in Philip V Bohlman, ed, The Cambridge 
History of World Music (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 397. 
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for real estate services, they probably had not acquired secondary meaning in Canada at the time 
of their trademark applications. If traders benefit from having examiners think that CHEUNG 
KONG is an invented English term, or that 長 江 is an arbitrary combination that means “long 
river”, then such traders must accept the corollary difficulty of showing evidence of confusion 
with YANGTZE. 
 Professor Craig writes in the copyright context about how the “powerful and 
mesmerizing badge of „property‟ … takes over our understanding and distorts our policy 
decisions.”187 We see in this chapter how the blinding and paralyzing fear of what is “foreign” 
can have the same effects. First, it takes over our understanding of basic laws in that 
administrative and judicial cases ignored prior judicial explanation of who the consumer is – the 
target consumer of the product, instead of the general public – in their application of the test for 
confusion to foreign-language marks. Second, it distorts our policy decisions in that the case law 
still requires evidence that the foreign language used in a trademark is understood by the target 
consumer, even though the statutory permission to prove the confusion arising from linguistic 
knowledge cannot necessarily be interpreted as a statutory requirement to prove the existence of 
linguistic knowledge.  
 It is clear from this chapter that the Canadian test for confusion can be improved through 
an understanding of what is “foreign”. This should be done by including linguistic knowledge as 
part of “all” the circumstances that are relevant to the test for confusion, and by remembering 
that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of the consumer instead of the trader. In the words 
                                                 
187
 Carys Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author‟s Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to 
Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen‟s LJ 1 at 57. 
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of the two-time Nobel Prize winner Marie Curie: “Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be 
understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less.”188 
  
                                                 
188
 Marie Curie in Melvin Bernarde, Our Precarious Habitat, 2nd ed (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1973) at 
v. 
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6 JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES 
 
This chapter explains several alternatives in response to the problem of proving linguistic 
knowledge, as the evidence required to prove such knowledge changes constantly depending on 
international trade, multicultural consumers, brand extension and cross-branding in order to 
access untapped markets. Each alternative is explored and its challenges are explained in order to 
reinforce why the problem is best addressed with the solution of assuming linguistic knowledge. 
 
6.1 American Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents 
The first alternative is the American doctrine of foreign equivalents. However, it was 
rejected as early as 1992 by the same Federal Court of Canada which later included linguistic 
knowledge as part of the Canadian test for confusion. One reason was because the American 
doctrine is only a guideline and not law in the United States.
189
 The guideline was developed by 
the common law, is not always applied consistently, and has even resulted in contradictory cases. 
All this has led some scholars to suggest that at best it is unreliable and should be abolished at 
worst.
190
 Another reason was because the purpose of the American doctrine diverges from that of 
                                                 
189
 Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 172 (“The Appellant further submitted that it would be useful in the context of the 
facts of this case to consider the doctrine of foreign equivalents as applied in the United States of America, since that 
country is a party to the Paris Convention. The doctrine of foreign equivalents in the United States of America 
essentially provides that foreign words or terms may not be registered as a trade mark if the English language 
equivalent has been previously registered for products which might reasonably be assumed to come from the same 
source. This doctrine is not based on any statutory provision, but rather is merely a principle to be applied in 
determining the registrability of a trade mark. I see no basis for importing this American doctrine into our law in 
view of the statutory scheme in the Act pertaining to the determination of confusion.”). 
190
 Shuy, supra note 86 at 36 (“McCarthy is surely correct when he states that application of the doctrine of foreign 
equivalents can result in a finding quite out of phase with reality.”); Elizabeth Rest, “Lost in Translation: A Critical 
Examination of Conflicting Decisions Applying the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents” (2006) 96 INTA Trademark 
Reporter 1211 at 1223 (“there is little agreement among courts regarding what the doctrine actually dictates, and 
there is disagreements as to when and how the doctrine should be applied”); Serge Krimnus, “The Doctrine of 
Foreign Equivalents at Death‟s Door” (2010) 12:1 NCJL & Tech. 
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the Canadian test. The Canadian test is in accordance with the dual purposes of trademark law – 
protecting consumers from confusion and owners from unfair competition – and remains the 
same for both official-language marks and foreign-language marks.
191
 When Home Juice 
prohibited clearly descriptive marks from foreign countries, before they have begun to be used in 
Canada, it was to protect Canadians and not to obtain a quid pro quo from foreign countries. By 
contrast, the American doctrine extends beyond the purpose of trademark law for the purpose of 
international comity:
192
 
“The international trade foundation for the rule is significant from the standpoint 
of the protection of the United States trading interests in foreign countries. Since 
prior to the Lanham Act, the United States, through its Departments of State and 
Commerce, has protested the registration in foreign countries of terms considered 
to be generic names in the English language of products sold in the United States 
and sold or intended to be sold in export trade. The rationale of these protests is 
that registration of generic terms as trademarks would interfere with the free flow 
of international trade in products known by that generic term. … Obviously, to 
permit registration here of terms in a foreign language which are generic for 
                                                 
191
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 72 (“Second, the purposes of paragraph 12(1)(d) include the protection of 
consumers from being misled about the source of wares and services, and to enable providers and suppliers to 
identify their wares and services and to protect them from unfair competition. Hence, it would seem to me that 
whether a “significant” number of consumers are likely to be confused may be determined, not only by the 
proportion of those misled, but also in certain circumstances by the absolute number of such persons. As a legal test 
of the likelihood of confusion, the impression on the “average Canadian”, or even the “average consumer”, may 
assume a greater homogeneity among actual consumers of a service or ware than is appropriate in such a richly 
diverse society as contemporary Canada.”). 
192
 The concept of international comity suggests reciprocity. This raises questions as to what should happen if a 
word is generic in one country but not in another country using the same language: For Canada to protest the 
registration of generic French terms in the United States, will Canada have to cancel current registrations for 
ASPIRIN, CELLOPHANE, or THERMOS because they are generic English terms in the United States? And for a 
third country (like China) to protest the registration of generic Chinese terms in the United States, will it have to 
ignore Canadian registrations that conflict with American genericness?  
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products sold in a foreign country would be inconsistent with the rationale 
supporting these international protests.”193 
 
Perhaps the Canadian test should also expand to include the purpose of international 
comity for three reasons. First, Canada‟s Trademarks Act deems trademark use on exported 
products to be use in Canada.
194
 Second, other jurisdictions have held that passing off on 
exported products is actionable locally even if the confusion occurs abroad.
195
 Third, Canada‟s 
membership in the World Trade Organization as of January 1, 1995 and its anticipated accession 
to the Nice Agreement, Singapore Treaty and Madrid Protocol – which allow a trademark 
registered in one member country to extend that registration to any or all of the other member 
countries – would discourage permitting the registration of foreign-language marks which are 
generic for products sold in the member countries of these international trade agreements. If 
extra-territoriality is not an issue for specific trademarks in the examples above, then it should 
not be an issue for trademarks that are generic terms of products.  
Perhaps the policy of international comity should apply to all countries and not just to 
some countries. This would mean that the Holy See (Vatican City) can protest generic terms in 
                                                 
193
 Re Le Sorbet, supra note 154. Contrast that with Re Spirits International, NV, 86 USPQ 2d 1078 (TTAB 2008) at 
13 (“The purpose of the Trademark Act is two-fold: to protect business and to protect the consumer. … The doctrine 
of foreign equivalents is fundamental to this protection. It extends the protection of the Act to those consumers in 
this country who speak other languages in addition to English.”) [Re Spirits TTAB]. 
194
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 4(3) (Use by export – “A trademark that is marked in Canada on wares or on 
the packages in which they are contained is, when the wares are exported from Canada, deemed to be used in 
Canada in association with those wares.”). 
195
 William Grant & Sons Ltd & Ors v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd & Ors [2001] ScotCS 116 at para 66 
(“[We reject the ground of appeal] that the Lord Ordinary had erred in holding that interdict should apply in respect 
of export of the defendant‟s products bearing the name Grant‟s to all countries, since the evidence did not warrant a 
view that exports to all overseas markets were unlawful. In dealing with the matter, I proceed on the basis that the 
Lord Ordinary‟s findings are more than ample to demonstrate that the defenders are liable to pass off their products 
as the pursuers‟ in many overseas markets and that consumers and others in those markets are likely to experience 
confusion as a result.”). Lord Clarke supported this position at para 17 of his own opinion (“As is said in Burn 
Murdoch Law of Interdict at para. 348: “Defenders whose residences or business lies within Scottish jurisdiction can 
by interdict, operating in personam, be restrained from making infringing use of the pursuers‟ marks anywhere 
throughout the world.”). 
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the Latin language. The world‟s smallest sovereignty currently uses an official language (even its 
ATM uses Latin) that the United States generally has deemed to be a dead language and 
irrelevant to the issue of distinctiveness.
196
 However, it is uncertain what this would mean for 
Aboriginal and minority languages that are not the official language of any country (including 
the Inuit language, which is recognized as an official language only in a subdivision of a 
country).
197
 Either way, it is incorrect for the quote above to apply the policy of international 
comity only to countries with which the United States has trading interests significant enough to 
protest their registration of generic names in the English language. And it is also incorrect for the 
cases below to apply the American doctrine only to languages for which the United States has a 
linguistic population significant enough to translate. 
Despite their divergence in purpose, the American doctrine takes the same approach as 
the Canadian test by translating foreign-language marks into English in order to decide issues 
such as trademark distinctiveness
198
 and likelihood of confusion
199
: 
“Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words from common 
languages are translated into English to determine genericness, descriptiveness, as 
                                                 
196
 Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures, § 12.09.03(g) s (Considerations Relevant to Determination of 
Descriptiveness or Genericness – Foreign Equivalents – “Latin is generally considered a dead language. However, 
if evidence exists that the relevant purchasing public still uses a Latin term (e.g., if the term appears in current 
dictionaries or news articles, then that Latin term is not considered dead. The same analysis should be applied to 
other uncommon languages.”). 
197
 Inuit Act, supra note 138, c 17. A territory‟s statute must receive judicial notice. 
198
 Lanham Act 1946, 15 USC, c 22, § 1052(e) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature 
unless it – (e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely 
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,”). 
199
 Lanham Act 1946, 15 USC, c 22, § 1052(d) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature 
unless it – (d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, 
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive: …”). 
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well as similarity of connotation in order to ascertain confusing similarity with 
English word marks”200 
 
The doctrine applies if “it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would „stop and 
translate [the word] into its English equivalent‟.” 201 This sentence alone resulted in uncertainty 
as courts tried to reconcile two major contradictions.  
First, the ordinary American purchaser was clarified to mean only those “familiar with 
the foreign language”202 until a later case contradicted it by claiming that “the term includes all 
American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily 
be expected to translate words into English.”203 The cases can supposedly be reconciled to mean 
that the ordinary American purchaser should be restricted to the fluent consumer in general cases, 
but expanded to both the fluent and illiterate consumers in the specific case of geographic 
deceptiveness and descriptiveness.  
Second, “translate” was clarified to exclude transliterations. When a trademark 
application for VITAMILK was opposed due to prior use, the applicant tried to predate the 
opponent‟s prior use by tacking on its earlier use of the original Chinese-language mark 維 他 奶 
(WEI2 TA1 NAI3).
204
 The tacking was not allowed because the Chinese-language mark was 
rejected as a legal equivalent to VITAMILK. The two marks were not considered to continue the 
                                                 
200
 Palm Bay Imports, Inc v Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée En 1772, 396 F (3d) 1369, 73 USPQ 2d 1689 
(Fed Cir 2005) at 1377 [Palm Bay]. 
201
 Palm Bay, supra note 200. 
202
 Re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 2014 (TTAB 2006) at 1024 [Re Thomas]. 
203
 Re Spirits International, NV, 563 F (3d) 1347 (Fed Cir 2009) at 1352. 
204
 Green Spot (Thailand) Ltd v Vitasoy Int’l Holdings Ltd, Opposition No 91165010 (February 21, 2008) at 9 (“As a 
matter of law, the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not apply to a foreign mark partially comprised of characters 
that have no English translation … The fact that the first two characters of the mark have no meaning in English 
makes the mark overall incapable of translation.”). If this decision seems to have the reverse logic of my analysis 
above, it is because this decision reversed the facts by assuming that the foreign-language mark is the successor to 
and transliteration of the English equivalent. 
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same commercial impression because the American doctrine applies to translations of meanings, 
not transliterations of sounds. However, this clarification has been contradicted since then. When 
the trademark use of HANA BANK resulted in a lawsuit for trademark infringement, the user 
tried to predate the registrant‟s prior use by tacking on its earlier use of the original Korean-
language mark 하 나 은 행 (HA NA EUN HAENG).205 The tacking was allowed even though 
the first two characters were transliterated as HANA, which had no meaning in English. The 
Korean-language mark was accepted as a legal equivalent to HANA BANK even though the first 
two characters could have been transliterated as HA NA, ANA or HANNAH. The trademarks 
were considered to continue the same commercial impression even though the first two 
characters were not literally translated as “one” to mean “united” or “whole”. As a result, the 
trademark registration for HANA FINANCIAL was not infringed by the later use of HANA 
BANK due to an earlier use of the original Korean-language mark. It is interesting to note that if 
the disputing parties had translated instead of transliterated their original Korean-language marks, 
the comparison would not have been between HANA BANK and HANA FINANCIAL, but 
between ONE BANK and ONE FINANCIAL. Such a comparison would have led to a finding 
that the trademarks lacked distinctiveness. This would have been consistent with a court finding 
that there was no confusion between SUN BANK and SUN FEDERAL for banking services. 
Although similar in sight, sound and meaning, the court found that the word SUN lacked 
distinctiveness.
206
 
The uncertainty described above continues in the actual application of the doctrine, as the 
subsections below try to illustrate where the ordinary American purchaser is likely to “stop and 
translate” the foreign-language mark. In this regard, the American doctrine is even less 
                                                 
205
 Hana Financial, Inc v Hana Bank et al, 735 F (3d) 1158 (9th Cir 2013), aff‟d 135 US 907 (2015). 
206
 Sun Banks v Sun Federal Savings & Loan, 651 F (2d) 311 (5th Cir 1981). 
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satisfactory than the Canadian test and can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for 
all foreign-language marks. 
 
6.1.1 Comparing English to a Foreign Language 
When comparing an English-language mark to a foreign-language mark, the foreign-
language mark is translated into English since one of the trademarks needs to be translated and 
English is the only official language of the United States. Examples include applying the 
American doctrine and finding confusion between the French-language mark CHAT NOIR and 
BLACK CAT;
207
 the Spanish language mark EL SOL and SUN;
208
 the Italian language mark 
LUPO and WOLF;
209
 the Spanish language mark BUENOS DIAS and GOOD MORNING;
210
 
the Spanish language mark KRIPTONITA and KRYPTONITE;
211
 the French-language mark 
MARCHÉ NOIR and BLACK MARKET MINERALS;
212
 as well as the Spanish language mark 
LA PEREGRINA and PILGRIM.
213
 In the same way, the American doctrine can be applied but 
find that there is no confusion between marks that lack distinctiveness (such as the French-
language mark HAUTE MODE and HI-FASHION SAMPLER,
214
 as well as the French-
language mark LABONTÉ and GOOD-NESS
215
) or have other distinguishing features (such as 
the French-language mark DECI DELÀ and HERE & THERE & Design
216
). 
The Canadian test would consider whether there is evidence that the target consumer is 
familiar with the foreign language used in the trademarks. This means that the French-language 
                                                 
207
 Ex parte Odol-Werke Wien Gessellschaft MBH, 111 USPQ 286 (Comm‟r Pats 1956). 
208
 Re Hub Distrib, Inc, 218 USPQ 284 (TTAB 1983). 
209
 Re Ithaca Idus, Inc, 230 USPQ 702 (TTAB 1986). 
210
 Re Am Safety Razor Co, 2 USPQ 2d 1459 (TTAB 1987). 
211
 DC Comics v Pan Grain Mfg Co, 77 USPQ 2d 1120 (TTAB 2005). 
212
 Re Thomas, supra note 202. 
213
 Re La Peregrina, 86 USPQ 2d 1645 (TTAB 2008). 
214
 Re L’Oréal , 222 USPQ 925 (TTAB 1984). 
215
 Re Ness & Co, 18 USPQ 2d 1815 (TTAB 1991). 
216
 Horn’s Inc v Sanofi Beaute Inc, 43 USPQ 2d 1008 (SDNY 1997). 
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marks would automatically be compared with their English translations, and vice versa, because 
both French and English are official languages of Canada. This also means that the Spanish and 
Italian language marks will not be compared with their English translations if their products were 
marketed on a national scale. 
 
6.1.2 Comparing the Same Foreign Language 
When comparing two marks in the same foreign language, the comparison is still based 
on the English translations and not on the foreign language. This can lead to interesting but 
presumably reconcilable results. For example, the American doctrine was applied to the French-
language marks BON JOLIE and TRÈS JOLIE since the ordinary American purchaser would 
have enough basic French to translate them as “quite pretty” and “very pretty”, but found that 
there was no confusion because the trademarks lacked distinctiveness.
217
 Contrast that with a 
similar but presumably reconcilable example where the American doctrine was not applied to the 
French-language marks VEUVE ROYALE and VEUVE CLICQUOT since the ordinary 
American purchaser would not have enough advanced French to translate them as “royal widow” 
and “widow Clicquot”, but still found that there was confusion based on other grounds.218 This 
point was driven home when the American doctrine was applied and confusion was found with 
the Spanish language marks CHUPA CHUPS and CHUPA GURTS. Even though the literal 
translation for “chupa” was “to lick” or “to suck”, the ordinary American purchaser was deemed 
to have enough Spanish to understand that “chupa” was slang for “lollipop”.219 Presumably it 
                                                 
217
 Re Lar Mor Int’l, Inc, 221 USPQ 180 (TTAB 1983) at 181-183 (“[i]t seems to us that the fact both marks may be 
comprised of foreign words should not mean that we can disregard their meanings. Indeed, we believe that many 
members of the American public, even those who have only a rudimentary acquaintance with the French language 
are likely to understand the significance of the respective terms;”) 
218
 Palm Bay, supra note 200. 
219
 Enrique Bernat, supra note 166. 
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was the presence of a large Spanish-speaking population in the United States that was 
responsible for the result that the ordinary American purchaser is presumed not to understand an 
actual French word but can understand Spanish slang. 
The Canadian test is clearest in this scenario because French and Spanish have the 
opposite status in Canada from that in the United States. First, the French-language marks would 
be compared as is without translating into English because French is an official language in 
Canada. Second, the Spanish language mark would still be compared as is without translating 
into English if the product is known to be marketed nationally and the percentage of Spanish 
speakers was still deemed to be insignificant.
220
 Third, the Spanish language mark would be 
treated differently in Canada because Canadian courts have not espoused the international comity 
purpose of the American doctrine: 
“Moreover, the policy of international comity has substantial weight in this 
situation. If we permit Chupa Chups to monopolize the term „chupa‟, we will 
impede other Mexican candy makers‟ ability to compete effectively in the U.S. 
lollipop market. Just as we do not expect Mexico to interfere with Tootsie‟s 
ability to market its product in Mexico by granting trademark protection to the 
word „pop‟ to another American confectioner, so we cannot justify debilitating 
Dulces Vero‟s attempts to market „Chupa Gurts‟ in the United States by 
sanctioning Chupa Chups‟ bid for trademark protection in the word „Chupa.‟”221 
 
                                                 
220
 The latest census of 2011 shows 1.3% of the Canada population spoke Spanish. Canada‟s total population was 
33,476,688 (http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-310-x/98-310-x2011001-eng.pdf) and its 
Spanish-speaking population was 439,000 (http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-314-x/98-
314-x2011003_2-eng.pdf). 
221
 Enrique Bernat, supra note 166. 
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 The policy of international comity appears to have been adopted as a purpose of the 
American doctrine after 1985, as it was ignored multiple times in prior cases. The generic term 
GREENGROCER for a British retailer of fruits and vegetables was refused protection in the 
United States even though “[t]the parties agree that the term is generic in Britain. Since we deal 
here with American trademark law, and thus American consumers, neither British usage nor the 
dictionary definition indicating such usage are determinative.” 222  The United States rejected 
generic terms from Britain, even though Britain had already gone as far as to accept colloquial 
slang from the United States with the reasoning that failing to do so would be to ignore the 
influence of the American film industry in England.
223
 Likewise, the generic term SEIKO for a 
Japanese sporting store was refused protection in the United States because “[w]hile the plaintiff 
has sought to show that Seiko is a generic term in Japanese, it is not so recognized in this country. 
Accordingly, the trademark must still be regarded as arbitrary and fanciful in the United 
States.”224 It became apparent that this case would have been decided differently in later years 
when the generic term OTOKOYAMA for a Japanese sake was granted protection in the United 
States because “[if] one United States merchant were given the exclusive right to use that word 
to designate its brand of sake, competing merchants would be prevented from calling their 
product by the word which designates that product in Japanese.”225 
  
6.1.3 Comparing Different Foreign Languages 
When comparing two marks in different foreign languages, the comparison may be based 
on the English translations or may be based on the foreign languages, as decided on a case-by-
                                                 
222
 Carcione v The Greengrocer, Inc, 205 USPQ (BNA) 1075 (ED Cal 1979). 
223
 Re La Marquise, supra note 150. 
224
 Seiko Sporting Goods USA, Inc v Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten, 545 F Supp 221 (SDNY 1982) at 226. 
225
 Otokoyama Co Ltd v Wine of Japan Import, Inc, 175 F (3d) 266 (2nd Cir 1999) at 272.  
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case basis. This can lead to contradictory results. The general rule is that the doctrine does not 
apply because the ordinary American purchaser would probably be unfamiliar with multiple 
foreign languages:
226
 the Italian language mark BEL ARIA and the French-language mark BEL 
AIR were compared as is, which meant that there was no confusion because the former mark had 
an Italian connotation and the latter mark had a geographical connotation.
227
 Contrast that with a 
contradictory example where the doctrine was applied because the ordinary American purchaser 
familiar with one foreign language was deemed to be capable of deciphering the other foreign 
language: the Italian language mark DUE TORRI and the Spanish language marks TORRES and 
TRES TORRES were compared in English, which resulted in the finding of confusion among the 
translations of “two towers”, “towers” and “three towers”.228 Perhaps the discrepancy arises from 
the fact that the latter case involved a Spanish language mark, since the ordinary American 
purchaser was deemed to understand even Spanish slang. 
The Canadian test has not produced any cases involving different foreign languages. 
While it is unclear how Canada would compare the Italian language mark to the Spanish 
language mark if each targeted its respective linguistic population, it is clear that Canada would 
compare them as is without translation if each were marketed on a national scale and less than 1% 
of the Canadian population spoke each language. And if a translation was warranted, Canada 
would translate the Italian language mark BEL ARIA into French for comparison with the 
French-language mark BEL AIR, whereas the United States would have translated both language 
marks into English for comparison. The uncertainty of the American doctrine is more 
pronounced with the Canadian test in this situation because Canadians – “presumably” fluent in 
both English and French – are more likely to be confused with other Romance languages. Even if 
                                                 
226
 Brown Shoe Co v Robbins, 90 USPQ 2d 1752 (TTAB 2009) at 1756 [Brown Shoe]. 
227
 Safeway Stores Inc v Bel Canto Fancy Foods Ltd, 5 USPQ 2d 1980 (TTAB 1987). 
228
 Miguel Torres SA v Casa Vinicola Gerardo Cesari SRL, 49 USPQ 2d 2018 (TTAB 1998). 
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such Canadians are not fluent in Italian or Spanish, their bilingual knowledge increases the 
possibility of their understanding such languages. The need to establish evidence as to the 
existence of multi-linguists, their numbers, and how well they understand other Romance 
languages can be avoided by assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks.  
 
The uncertainty described above is also found in cases where the doctrine does not apply, 
such as in the subsections below where the ordinary American purchaser is unlikely to “stop and 
translate” the foreign-language mark. 
 
6.1.4 Multiple Meanings Discourage Translation 
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark has no literal 
translation in English. An example is the French-language mark REPECHAGE and SECOND 
CHANCE, since the French-language mark could mean “to recover” or “to fish out”.229 Another 
example is the Spanish language mark PALOMA and DOVE, since the Spanish language mark 
could mean “dove” or “pigeon”.230  Some might find this rationale weak since a dove is a 
domesticated breed or whiter version of a pigeon, but the same rationale was applied when 
comparing marks in the same foreign language, as in the case of the Spanish language marks for 
PALOMA and PALOMITA.
231
 Trying to decide whether an English translation is literal enough 
can lead to interesting but presumably reconcilable results. Contrast the two PALOMA cases 
with a similar example involving the Spanish language mark EL GALLO and ROOSTER: 
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although the Spanish language mark had multiple meanings, the American doctrine was applied 
because evidence showed that its use focused on the English translation of “rooster”.232 
 
6.1.5 Marketplace Meaning Discourages Translation 
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark is used in a 
marketplace setting that discourages translation into English. An example is the Spanish 
language mark LA POSADA being used with the words “motor hotel”, which discouraged the 
actual translation of “the inn”.233 Another example is the Spanish language mark TIA MARIA 
being used in a Mexican restaurant with Mexican interior and Mexican food, which discouraged 
translation and avoided confusion with the English-language mark AUNT MARY‟S for canned 
produce.
234
 The same rationale applies if the marketplace meaning is different from the translated 
meaning in English. An example is not translating the French-language mark CORDON BLEU 
because the marketplace recognizes it “as is” without translation.235 
 
6.1.6 Language Combination Discourages Translation 
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark contains multiple 
languages, including English, because the ordinary American purchaser is not going to translate 
only part of a mark. This enabled the following generic English words to become distinctive 
trademarks that were registrable: LA YOGURT for yogurt,
236
 LE CASE for jewellery and gift 
boxes,
237
 and LE CRYSTAL NATUREL for deodorant crystals.
238
 This point was driven home 
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when an applicant tried to register LE SORBET for ices by arguing that LE was French and 
SORBET was English. The court disagreed and deemed the entire phrase to be French, translated 
it into English, then found it to be generic and unregistrable.
239
 
 
The three scenarios above where the American doctrine was not applied have no similar 
counterparts in the Canadian test.
240
 This is because Canadian courts translate the foreign-
language mark upon taking judicial notice of linguistic knowledge, as illustrated most clearly by 
the different results in the Saint Anna and the Saint Honore cases. The Saint Anna case ignored 
the Chinese-language marks when it concluded that the number of Canadians fluent in Chinese 
was insignificant. Conversely, the Saint Honore case translated the Chinese-language marks 
even though they had multiple meanings (they could have been transliterated but were translated 
arbitrarily); they had marketplace meanings that discouraged translations (they were used in 
Chinese bakeries where the owners spoke Chinese and sold coconut buns, egg tarts and moon 
cakes); and they were used in a language combination (albeit they are just Chinese-language 
marks with the English translations attached). 
In this regard, the American doctrine is even less satisfactory than the Canadian test 
because it is inconsistent with regard to whom it applies (is the ordinary American purchaser 
fluent in the foreign language?), to what it applies (are transliterations excluded?), to when it 
applies (can a foreign equivalent be tacked on as a legal equivalent?), to where it applies (is the 
ordinary American purchaser likely to stop and translate?), and to why it applies (is international 
comity a purpose only after 1985?). Even if these inconsistencies were reconciled miraculously, 
it is still uncertain whether traders actually intend for consumers to stop and translate their 
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foreign-language marks in light of the translation problems discussed in Chapter 3. The 
unflattering translations for COLA-COLA – as well as the name changes for PEPSI, KFC, and 
MCDONALD‟S without corresponding changes in the translations – all suggest that courts 
cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the translation 
will be. The American doctrine can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all 
foreign-language marks, as doing so focuses the evidence on the trademarks as they are and the 
association between them, which allows their distinctiveness and confusion to be assessed in the 
same manner as trademarks in the official languages. 
 
6.2 European Approach 
The second alternative is to consider the European approach. 
While the purpose of the American doctrine of foreign equivalent is international comity, 
the purpose of the European approach is the harmonization of its internal market.
241
 This is 
because the European Union is an economic and political union that was created after the Second 
World War with “the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically 
interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.”242 This was the reasoning behind awarding 
the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union in honour of its six decades of contributions 
“to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” by 
which “historical enemies can become close partners.” 243 International trade provides a great 
incentive to keep the peace. It is also no secret that the current island dispute between China and 
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Japan has been mitigated by $345 billion of trade, proving that “trade partners” might just lead to 
“peace partners”. 
This harmonization has resulted in the following legal system for registering trademarks: 
(1) a national system to register trademarks in one member country; (2) a regional system to 
register trademarks in the member countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; (3) a 
collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office to register 
European Union Trade Marks in all member countries; and (4) an international system to register 
trademarks in any country that is a signatory to the Madrid Protocol.
244
 Although the four tiers 
are supposed to complement each other, the subsections below reveal how the stratified system 
has resulted in inequality in assessing foreign-language marks for distinctiveness
245
 and 
confusion
246
 under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property 
Office. In this regard, the European approach is just as unsatisfactory as the Canadian test for 
confusion and can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language 
marks.  
 
6.2.1 Official & Working Languages 
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office, 
these 24 languages receive the highest level of protection because they are officially recognized 
by the 28 member countries of the European Union.
247
 
A trademark in an official language is unregistrable because it lacks distinctiveness if it is 
the generic term for a good or service, or if it describes the characteristic of a good or service, in 
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any of the official languages. This is true even if the official language has a small linguistic 
population or generates little economic activity. As a result, an examiner must translate a 
trademark into all of the official languages to ensure that it is not generic or descriptive in any of 
them.
248
 This means that the collective system must be consistent with “the national system to 
register trademarks in one member country”, but the reverse is not guaranteed. For example, the 
national system in Spain allowed the registration of MATRATZEN even though it meant 
“mattress” in German, the second most common official language in the European Union. Spain 
did so because its population did not understand German and, therefore, the trademark was not 
generic as far as Spanish consumers were concerned.
249
 
A trademark in an official language is unregistrable because it is confusing with an earlier 
mark if the relevant public makes an association between the marks in the territory where the 
earlier mark is protected. For example, BIMBO DOUGHNUTS for pastry and bakery products 
was confusing with an earlier registration in Spain for DOGHNUTS for confectionary and pastry 
products. Although English was the most common official language in the European Union, it 
was not understood by the relevant public in Spain. The fact that both trademarks had no 
meaning to the relevant public in Spain increased their distinctiveness,
250
 but not enough to avoid 
the likelihood of confusion.
251
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6.2.2 Indigenous Regional & Minority Languages 
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office, 
these 79 languages receive special protection because they are used by the 203 national 
minorities or linguistic groups that promote Europe‟s cultural heritage. 252  These languages 
originate from a certain region (such as Catalan and Welsh) or from a certain minority 
community (such as Romani and Yiddish) that are indigenous to the European Union.
253
 
A trademark in a non-official language lacks distinctiveness if it is understood in at least 
a part of the European Union. This is true only if the relevant public in that “part of the European 
Union” understands the non-official language, because a trademark‟s registrability at the national 
level in a member country should be consistent with its registrability at the collective level 
throughout the European Union. As a result, ESPETEC for raw meat sausages and dried pork 
cannot be registered because it means “a type of sausage that is not cooked but left to dry in 
order to be eaten” in the Catalan language, which is used in a part of Spain.254  
A trademark in a non-official language is confusing with an earlier mark if it is 
understood by the relevant public in the territory where the earlier mark is protected. For 
example, the Turkish-language mark HELLIM for milk products was confusing with the earlier 
Greek-language mark HALLOUMI for cheese. Although Turkish was not an official language of 
the European Union, it was understood by the relevant public in Cyprus, where the earlier mark 
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was protected. The fact that both Turkish and Greek were official languages in Cyprus certainly 
increased the likelihood of the relevant public confusing the two trademarks.
255
 
 
6.2.3 Foreign Languages 
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office, 
these languages receive the least legal protection because they do not have any formal status as 
the languages of immigrant communities (such as Arabic and Chinese) that are not indigenous to 
the European Union.
256
 
A trademark in a foreign language lacks distinctiveness or is confusing in the same 
manner as an indigenous regional & minority language. This is worrisome because the two 
groups of languages are being treated equally when the latter group is supposed to receive 
special protection to protect and promote Europe‟s cultural heritage. As a result, a foreign 
language – which is supposed to receive less legal protection – could actually receive more 
trademark recognition than an indigenous language such as Catalan, especially if the immigrant 
population increases in significance while the local population decreases. Another worry is the 
differential treatment between foreign languages themselves. For example, a registration for the 
Arab-language mark EL BAINA for halal food was enough to block another confusing 
application, because the courts found that halal food was only consumed by Arabic consumers 
who understood the language.
257
 Compare this to the opposite finding for four registrations for 
the Chinese-language marks WANG LAO JI for traditional medicine. The four registrations 
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were not enough to block another confusing application, because the courts found that traditional 
medicine were also consumed by the average European consumers who were not Chinese and 
did not understand the language.
 258 
 
In this regard, the European approach is just as unsatisfactory as the Canadian test 
because it results in a stratified system. Trademark distinctiveness will depend on the linguistic 
populations and economic activities associated with a language. Trademark confusion will differ 
according to the territory where the earlier mark is protected. The European approach can also 
benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, as doing so focuses 
the evidence on the trademarks as they are and the association between them, which allows their 
distinctiveness and confusion to be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in the official 
languages. 
 
6.3 Chinese Approach 
The third alternative is to consider the Chinese approach.  
There is little use in looking at multilingual Hong Kong and Singapore, which do not 
have difficulty adjudicating English-language and Chinese-language marks.
259
 This dissertation 
is developing a workable model for those without any knowledge of a foreign language (such as 
Chinese) in order to assess and compare such marks. This is similar to how bilingual Canada has 
no difficulty adjudicating English-language and French-language marks, whereas the United 
States needed the doctrine of foreign equivalents because it had no knowledge of French.  
                                                 
258
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On the other hand, China and Taiwan are monolingual like the United States and may 
have case law on assessing English-language marks and comparing them to Chinese-language 
marks. Such case law is of little use when both countries are civil law jurisdictions, which have 
neither judicial comity with the Western countries above nor reporting databases that are freely 
accessible (such as Quicklaw, Westlaw, and CanLII). It is important to remember that China 
enacted its first trademark law only in 1982.
260
 Despite the paucity of cases, as well as the 
shortness and v\agueness of their reasoning, it can be instructive to consider the most famous and 
recent trademark decisions coming out of China. While the purpose of the American doctrine of 
foreign equivalent is international comity, and the purpose of the European approach is the 
harmonization of its internal market, it appears from the subsections below that the purpose of 
the Chinese approach comes from political pressure to affirm intellectual property rights and 
develop a friendlier environment for international businesses. 
 
6.3.1 Example of TRUMP 
The first decision involved Donald Trump. Donald Trump owned multiple trademark 
registrations in China for TRUMP, which was licensed on everything from steaks to universities. 
Many other traders in China also registered TRUMP for different goods and services, the most 
famous being toilets that conduct pregnancy tests. It was inevitable that Donald Trump would 
eventually clash with the other traders: his 2006 trademark application to use TRUMP for real 
estate services was denied due to another trader‟s earlier registration for construction services, 
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and his 2007 trademark application to use TRUMP for restaurants was also denied due to another 
trader‟s earlier registration for coffee shops, restaurants and catering. Donald Trump spent a 
decade losing at every administrative and judicial level to which he appealed: even though he 
sent 300 pounds of materials to convince China that TRUMP was an internationally recognized 
brand in 2009, and he wrote to the United States Commerce Department requesting intervention 
in 2011.
261
 So it was nothing short of a miracle (or mystery) when China‟s highest court 
approved his registration of TRUMP for restaurants in May 2016, as well as invalidated another 
trader‟s registration for constructions services.  
First, China has a first-to-file system for recognizing trademark rights. So why would a 
court decide that another trader‟s prior registration for coffee shops, restaurants and catering no 
longer barred Donald Trump‟s later trademark application to use the same trademark for 
restaurants?  
Second, it is difficult to invalidate trademarks after the 5-year registration period. So why 
would a court decide in November 2016 to invalidate another trader‟s pre-2006 registration for 
construction services in order to approve Donald Trump‟s 2006 trademark application to use the 
same trademark for real estate services?  
Third, TRUMP is a common word. So why would a court reward Donald Trump with a 
monopoly over an English word? The finding was based on the 300 pounds of materials that 
TRUMP was an internationally recognized brand. But we need to understand – incredible as it 
sounds – that China‟s administrative and judicial levels were correct to deny Donald Trump‟s 
trademark applications, while China‟s highest court was incorrect to approve them. Consider 
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how the Canadian test for confusion currently requires proof that the average consumer of the 
product will understand the foreign-language mark, how the American doctrine of foreign 
equivalents requires that the ordinary purchaser is likely to “stop and translate”, or how the 
European approach requires that the relevant public will understand the non-official language. 
Applying the same expectation in China would mean accepting the reality that the average 
Chinese consumers of real estate services, the ordinary Chinese purchasers at restaurants, or the 
relevant Chinese public cannot even read or sound out, much less understand, the foreign-
language mark TRUMP. For every indignant protest that TRUMP should be recognized in China 
anyway because it is a common word in English, let us remember that 安 娜 (ANNA) was not 
recognized in Canada even though it was a common name in Chinese. And for every cynical 
scoff at the idea that the Chinese public does not recognize TRUMP when Donald Trump has 
appeared on television shows and magazine covers, let us remember that the Canadian public 
was not expected to recognize 長 江 (YANGTZE) even though it was geographical landmark 
and trademarked as early as the 1950‟s by Li Ka-Shing. As Asia‟s richest man and #23 on 
Forbe‟s 2018 ranking of the world‟s billionaires, Li Ka-Shing and his corporate trademark have 
received more international attention than Donald Trump (ranked at #766). 
Suffice it to say, the sudden turn of events after a decade of losing litigation raised 
speculation that China‟s decisions were politically motivated by Donald Trump‟s presidential 
campaign at that time. The rumour mills churned even faster when China approved 38 new 
trademark applications for TRUMP and its translation as 川 普 (CHUAN1 PU3) in February 
2017, setting a record for the number and speed of the approvals.
262
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6.3.2 Example of JORDAN 
The second decision involved Michael Jordan. The standard translation that is 
internationally accepted for JORDAN, whether it be the name of a person or a country, is 約 旦 
(YUE1 DAN4). However, when Michael Jordan debuted on Chinese television during the 1984 
Olympics, a news reporter made up the new translation 喬 丹 (QIAO2 DAN1). It is not clear 
why the reporter did not use the standard translation. Perhaps the reporter thought the legendary 
basketball player deserved a unique translation with an extraordinary meaning: “tall – red” 
evokes a positive image because this specific Chinese character for “red” suggests sincerity and 
loyalty of heart. The new translation became popular and was registered by a clothing chain in 
China. Michael Jordan then spent years suing the clothing chain until he finally won an 
infringement case on December 8, 2016.
263
 This decision from China‟s highest court was 
astounding for three reasons. 
First, there is a standard translation for JORDAN. So why would a court decide that the 
new translation actually identified Michael Jordan? The finding was based on evidence that the 
Chinese media has identified Michael Jordan by the new translation since the 1984 Olympics. 
This evidence exposes a weakness in Michael Jordan‟s case from a trademark perspective: the 
new translation was neither used by Michael Jordan nor used as a trademark. The evidence 
suggests that the new translation was actually used by the public and used as information. 
Nevertheless, there is support for deciding that such use can enure to a specific trader in light of 
Coca-Cola v Busch.
264
 The Coca-Cola Company advertised its products in association with the 
COCA-COLA mark, which the public abbreviated as COKE. Since The Coca-Cola Company 
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was not using the abbreviation, a competitor started using the variation KOKE. In order to 
persuade an American court that it had a complaint for confusion, The Coca-Cola Company first 
had to claim that the use by others of the COKE abbreviation should enure to it as the owner of 
the COCA-COLA mark.  
Second, there is nothing distinctive about the name JORDAN. So why would a court 
decide that the new translation only identified Michael Jordan and did not also identify anyone 
and everyone named Jordan? The decision was based on evidence that the Chinese company 
accused of taking the new translation from Michael Jordan also registered other trademarks 
associated specifically with Michael Jordan: an NBA silhouette that was amended to reflect 
Michael Jordan‟s physique, the number 23 that used to be on Michael Jordan‟s basketball jersey, 
and the Chinese names of Michael Jordan‟s children.265 This evidence could be dismissed on the 
basis that none of the registrations relate to trademarks or names actually belong to Michael 
Jordan: the trademarks belong to Nike, Inc.
266
 and the names to his children. Nevertheless, there 
is support that such evidence is relevant in light of a much repeated commentary on passing off, 
the common law forefather of trademark infringement: “Why should the court be astute to say 
that the defendant cannot succeed in doing that which he is straining every nerve to do?”267  
Third, there was at least a 10-year delay between the clothing chain in China registering 
the new translation in 2000 and Michael Jordan commencing his lawsuit in 2012. Although Nike, 
Inc. registered JORDAN in the 1990‟s, it did nothing with respect to filing or opposing 
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trademark applications for the new translation.
268
 So why would a court reward Michael Jordan 
for the inexcusable delay, especially when trademark registrations were supposed to be difficult 
to invalidate after the 5-year registration period? During that time, the clothing chain had become 
well known to the public through its large-scale activities: registering almost 500 trademarks, 
investing over $10 million USD in annual advertising, establishing over 5,700 retail outlets, and 
attempting to become a publicly traded company.
269
 If it is wrong for one to benefit from 
Michael Jordan‟s popularity, then is it not also wrong for the other to benefit from the clothing 
chain‟s decade of advertising? This could be a reason behind the decision from China‟s highest 
court that Michael Jordan can only claim the new translation with respect to the writing (乔 丹) 
but not with respect to the pronunciation (QIAO2 DAN1).  This means that although the clothing 
chain can no longer use the Chinese characters, it can continue to use the PinYin letters by which 
it is also known. It can also use other Chinese characters that correspond with the same PinYin 
letters, which can compete with and dilute the uniqueness of the new translation that Michael 
Jordan just won. 
If Michael Jordan could have known that this would be the result, would he still have 
commenced the lawsuits in 2012 or would he have choosen to rebrand instead? His decision was 
probably pre-determined by the advice he sought. For example, an ad agency would know 
nothing of litigation but be quick to advise on rebranding. The marketing experts might realize 
that there is no mandatory translation for JORDAN. This meant that Michael Jordan was free to 
ignore both the standard translation that was internationally accepted and the new translation 
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given to him by the Chinese media. He was free to create and register his own Chinese name, use 
it in all future communications, and publicize in future interviews that any other Chinese 
translations have nothing to do with him. Doing so could have neutralized the Chinese company 
and publicized its illegitimacy just as effectively, and without the years and fees spent on 
litigation. On the other hand, a law firm is not in the business of rebranding but would have 
ample advice on litigation. 
Legal experts might assume that Michael Jordan‟s situation is the same as that of Jeremy 
Lin. Jeremy Lin now plays point guard for the Charlotte Hornets, the NBA team owned by 
Michael Jordan. When he filed applications in China for his trademarks, including JEREMY LIN 
and LINSANITY in English, he discovered that another company in China had already 
registered his Chinese name.
270
 His situation differs from that of Michael Jordan, however, 
because he does not have the option of rebranding. His Chinese name is independent, as it is 
neither a standard translation nor a media designation of his English name. His Chinese name is 
also much more personal, as it what his parents have called him since birth. We must consider 
whether Donald Trump and Michael Jordan deserve the same protection for their Chinese 
translations as Jeremy Lin does for his Chinese name, especially in light of Professor Scassa‟s 
observation that names are “the simplest, most literal and most obvious of all symbols of identify” 
and surnames “can reflect one‟s cultural, ethnic, religious or familial heritage.”271 Fortunately for 
Jeremy Lin, his boss already knows how to win a trademark case in China. 
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 Benjamin Kang Lim, “Jeremy Lin Trademarks Scooped Up By Chinese Company Last August”, The Huffington 
Post (27 February 2012), online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/27/jeremy-lin-trademark-scooped-
chinese-company_n_1303271.html>. 
271
 Teresa Scassa, Legislating the Mother Tongue: Language, the Individual and the State (SJD Thesis, University of 
Michigan, 1995) quoting from Harold Isaacs, “Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe” in Nathan Glazer & 
Daniel Moynihan, eds, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) 29 at 50 and 
“Parent‟s Selection of Children‟s Surnames” (1983) 51 Geo Wash L Rev 583 respectively [Scassa]. 
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It is clear from this chapter that the Chinese approach is actually the closest to assuming 
linguistic knowledge out of all the countries discussed. This reveals how Canada, the United 
States, and the European Union themselves are sensitive to foreign-language marks but fail to 
appreciate that others can also be blinded and paralyzed with the “foreign-ness” of English-
language marks. The expectation for Chinese locals to be fluent consumers regardless of whether 
a trademark is in Chinese or English means that the Western countries above have failed to apply 
the very approach that they expect from China. 
  
 114 
 
7 LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
This chapter tests the solution of assuming linguistic knowldge by applying it to the 
criteria for trademark registrability, as well as to the trader‟s rights against infringement, against 
depreciation of goodwill, to license, and to translate. Assuming linguistic knowledge serve the 
dual purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from 
unfair competition, because assessing foreign-language marks in the same manner as trademarks 
in the official languages stops the expansion of rights by minimizing claims that any and all 
translations infringe or depreciate a registered trademark. 
 
7.1 Registrability of Trademarks 
Section 12 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out a defined list of when trademarks are 
registrable in order to receive statutory protection. The criteria for registrability used to mean 
little for foreign-language marks. It had limited application when the test for confusion always 
imagined the illiterate consumer. This was true even though it was odd and contradictory that 
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized were deemed to be designs (which had no 
distinctiveness issue), but still had to provide translations as if they were words (in order to 
assess for distinctiveness). The inclusion of the fluent consumer now raises the question whether 
registrability should be assessed based on the foreign language used in the trademark or based on 
the English translation of the trademark. This is an important issue because conducting the 
assessment in different languages could affect the registrability of foreign-language marks, as 
demonstrated in the subsections below. 
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7.1.1 Names or Surnames 
 Section 12(1)(a) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is 
not a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has 
died within the preceding thirty years.” 
 This is generally assessed by checking a Canadian directory to see if it has 25 entries or 
more of the name or the surname. For example, the surname “McDonald” is not registrable due 
to its numerous entries in the Canadian telephone directory (although the fast food restaurant 
MCDONALD‟S could register its trademark after it acquired secondary meaning to overcome its 
original lack of distinctiveness). The same approach meant that foreign surnames such as the 
Spanish “Galanos”,272 the Japanese “Nishi”,273 and the Arabic “Abd-Ru-Shin”274 were registrable 
because they were unlikely to be recognized as such or found in a telephone directory in Canada. 
Would it matter if the surnames found in a telephone directory are skewed representations as a 
result of segregation (such as Germany mandating Jewish names to the point of requiring all 
Jewish males and females to use Israel and Sarah respectively), assimilation (such as Italy 
forbidding foreign names to the point of “re-italianizing” gravestones), or nation-building (such 
as Bulgari‟s name-change program in order to conceal its Turkish minority)?275 
 Applying the same general assessment to names and surnames in non-Roman languages 
will produce different results depending on whether the assessment is based on the non-Roman 
language or the English translation. For example, the surname “Goh” is registrable due to its 
limited entries in the mainstream Canadian telephone directory. This assessment should not 
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 Galanos v Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks) (1982), 69 CPR (2d) 144 (FCTD). 
273
 Nishi v Robert Morse Appliances Ltd (1990), 34 CPR (3d) 161 (FCTD). 
274
 Drolet v Stiftung Grasbotschaft, 2009 FC 17, [201] 1 FCR 492 (FCTD) [Drolet]. 
275
 Scassa, supra note 271 at 156-162. 
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change due to the increased entries by considering that “Goh”, “Ng”, and “Wu” are actually 
English versions of 吳  from Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and China respectively, as most 
Canadians will neither know of the association nor confuse the surnames in English. They are 
more likely to be confused by “Chen”, “Cheng”, and “Cheung”, even though all three come from 
different Chinese characters. On the other hand, 吳 itself should not be registrable due to its 
numerous entries in Chinese-Canadian telephone directories. It is one of the 100 most common 
Chinese surnames listed in a classic Chinese text called Hundred Family Surnames (one of three 
literary texts that children must memorize in order to learn Chinese characters). The corollary of 
not equating Chinese surnames with their English translations means that the unregistrability of 
“Anna” should not apply automatically to 安 娜, as there can also be different Chinese versions 
of the English name. Notwithstanding this, 安 娜 is unregistrable because the numerous entries 
in Chinese-Canadian telephone directories serve as evidence to prove that it is the standard 
translation that is internationally accepted for “Anna”. 
Now that the test for confusion considers linguistic knowledge as part of the surrounding 
circumstances, should cultural differences also become a consideration when it comes to name-
based trademarks? For example, Anglo-speaking countries start with the personal names and end 
with surnames. Chinese-speaking countries reverse the order by starting with the surnames to 
indicate the family, then following with the personal names to indicate the individual.
276
 This 
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 Chinese personal names can be one character or two characters (just as English personal names can be limited to 
a first name only, or can be composed of first and middle names). What matters is that the first character indicates 
the generation of the individual in the family. This is because it often happens in traditionally large families that the 
youngest aunt/uncle is born after the oldest niece/nephew, or there are 30-year differences between cousins of the 
same generation. Since one‟s generation takes precedence over one‟s age, generational names are an important 
source of information in helping to determine one‟s hierarchy in the family. The importance of generational names 
is illustrated by America‟s beloved cellist Yo-Yo Ma: around 1755, one of his ancestors not only documented the 
past generational names of the Ma family back to Yo-Yo‟s 13th great-grandfather in 1435 but also dictated the future 
generational names of the Ma family up to Yo-Yo‟s 30th great-grandchild. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Faces of 
America: How 12 Extraordinary People Discovered Their Pasts (New York: NYUP, 2010) at 99-101. 
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cultural norm can also apply to English translations of Chinese names, which means America‟s 
beloved cellist would call himself MA Yo-Yo in Chinese-speaking countries. Unfortunately, 
doing so causes confusion in the West, so he follows the cultural norm in Anglo-speaking 
countries by calling himself Yo-Yo MA. However, not all Chinese follow the cultural norm in 
Anglo-speaking countries, so Anglo-speakers are often and rightfully confused when faced with 
English translations of Chinese names. Some Chinese try to minimize the confusion by 
capitalizing the surname (as in MA) or by joining both components of their personal names (as in 
Yo-Yo). If an English translation mirrors a Chinese name instead of following the English 
cultural norm, can someone else use an English translation which reverses the order?
277
 
 
7.1.2 Distinctiveness of Trademarks 
Sections 12(1)(b) and (c) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act state that “a trademark is 
registrable if it is not (b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or 
deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the character or quality of the 
goods or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions 
of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin; (c) the name in any 
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 Apple Inc v Wholesale Central Ptd Ltd, [2010] ATMO 7 found that a trademark application for DOPi was not 
confusing with trademark registrations for iPOD and IPOD. No author, “Ex parte I Rokeach & Sons, Inc (1953)” 
(1954) 44:1 INTA Trademark Reporter 102 at 102-103 (“With this conclusion there can be no doubt, the word 
Kosher, whether written in Hebrew characters or not, is considered wholly incapable of functioning as a trademark 
owned by any particular individual or company. The letters as shown on the drawing are not written as they 
ordinarily appear, but the word as shown is the mirror image of the word when normally written, having the 
appearance, for example, the word would have when viewed from the inside of a store on the window of which the 
word appears. Being so obviously unregistrable when written in normal manner, I do not believe that the word could 
be registered when viewed from the rear side.”). This appears consistent with the Intellectual Property Office of 
Singapore‟s finding in Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Holding Limited v Multi Access Limited, [2017] SGIPOS 13 at 
paras 9 and 37 (“The Applicant‟s Marks as registered in Singapore have the same Chinese characters written from 
right to left and the Proprietor‟s Mark has the Chinese characters written from left to right. … In 2006, in so far as 
the average Chinese reader in Singapore is concerned, he or she would not likely read a Chinese phrase from right to 
left anymore. … Consequently, the two marks would not look similar to the average consumer in Singapore.”) 
[Wang Lao Ji]. 
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language of any of the goods or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to be 
used.” 
As previously discussed in subsection 5.1.1 on “Assessing for Distinctiveness”, the 
difference between descriptive marks being barred in the English or French language versus 
generic marks being barred in any language should be removed because traders should be 
prohibited from doing in a foreign language what they cannot do in English or French.  
On the one hand, both the Supreme Court of Canada‟s “matter of first impression and 
imperfect recollection” and the Federal Court of Canada‟s “average consumer of the product” 
statements are clear that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of the consumer. This may 
suggest that the distinctiveness should be assessed based on the foreign language used in the 
trademark, since the fluent consumer will be thinking in that foreign language. For example, the 
fluent consumer will think in English when reading the English words and will think in French 
when reading the French words in the sentence: “You committed a faux pas by bringing your 
bouquet from the ballet into the café where we had croissants before heading to the restaurant.” 
The fluent consumer will not translate the entire sentence into English in order to understand it: 
“You committed a [fake step/social blunder] by bringing your [bunch of flowers] from the 
[Italian dance performance] into the [coffee shop] where we had [French rolls] before heading to 
the [establishment for eating].” Nor will the fluent consumer translate the entire sentence into 
French. 
On the other hand, such an approach would place a heavy burden on courts to familiarize 
themselves with the foreign language used in the trademarks in dispute in order to access the 
mind of the consumer. The fact remains that Canadian courts think only in Canada‟s official 
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languages, so it is a practical necessity for them to assess distinctiveness based on the English or 
French translation of the trademark. 
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the test for confusion now means that the 
spectrum running from strong to weak distinctiveness for trademarks will also apply to foreign-
language marks. The subsections below will continue to review the stories of The Coca-Cola 
Company and the two Chinese bakeries in Canada that originally ignored linguistic knowledge to 
illustrate how conducting the assessment in different languages will result in different levels of 
trademark distinctiveness. 
 
7.1.2.1 Inherently Distinctive Marks 
Inherently distinctive marks may be fanciful, coined, or arbitrary marks. 
A fanciful and coined mark is an invented word that has no dictionary definition. 
Therefore it has a strong distinctiveness because it has no meaning as a word and only has 
meaning as a mark. This is the case with PEPSI-COLA‟s translation 百 事 可 樂, since 可 樂
was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933 and the four characters have no meaning as 
a combination. The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were to have no 
meaning as a combination.  
An arbitrary mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, but is used arbitrarily in a 
meaningless context. Therefore it also has a strong distinctiveness because its meaning as a word 
is irrelevant to the arbitrary meaning of the trademark. This is the case with PEPSI-COLA‟s 
translation 百 事 可 樂, since neither the literal meaning “hundred things possible happy” nor the 
suggested meaning “happy with everything” has anything to do with colas. The same rationale 
applies to the Chinese characters 聖  安  娜 , since neither the literal meaning HOLY – 
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PEACEFUL – ELEGANT nor the colloquial meaning SAINT ANNA has anything to do with 
pastries.  
 
7.1.2.2 Suggestive Marks 
A suggestive mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is used to hint at the 
character or quality of the product. Therefore it is less distinctive because its meaning as a word 
is relevant to the hinted meaning of the trademark. This is the case with COCA-COLA‟s 
translation 可 口 可 樂 being used in association with colas, since 可 口 meant “tasty”. The same 
rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖  安  娜  were used in association with baking 
communion bread for Christian and Catholic churches, since both the literal meaning HOLY – 
PEACEFUL – ELEGANT and the colloquial meaning SAINT ANNA are religious. 
 
7.1.2.3 Descriptive/Misdescriptive Marks 
A descriptive (or misdescriptive) mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is 
used to describe (or mislead as to) the character or quality of the product. Therefore it is not 
distinctive, because its meaning as a word is the same as the actual meaning of the trademark, 
but it can become distinctive if it acquires secondary meaning. This would be the case if COCA-
COLA had been translated literally as 古 柯 (GU3 KE1 means “coca”) and 汽 水 (QI4 SHUI3 
means “air water” as in a carbonated drink), unless the trademark acquired secondary meaning so 
that consumers no longer associate it with any and all carbonated drinks made from coca leaves. 
The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖  安  娜  were translated as SAINT 
HONORÉ (the name of the French patron saint of bakers and pastry chefs; the name of a 
municipality in Québec; the name of a commune and a street in France) or SAINT ANNA (the 
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name of the Virgin Mary‟s mother; Jesus‟ grandmother), unless the trademark acquired 
secondary meaning so that consumers no longer associate it with the famous person or place of 
the same name. 
 
7.1.2.4 Generic Marks 
A generic mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is used as a common word 
for the product itself. Therefore it can never be distinctive because its meaning as a word is the 
same as the actual meaning of the product itself. This would be the case regardless of whether 
COCA-COLA is translated literally as 古 柯 汽 水 or colloquially as 可 口 可 樂. This is 
because 汽 水 has always meant “air water” as in a carbonated drink, whereas 可 樂 was 
distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933 but has come to mean “cola” and now lacks 
distinctiveness. The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were translated as 
CHALLAH, which is the common name for a type of Jewish bread eaten on the Sabbath. 
 
It is important to note that the subsections above only illustrate how linguistic knowledge 
can affect trademark distinctiveness: the Chinese characters remain the same, yet their trademark 
distinctiveness will vary depending on their English translations. And translations have linguistic 
limitations, as they may fail to capture all the linguistic possibilities of foreign languages. For 
example, there is only one word in English for “cousin”, but there are multiple such words in 
Chinese which immediately specify whether the cousin is male or female, older or younger, on 
the paternal side or maternal side, and related by blood or marriage. The test for confusion is thus 
applied to foreign-language marks within the limits of a mind that only understands English, not 
within the mind of the fluent consumer open to all its cultural connotations. 
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Some may find this problematic and suggest solving it by reverting to the time when all 
foreign-language marks were treated by imagining the illiterate consumer. This approach was 
acceptable in a national economy when each country established its own trademark system in 
accordance with its own official language(s). It is no longer acceptable in today‟s global 
economy where foreign languages cross national boundaries when people migrate and inter-
marry, corporations merge with and acquire one another, and countries trade with each other. 
 
7.1.3 Confusion of Trademarks 
Section 12(1)(d) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is 
not confusing with a registered trademark.” 
As previously discussed in subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing for Confusion”, foreign-
language marks should not be compared for confusion based on their translations because the test 
for confusion does not make any references to languages. The recommended solution to assume 
linguistic knowledge, instead of requiring proof of it before including it in the test for confusion, 
does not mean that evidence as to how consumers perceive the trademark is no longer required. 
On the contrary, the courts can still leave the burden on the trademark applicant to dispute the 
assumption by proving that consumers have no linguistic knowledge for any registered foreign-
language mark that is barring the application. After all, it is the applicant who is in petitorio.
278
 
The subsections below illustrate that the kind of evidence required for the test for confusion also 
applies to linguistic knowledge: while evidence as to the existence of linguistic knowledge is not 
required, evidence as to the confusion arising from linguistic knowledge remains relevant. 
 
                                                 
278
 The test for confusion in opposition proceedings requires the trademark applicant to prove there is no likelihood 
of confusion, according to Mattel, supra note 99 at para 6. It is only infringement proceedings that require traders to 
prove that there is likelihood of confusion, according to Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, supra note 99 at para 14. 
 123 
 
7.1.3.1 Reference Sources 
The first type of evidence could be reference sources such as almanacs, biographies, 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, gazetteers, thesauruses, yearbooks, etc.
279
 An example is how 
PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because a reference to 
dictionaries established that “Cola would, therefore, appear to be a word which might 
appropriately be used in association with beverages and, in particular, with that class of non-
alcoholic beverages colloquially known by the description of „soft drinks‟.”280 Another example 
is how DIXI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because scientific and 
popular literature recognized Cola “as the name of a tree native to Africa” and pharmaceutical 
and scientific publications suggested that “it could be used to make a beverage that would 
successfully compete with tea and coffee as a refreshing and invigorating drink.”281 
Although it is important to respect the territoriality of trademarks, it must be noted that 
reference sources need not be restricted by national boundaries. Canada‟s Trademarks Act 
prohibits generic marks that are “the name in any language of any of the goods or services in 
connection with which it is used or proposed to be used.”282 The Home Juice case accepted 
evidence regarding the French word MAISON from foreign dictionaries published in France, 
which contained different definitions from the domestic dictionaries published in Canada. The 
court considered the meaning of the French word in France because failing to do so would enable 
“a shrewd trader [to] monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a trade mark as 
soon as it started being used in France or in another French-speaking country and before it could 
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 Donald F Duncan, Inc, v Royal Tops Manufacturing Company, Inc, and Randy Brown, 343 F (2d) 655, 144 
USPQ 617 (7th Cir 1965) at paras 28, 67-68 [Royal Tops]. And see Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc, et al, v Coca-Cola 
Co, 117 F (2d) 352 (4th Cir 1941) at 358 [Dixi-Cola]. 
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 Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102 at 617. 
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 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 355. 
282
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 12(1)(c). 
 124 
 
be shown to have begun being used in Canada.”283 This rationale could also apply to foreign-
language marks. Since the 1970 case already described English and French as international 
languages with “a vocabulary that is extremely difficult to define especially in these days when 
communication media are no longer confined within national boundaries,” the same logic could 
apply today to Chinese (the most widely-spoken language in the world) as well as to Spanish and 
Arabic (both are more widely spoken than French worldwide).
284
 
 
7.1.3.2 Social Influences 
A second type of evidence could be social influences ranging from contemporary (blogs, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) to traditional (newspapers, magazines, radio, 
television, film, etc.) media.
285
  
Keeping in mind the importance of respecting the territoriality of trademark, it would 
appear that social influences should be restricted by national boundaries; namely, the social 
influence may originate from a foreign source, but it should not be considered unless it ends with 
a local consumer. Not restricting reference sources makes sense since such evidence serves to 
explain the origin and meaning of the word used in the trademark, but not the trademark itself. 
Conversely, restricting social influences seems necessary because such evidence serves to prove 
the knowledge and use of the trademark in association with specific goods and services. This 
raises the question as to whether the territoriality of social influences will matter after Canada 
abandons the use requirement for trademark applications. Re an Application by La Marquise 
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 Home Juice, supra note 150 at para 51. 
284
 “Summary by Language Size”, Ethnologue, Languages of the World (last accessed on 27 April 2017), online: 
<http://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size>. (There are 1,302 million Chinese speakers; 427 million Spanish 
speakers; 339 million English speakers; 267 million Arabic speakers; and 75.9 million French speakers worldwide.) 
285
 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 53-55. 
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Footwear
286
 accepted evidence regarding the English slang OOMPH from the United States, 
because failing to do so would be to ignore the influence of the American film industry in 
England: 
“I should perhaps add this: much argument was addressed upon the footing that, 
after all, the word, in so far as it is in current use, however short and brutish a life 
it may have, is American slang rather than, as we would say, part of our own 
native tongue. That is a matter upon which one might have debate for hours – 
whether it is the fact that the English tongue as spoken in these islands and the 
English tongue as spoken in the United States or in Canada or in Australia or in 
other parts of the globe is or is not one and the same language. I do not propose to 
throw any light upon any possible answer to the question, save to say that where, 
as here, the word is primarily employed in the film industry, and, as is well known, 
are shown and seen by hundreds of thousands of people throughout the whole of 
the English-speaking world, I think that it would be an affectation to say that a 
word which has gained any currency as an American slang word ought to be 
treated in these islands, in the absence of any evidence one way or the other, as a 
foreign word.”  
 
This rationale could also apply to foreign-language marks nowadays given that many of 
Canada‟s linguistic populations have their own highly profitable and widely distributed media, 
including newspaper and magazines, radio, television and movies. 
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 Re La Marquise Footwear, supra note 150. 
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7.1.3.3 Government Documents 
A third type of evidence could be government documents such as trademark registrations, 
patent specifications, corporate certificates, etc.
287
 For example, PEPSI-COLA was found to be 
not confusing with COCA-COLA due to evidence of “a series of 22 trademarks registered 
Canada in during a period of 29 years, viz, from 1902 to 1930 [sic], in connection with beverages 
[which showed] that the word Cola had been adopted in Canada as an item in the naming of 
different beverages.”288 Conversely, The Coca-Cola Company tried unsuccessfully to use its five 
trademark registrations to stop another competitor from using DIXI-COLA.
289
 One reason for the 
failure was because a claim to the exclusive use of COCA-COLA was insufficient to monopolize 
the word COLA, as the court noted that there were at least 143 registrations in the United States 
using the word COLA as a suffix for competing drinks.
290
 Another reason for the failure was 
because the company had admitted previously in affidavits that “the name in large measure [was] 
descriptive of the character of the article” in order to benefit from a then-existing provision 
“which permits the registration of a descriptive mark by one who has made actual and exclusive 
use thereof for ten years next preceding the approval of the act.”291 
Another example of “government documents” comes from the Saint Honore case, where 
evidence that federal Members of Parliament and provincial Members of the Legislative 
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 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 43-52, 56-57, 62-66. And see Parke, Davis & Co v Empire Laboratories Ltd, 
[1964] SCR 351, 1964 CanLII 74 at 355-356 (“… there was evidence that the appellant at one time held a United 
States patent on sealed capsules with similar bands from 1932 until it expire in 1949. … Then, after the patent had 
expired, the appellant registered its 10 trademarks in Canada on September 19, 1950. In this way it sought to 
perpetuate its monopoly of the patent by applying for registration of the trademarks which, if regularly renewed, 
may be perpetuated. A similar situation arose in the case of Canadian Shredded Wheat Company v Kellogg 
Company et al. … Lord Russell ((1938) D.L.R.) at p. 150 stated: „... There can be little doubt that had the plaintiff, 
when the patent expired, attempted to register the words „Shredded Wheat‟ as a trademark for the sale of biscuits 
and crackers, the application would have met with short shrift. It would be attempting by registering the name of the 
patented product to prolong the patent monopoly; and this may not be done.‟”). 
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 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 358. 
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 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 356. 
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Assembly who are non-Chinese now have Chinese names on their business cards and newsletters 
assisted the court in taking judicial notice of a significant Chinese linguistic population in 
Canada.
292
 Keep in mind that this is different from using the evidence to prove the confusion 
arising from linguistic knowledge, which was illustrated during the United States election of 
2016. The voting ballots in California translated Donald J. Trump‟s name as 唐 納 徳 J. 特 郎 普 
(TANG2 NA4 DE2 J. TE4 LANG3 PU3), while the voting ballots in New York translated it as 
唐 諾 得 J. 川 普 (TANG2 NUO4 DE2 J. CHUAN1 PU3). 293 Are the voting ballots evidence 
that both are standard translations that are internationally accepted for the names “Donald” and 
“Trump”, which means they need to acquire secondary meaning to overcome the original lack of 
distinctiveness? Alternatively, are the voting ballots evidence that there are no standard 
translations for the names, which means they are not barred from registration as “a word that is 
primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the 
preceding thirty years”?294 Foreign government documents provide conflicting evidence because 
China uses the former translation, while most other Chinese jurisdictions (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan) use the latter translation. The United States government could have created a third 
translation in order to avoid the political awkwardness of choosing between the existing 
translations, which would have avoided the practical confusion of having contradictory voting 
ballots. Since Donald Trump used and registered the latter translation, does the former 
translation remain free for others to use? Since both translations mirror Donald Trump‟s English 
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 Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 27. 
293
 Nikhil Sonnad, “New York‟s and California‟s Ballots Disagree on How to Write „Donald Trump‟ in Chinese” (8 
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name instead of following Chinese cultural norm, can someone else use Chinese trademarks 
which reverse the order?
295
 
Although it is important to respect the territoriality of trademarks, judicial willingness to 
consider French references and American influences raises the possibility that the courts may 
also accept the relevance of foreign trademark registrations, and even foreign court decisions. 
Accepting foreign trademark registrations in keeping with the policy of international comity 
discussed in Chapter 6, as well as with international trademark systems, such as the Madrid 
Protocol, which extends a trademark registration in one member country to any or all of the other 
member countries. And foreign court decisions could arguably be admissible as “government 
documents” since courts form the judicial branch of government. Of course, foreign trademark 
registrations may carry little persuasive weight when issued from countries known for trademark 
squatters, just as foreign court decisions may have little precedential value.
296
  
 
7.1.3.4 Corporate Materials 
A fourth type of evidence could be corporate materials such as licence agreements, order 
sheets, promotional materials, cease-and-desist letters, etc.
297
 For example, DIXI-COLA was 
found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because “The Coca-Cola Company itself has 
recognized the propriety of competitive trade names containing the word “Cola” by consenting 
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 Wang Lao Ji, supra note 277 discussed how the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore found no confusion 
when one party‟s trademarks wrote Chinese characters from left to right and another party‟s trademark wrote the 
same Chinese characters from right to left. 
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 The Law Library of Congress, “The Impact of Foreign Law on Domestic Judgments” (2010) Global Legal 
Research Center at 1 noted that “From time to time, American courts, which are relatively isolated from foreign 
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decisions.”, whereas at 3 noted that “[Chinese] judges are familiar with foreign methods of legal interpretation and 
apply their knowledge of foreign legal doctrines in their domestic practice, but do not mention foreign law 
directly.”). 
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 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 40-42, 69-70. 
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to a number of consent decrees.”298 As a result of weekly lawsuits against competitors from 
1911-1941, the company won twenty-nine court orders in the duration of thirty years to enjoin 
the use of the word “Cola” on its own. Twenty-three of them were consent decrees.299 
 
7.1.3.5 Expert Witnesses 
A fifth type of evidence could be expert witnesses such as linguists, etymologists, social 
scientists, etc. A pessimist would assume that such evidence would be reduced to experts 
contradicting each other on the distinctiveness of and the confusion between whatever marks are 
in question,
300
 but an optimist would hope that the court can separate the truth from the 
contradictions. From Singapore
301
 to the United States,
302
 it is now common place for an expert 
witness to study a word, express an opinion as to its origin, and explain its meaning in order to 
assist the courts in assessing for distinctiveness or comparing for confusion.
303
 
 
7.1.3.6 Lay Testimonies 
The sixth type of evidence could be lay testimonies such as non-expert witnesses, 
customer surveys, etc.
304
 For example, The Coca-Cola Company introduced forty-one witnesses 
to testify that “when they saw goods labeled by a name containing the suffix „COLA‟, they were 
led to believe, not that the goods were COCA-COLA, but that they originated with the Coca-
                                                 
298
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 358. 
299
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 359. 
300
 Yee Hong, supra note 70 at para 16. 
301
 Yomeishu Seizo Co Ltd v Sinma Medical Products (M) Sdn Bhd in NG-LOY Wee Loon, “The Meaning of 
„Invented‟ in Trade Mark Law” (1997) 9 Sing Ac LJ 203-210. 
302
 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at para 28. And see Shuy, supra note 86. 
303
 Cinar, supra note 4 at para 55 also accepted expert evidence from a semiologist in a copyright infringement case 
based on the criteria listed in para 49 (“For expert evidence to be admitted at trial, it must (a) be relevant; (b) be 
necessary to assist the trier of fact; (c) not offend any exclusionary rule; and (d) invoke a properly qualified expert: 
R v Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9. These criteria apply to trials for copyright infringement, as they do in other 
intellectual property cases: Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles Inc, 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 SCR 387, at para. 75.”).  
304
 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 58-61, 71-78. 
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Cola Company”.305 Although the court found such evidence insufficient to stop a competitor 
from using DIXI-COLA, since it found that a claim to the exclusive use of COCA-COLA was 
insufficient to monopolize the word COLA, the court did find unfair competition on another 
ground: a scheme to confuse consumers by copying the colour, the script, and the display.
306
 The 
fact that the court finding was not based on trademark infringement, but on unfair competition, 
was emphasized with its affirmation that “the product including the coloring matter is free to all 
who can make it if no intrinsic deceiving element is present”307 [emphasis added]. Likewise, the 
court took judicial notice of a significant Chinese linguistic community in Canada in the Saint 
Honore case because 1,905 of the 2,259 customer surveys (conducted in previous years on other 
issues) were filled out in Chinese instead of English.
308
 
 
7.1.3.7 Translations vs Transliterations 
A new type of evidence could be comparing the trademark in dispute with its foreign-
language equivalents. Perhaps a novel argument can be made that the foreign-language 
equivalents shed light on how much a trader values the sound or the meaning of a trademark. For 
example, MICROSOFT is translated literally as 微 軟. Can the translation be used to oppose a 
competitor from using BABY SOFT by helping to overcome arguments that MICROSOFT has 
lost much – perhaps all – of its original meaning due to the combination? Consider also that the 
MAVERICKS is translated literally as 小 牛 隊. Can the translation be used as evidence that 
MAVERICKS only means “little cows team” and should not oppose a competing basketball 
team from using RENEGADES? Conversely, COCA-COLA is transliterated phonetically as 可 
                                                 
305
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 354-355. 
306
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 359. 
307
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 361. 
308
 Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 48. 
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口 可 樂. Although the English trademark originally focused on the meaning to refer to the 
product‟s ingredients, can the Chinese transliteration support a claim that it has evolved to focus 
just as much on the sound? Even though the English trademark could not block a competitor 
from selling PEPSI-COLA, can the Chinese transliteration help to oppose the American actress 
who is popular with Asian fans from selling CUOCO COLA?  
Perhaps such a novel argument would carry more (or less) weight depending on how 
many (or few) other foreign-language equivalents are consistent with the Chinese-language mark 
in valuing the meaning vis-à-vis the sound. Since the current judicial application of the test for 
confusion requires evidence of linguistic knowledge, it would probably limit this novel argument 
only to foreign-language equivalents for which there is evidence that the consumers understand 
the language. However, if the test for confusion were to assume linguistic knowledge, then this 
novel argument would probably expand to accepting all foreign-language equivalents as 
evidence. Such an argument would be particularly interesting with the 1,073 trademark 
applications in Canada that contain the typographical symbol @.
309
 Some languages translate @ 
as a variation of the English letter “a”, while other languages translate @ as a variation of the 
English word “at”. Most languages, however, translate @ according to how it looks to that 
culture: a little mouse, an elephant‟s trunk, a maggot, a snail, a spider monkey, a pickled fish roll, 
etc.
310
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 “Search Criteria „@‟ in Trademark”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22 June 2017), online: 
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>. 
310
 Tom Chatfield, “How do you say @ in other languages?”, BBC (7 March 2016), online: 
<http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160307-how-do-you-say-in-other-languages>. 
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7.1.4 Prohibited Marks 
 Section 12(1)(e) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is 
not a mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10.” 
An example of a prohibited mark is “any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or 
device”.311 Canada currently makes this value judgment from the perspective of the general 
public.
312
 This is consistent with the United States denying FUKU to a Japanese restaurant trying 
to transliterate “good fortune” from Japanese to English,313  as well as the United Kingdom 
denying FOOK on t-shirts.
314
 Although Canadians are presumably bilingual enough to know that 
PHOQUE means “seal”, the word still sounds scandalous in English. This may be a reason why 
the Canadian application for the French- and English-language mark PHOQUE EWE, despite the 
accompanying picture of a seal and a sheep, was abandoned.
315
 This would probably mean 
similar denials for a Vietnamese restaurant using PHO KING, as only Vietnamese speakers or 
foodies would know “pho” is a type of noodle soup pronounced like “fir/fur”. 
                                                 
311
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 9(1)(j) (Prohibited marks – “No person shall adopt in connection with a 
business, as a trademark or otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be mistaken 
for … any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or device;”). 
312
 Drolet, supra note 274 at para 166; Miss Universe, Inc v Bohna (1991), 36 CPR (3d) 76 (TMOB), aff‟d [1992] 3 
FCR 682 (FCTD), rev‟d on other grounds [1995] 1 FCR 614 (FCA). And see Canadian Intellectual Property Office, 
Trademarks Examination Manual (Ottawa: Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 21 September 
2017) at 4 of 5, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03636.html#iv.10>. 
Section IV.10.6 states, “A scandalous word or design is one which is offensive to the public or individual sense or 
propriety or morality, or is a slur on nationality and is generally regarded as offensive. It is generally defined as 
causing general outrage or indignation. A word is obscene if marked by violations of accepted language inhibitions 
or regarded as taboo in polite usage. This word is generally defined as something that is offensive or disgusting by 
accepted standards of morality or decency; or offensive to the senses. A word or design is immoral when it is in 
conflict with generally or traditionally held moral principles, and generally defined as not conforming to accepted 
standard of morality.”) [emphasis added]. 
313 Beth Hutchens, “It‟s Pronounce Foo Koo”, IPWatchdog (8 May 2012), online: 
<http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/05/08/its-pronounced-foo-koo/id=24687/>. 
314
 Re Application No 2309350 (2004), O/133/04, aff‟d O/182/05. Even though the case of Re Registered Trade 
Mark No 2184549 (sub nom Dennis Wooman v French Connection Ltd) (2005), O/330/05, aff‟d O/137/06 later 
found FCUK not to be offensive, it also made the value judgment from the perspective of the general public at para 
71 (“Finally, he held that it was clear from the evidence that FCUK was a brand directed at younger persons, who 
were less likely to be offended by the „word play‟, but this was not a relevant consideration since the mark would be 
seen by people of all ages and backgrounds.”). 
315
 Trademarks: PHOQUE, Abandoned, 1673343. 
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The question is whether this value judgment should still be from the perspective of the 
general public when a trademark references a specific group. Canada kept the perspective of the 
general public when it permitted a restaurant‟s registration of THE RUDE NATIVE,316 but the 
United States switched to the perspective of the specific group being referenced when it 
cancelled a football team‟s registration for REDSKINS317 and originally denied a Chinese band‟s 
application for THE SLANTS.
318
 The latter approach adopted by the United States raised the 
additional question of what to do if there are multiple and contradictory opinions within a 
specific group. For every Chinese person who believes that racial slurs such as THE SLANTS or 
CHINKED OUT can be reclaimed from their derogatory meanings, there is another Chinese 
person who would rather have them disappear forever. This was illustrated when Oprah Winfrey 
interviewed Jay-Z Carter about his use of the racial slur for African-Americans. Jay-Z defended 
his use on the basis that his generation took the power out of the racial slur, and he even 
rationalized that eliminating the racial slur will only result in others taking its place anyway. 
Oprah‟s response was that the horrific history of the word was beyond redemption in light of 
“the millions of people [in her generation] who heard that as their last word as they were hanging 
from a tree.”319 
Another question is whether either perspective should assume linguistic knowledge for a 
foreign-language mark? Consider a popular brand of toothpaste in Asia that is sold with the 
English word DARKIE and the Chinese characters for “black man”. The toothpaste is now sold 
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 Rude Native Inc v Tyrone T Resto Lounge, 2010 FC 1278, 195 ACWS (3d) 1128 (FCTD) was an infringement 
case where neither the defendant (nor the judge) challenged the registration as a prohibited mark. 
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 Pro-Football, Inc v Amanda Blackhorse, 112 F Supp (3d) 439 (ED Va 2015), appeal docketed, No 15-1874 (4th 
Cir, August 6, 2015) [Pro-Football]. 
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 Re Simon Shiao Tam, 808 F (3d) 1321 (Fed Cir 2015), aff‟d as Matal v Tam, 582 US __ (2017), Docket No 15-
1293 [Re Simon]. 
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 Oprah Winfrey, “Oprah Interviews Jay-Z” (Oct 2009), O Magazing (blog), online at 8: 
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in Canada as DARLIE,
320
 but with the same Chinese characters. The perspective of the general 
public would think nothing of the Chinese characters, but assuming linguistic knowledge would 
allow for a value judgment on the acceptability of “black man”. Likewise, the perspective of a 
specific group would not become an issue without first assuming linguistic knowledge. Since the 
registration for the Chinese characters included an explanation that they mean “black man”, it 
appears that Canada does not consider the term offensive to the specific group being 
referenced.
321
 
All these questions may become moot if the prohibition on “any scandalous, obscene or 
immoral word or device” becomes unconstitutional. Canada could very well follow the Supreme 
Court of the United States in deciding that such a prohibition violates the constitutional right to 
free speech.
322
 This is very likely in light of the fact that Canada prohibits both the registration 
and the use of such marks, whereas the United States prohibited only the registration and 
originally found that free speech was not infringed because traders could still use such marks.
323
 
Striking down such a prohibition would open the door for anyone and everyone to register marks 
that reference and offend a specific group. Perhaps there should be a distinction between those 
who “draw attention to their wares and service through shock tactics”324 and those who have 
suffered such references and, thus, have a legitimate interest in reclaiming them from their 
derogatory meanings. 
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 Trademarks: DARLIE, Registered, 0627543, TMA375418; and Trademarks: DARLIE MAN Logo, Registered, 
1688144, TMA948291. 
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A second example of a prohibited mark is “any badge, crest, emblem or mark … (ii) of 
any university, or (iii) adopted and used by any public authority”.325 These prohibited marks are 
called official marks and are the nuclear bombs of all marks for three reasons. First, the test for 
obtaining them focuses on the applicant, not on the official marks. This means that any 
university or a Canadian public authority
326
 can obtain an unlimited number of official marks 
that are descriptive, confusing with registered trademarks, and not limited by goods and services. 
Second, they only need to be advertised to come into effect, as they are neither trademarks nor 
registered. This means that these perpetual official marks are not subject to the usual prosecution, 
opposition, expungement, or renewal proceedings. Third, the requirement for them to be 
“adopted and used” is lower than that for a trademark to be “used” in association with goods and 
services, just as the prohibition against anything “consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be 
likely to be mistaken for” them is stronger than that against anything “confusing” with a 
trademark. This means that these unlimited and perpetual official marks are easier to obtain and 
to enforce than trademarks. Accordingly, it is important to limit their monopoly to what was 
advertised in order to avoid their expansion automatically into translations. We must keep in 
mind that official marks can still prohibit translations in the same manner that they currently 
prohibit other trademarks: by proving similarity. The comment also applies to official marks in 
foreign languages.
327
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 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 9(1)(n) (Prohibited marks – “No person shall adopt in connection with a 
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 United States Postal Service v Canada Post Corp, 2007 FCA 10, 54 CPR (4th) 121, leave to appeal to SCC 
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 The College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario obtained three official 
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7.1.5 Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 
 Section 12(1)(f) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is 
not a denomination the adoption of which is prohibited by section 10.1.” Section 10.1 in turn 
states that where “a denomination must, under the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, be used to 
designate a plant variety, no person shall adopt it as a trademark in association with the plant 
variety or another plant variety of the same species or use it in a way likely to mislead, nor shall 
any person so adopt or so use any mark so nearly resembling that denomination as to be likely to 
be mistaken therefor.” 
 This means that The Coca-Cola Company could only register COCA-COLA because the 
hyphenated combination acquired secondary meaning to overcome the original lack of 
distinctiveness in the two components.
328
 COCA was descriptive of the leaf extracts from the 
South American plant erythroxylum coca, which had the botanical term 古 柯 (GU3 KE1). After 
COCA became part of COCA-COLA, it kept the English botanical meaning but changed the 
Chinese meaning to 可 口 (KE3 KOU3 meant “tasty”). COLA was descriptive of the bean 
extracts from the Western African tree cola acuminata and cola nitida, which had the botanical 
term 可 拉 (KE3 LA1). After COLA became part of COCA-COLA, it gained the additional 
English meaning of a “soft drink, pop, soda” and also changed the Chinese meaning to 可 樂 
(KE3 LE4 was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933, but has come to mean “cola” 
and now lacks distinctiveness).  
                                                 
328
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 357, 360 (“It will be perceived that in some of these earlier cases the Coca Cola 
Company, in answer to the charges made against its trade-name, successfully maintained the position that the name 
of the beverage was not deceptive, but was actually justified by the ingredients, while in the present case the 
company is endeavoring to show that the name is purely arbitrary and fanciful, and does not truly describe the nature 
of the product.”) and (“With this rule in mind, we can realize the full significance of the evidence that the word 
“cola” was originally adopted in part for its descriptive properties, and has since become a generic term, used in 
common by manufacturers as part of the trade-names for their products;”). 
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7.1.6 Geographical Indications 
 Section 12(1)(g), (h), and (h.1) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is 
registrable if it is not in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the 
trademark is to be registered in association with [(g) a wine, (h) a spirit, or (h.1) an agricultural 
product or food]
329
 not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication.”  
 This is generally assessed by checking a Canadian list of wines, spirits, and agricultural 
product or food. Just like the difference between descriptive marks being barred in the English or 
French language versus generic marks being barred in any language, the list of geographical 
indications does not include translations for wines or spirits but only includes translations for 
agricultural products and food.
330
 
Imagine that YANGTZE is on the list as a geographical indication. Should it 
automatically block subsequent applications for CHEUNG KONG or 長 江? The answer is 
clearly “NO” if we consider what would happen if KENTUCKY was also on the list, as it would 
not block the standard translation KEN3 TA3 JI1 (肯 塔 基) for the geographical name. The 
reality is that we do not extend protection automatically from a geographical indication 
KENTUCKY to its acronym KY or to its nickname BLUEGRASS STATE. So why should we 
extend do it for its translation when Chapter 3 has shown that we cannot assume that a foreign-
language mark is intended to be translated or what the translation will be? 
                                                 
329
 While the statute currently limits geographical indications to a list of wines and spirits, the list will be expanded 
due to the Canada-Europe Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The expansion may be a 
welcome change for traders who have been circumventing the statute‟s limits by using certification marks as de 
facto geographical indications for the products that were not on the list (e.g., beer, cheeses, meats, confectionary and 
baked products). 
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translations of those indications.”). And see the corresponding subsections (2.1), (3.1), (4)-(5). Contrast “the 
automatic protection of translations” for wines and spirits in section 11.14 with “the limited-to-the-list protection of 
translations” for agricultural products or food in section 11.15.  
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7.1.7 Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act 
 Section 12(1)(i) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is 
not subject to subsection 3(3) and paragraph 3(4)(a) of the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, a 
mark the adoption of which is prohibited by subsection 3(1) of that Act.” 
 The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the test for confusion does not make a difference 
because the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act already states that no person “shall use in 
connection with a business, as a trademark or otherwise, a mark that is a translation in any 
language of an Olympic or Paralympic mark.” 331  Contrast that with official marks, the 
prohibition of which does not anticipate translations. The question now is whether extending the 
prohibition of an Olympic or Paralympic mark to its foreign-language translation also prohibits 
similar foreign-language marks. After all, the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act specifically 
prohibits the adoption or use of a mark that “so nearly resembles an Olympic or Paralympic mark 
as to be likely to be mistaken for it,”332 but fails to do the same for its translation. Is this poor 
drafting or is this a clear sign that this prohibition supports comparing foreign-language marks 
for confusion based on the English or French translations of the trademark, instead of the foreign 
language used in the trademark? 
  
7.2 Rights of (Limits/Defences to) Registration 
Up to now, the solutions proposed have been tested only against the criteria for 
registrability listed in section 12. It is also important to test them in the context of a trader‟s 
rights against infringement in sections 19-20, against depreciation of goodwill in section 22, to 
                                                 
331
 Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, SC 2007, c 25, s 3(2) [Olympic Act]. 
332
 Olympic Act, supra note 331, s 3(1). 
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license in section 50, and to translate. After all, the introduction of this dissertation 
acknowledged that their credibility depends on how well they serve the dual purposes of 
trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from unfair competition. 
Consumers usually have no participation in or say on a trademark, although they are used 
(or mis-used) by traders as the justification supporting its litigation. It is difficult to believe that a 
trader‟s rights also benefit consumers when one looks at the contradictory arguments in the case 
law. For example, one trader will argue that that the trademarks are confusing while the other 
trader will argue the opposite,
333
 just as one passenger will recline the airplane seat while the 
passenger behind will object to it.
334
 Focusing on the resource (trademark space or seat space) 
does not benefit consumers, who become schizophrenic puppets dancing at the behest of traders. 
Focusing instead on the parties vying for the resource can change the answer by redefining the 
question: do traders infringe while objecting to others infringing? Or, do passengers recline while 
objecting to others reclining?
335
  
Why is it that traders can engage in brand extension or cross-branding themselves in 
order to access untapped markets, yet they are convinced that others will cannibalize existing 
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 Beebe, supra note 7 at 2025. 
334
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Slate (23 Sept 2014), online: 
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 Consider the beloved American novel “To Kill A Mockingbird”. While several law articles have lauded the 
protagonist, Atticus Finch, the best praise is found in Steven Lubert, “Review: Reconstructing Atticus Finch: To Kill 
a Mockingbird by Harper Lee” (1999) 97:6 Mich L Rev 1339 at 1339 (“The name of Atticus Finch has been 
invoked to defend and inspire lawyers, to rebut lawyer jokes, and to justify (and fine-tune) the adversary system. 
Lawyers are greedy. What about Atticus Finch? Lawyers only serve the rich. Not Atticus Finch. Professionalism is a 
lost ideal. Remember Atticus Finch.”). Focusing on Atticus Finch vis-à-vis other lawyers makes him a hero: only he 
had the integrity to defend a black man wrongly accused of raping a white woman, and only he had enough faith in 
the justice system to encourage the black defendant to stand trial and to appeal a biased verdict instead of making a 
run for freedom. Focusing instead on Atticus Finch vis-à-vis himself reveals his hypocrisy: he failed to exercise the 
same level of integrity when the town‟s recluse later protects his children by killing their attacker in self-defense, as 
he accepted the sheriff‟s persuasion that it would be too cruel to subject the town‟s recluse to legal scrutiny and 
public attention. Only by redefining the question does the answer change as to whether Atticus Finch is a hero or a 
hypocrite: the lawyer, who earlier encouraged an innocent defendant to entrust life and liberty to a racist jury, later 
spared the town‟s recluse from the inconvenience of a trial that was sure to end in an acquittal. 
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sales instead of creating new markets? An example of this hypocrisy is margarine. When 
Emperor Louis Napoleon III held a competition to find an affordable butter alternative for his 
military and the poor, he awarded the prize to margarine in 1869. It turned out that winning a 
competition does not guarantee market success, because the French peasants turned up their 
noses at margarine as a butter substitute. The former was made from vegetable oil and had a pale 
white colour, while the latter was made from milk and had a sunnier complexion from happy 
cows. Nevertheless, North Americans were convinced that this French invention would 
cannibalize the sale of butter and lobbied for legislation to stop the anticipated confusion 
between the two. The United States tried a piece-meal approach such as compulsory labelling, 
manufacturing licensing, sales tax, and colour bans. The colour bans ranged from prohibiting the 
margarine to be dyed yellow to look like butter (which was also dyed yellow) to requiring that 
margarine be dyed pink.
336
 Canada took an aggressive approach by banning margarine from 
1886 to 1948, a year that marked two notable events. First, Newfoundland joined the Canadian 
Confederation on the condition that “Canada agreed to constitutionally protect the manufacture 
and sale of margarine in Canada, but retained its powers to prohibit and/or restrict the export of 
margarine from the new province.” 337 Then, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that federal 
legislation could not prohibit the manufacture or sale of margarine. Although it remained within 
federal jurisdiction to prohibit the importation of margarine, that applied to foreign trade and not 
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 Mitchell Okun, Fair Play in the Marketplace: The First Battle for Pure Food and Drugs (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1986) at 254, 263, 266. 
337
 Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening our Place in Canada (St. John‟s: Office of the Queen‟s 
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British Empire, after Westminster, was abolished and a dictatorship was imposed on 280,000 English-speaking 
people who had known seventy-eight years of direct democracy. The British government then used its constitutional 
powers to steer the country into a federation with Canada.‟”). 
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to Newfoundland as part of Canada.
338
 There is no literature explaining why the United States 
was surprisingly milder in its approach than Canada, but perhaps the American belief in free 
markets restrained an outright ban and resulted in surreptitious legislation.  
Another example of this hypocrisy is coffee. While we might expect that tea traders 
would perceive a threat from coffee, this was not the case. Even stranger is the historical 
evidence that it was actually the wine and beer traders who tried to stop competition from 
coffee.
339
 This is puzzling until we realize that what matters is not any and all traders, but a 
specific group of traders who are also producers: tea traders in Europe did not perceive a threat 
because they imported tea from China, but wine traders in France and Italy tried to protect their 
country‟s industry, as did beer traders in Germany. Perhaps it was a sign of the times, but these 
wine and beer traders did not rely on legal prohibition as much as on moral judgment: France 
translated Olearius‟ travelogue to warn against the evils of coffee, Italy would have declared 
coffee as Satanic if Pope Clement VIII had not found it to be delicious,
 
and King Frederick II 
claimed that German soldiers who drank coffee were unpatriotic because they could not win 
wars like beer drinkers.
340
  
The hypocrisy becomes even more obvious when we compare traders‟ past behaviour 
vis-à-vis their current lawsuits. For example, The Coca-Cola Company claimed descriptiveness 
in 1905 in order to benefit from a then-existing provision “which permits the registration of a 
descriptive mark by one who has made actual and exclusive use thereof for ten years next 
preceding the approval of the act.”341  After receiving its registration, it then tried to claim 
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 Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) Dairy Industry Act, [1949] SCR 1, aff‟d [1950] UKPC 31. 
339
 Calestous Juma, Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) at 61-62. 
340
 Bennett Weinberg & Bonnie Bealer, The World of Caffeine: The Science and Culture of the World’s Most 
Popular Drug (New York: Routledge, 2002) at 67-68, 85-86. 
341
 Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 356. 
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distinctiveness in order to sue competitors such as PEPSI-COLA for confusion.
342
 Likewise, a 
trader unsuccessfully tried to claim that YO-YO was descriptive in 1931 in order to overcome a 
competitor‟s registration of FLORES YO-YO. 343  After purchasing FLORES YO-YO and 
registering YO-YO, it then claimed distinctiveness in order to sue competitors for confusion.
344
 
In short, traders use the case law to litigate their claims against others in order to stop what they 
perceive as unfair competition against themselves. 
The subsections below discuss the growing gap between traders and consumers as a 
result of dilution and licensing, and we must beware not to widen it further through foreign-
language marks. In this regard, the solution of assuming linguistic knowledge serve the dual 
purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from unfair 
competition. 
 
7.2.1 Right against Infringement 
Trademarks have come a long way from past characterizations as a liability instead of an 
asset,
345
 as identifying source only instead of guaranteeing quality also,
346
 and as protecting 
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 Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 24-25, 27 (When the application YO-YO was blocked by the registration 
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345
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 814 (15
th
 Century England required trademarks “so that defective work might be 
traced to the guilty craftsman and heavily punished, or that „foreign‟ goods smuggled into an area over which the 
guild had a monopoly might be discovered and confiscated.”). 
346
 Sheldon Burshtein, “Trademark Licensing in Canada: The Control Regime Turns 21” (2014) 104:5 INTA 
Trademark Reporter 1001 at 1005. (“In Canada, a trademark is a guarantee of origin and is only inferentially an 
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consumers primarily instead of traders equally.
347
 The dual purposes of trademark law now are to 
protect consumers from confusion and traders from unfair competition.
348
 This requires that a 
trademark functions to identify the source (and quality) of goods and services.
349
 
Section 19 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act prohibits using a trademark that is identical with 
goods and services that are identical to a registration.
350
 Section 20 expands that to prohibit using 
a trademark that is similar, regardless of the goods and services, to a registration.
351
 There is little 
to say here because the solutions proposed for registrability in section 12 should be applied in 
exactly the same manner to infringement in sections 19-20. The subsections below discuss three 
problems that currently exist with infringement – and are exacerbated with dilution – when 
deciding whether or not to expand rights even more by allowing traders to claim that a foreign-
language mark is identical or similar to a registered trademark. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
assurance of quality. Similarly, a House of Lords decision said that, in England, a trademark is not a representation 
of quality. In the United States, a trademark represents a single source but has also been said to serve as an assurance 
of quality.”). 
347
 GA Hardie & Co v Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks), [1949] SCR 483 at para 64 (20
th
 Century Canada 
repeated “[t]hat the interest of the public is always important was emphasized in this Court upon a somewhat 
different point in Lightning Fastener Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Goodrich Co. Ltd., [1932] S.C.R. 189, where Rinfret J., 
(now Chief Justice) stated at p. 196: „and it should not be forgotten that legislation concerning patents, trademarks 
and the like exists primarily in the interest and for the protection of the public, so much so that it could be said that 
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348
 Schechter on The Historical Foundations, supra note 25 at 20-21. 
349
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is that given by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalf: 
“to identify the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed.”). 
350
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 19 (Rights conferred by registration – “Subject to sections 21, 32 and 67, the 
registration of a trademark in respect of any goods or services, unless shown to be invalid, gives the owner of the 
trademark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trademark in respect of those goods or services.”). 
351
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20(1) (Infringement – “The right of the owner of a registered trademark to its 
exclusive use shall be deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who (a) sells, 
distributes or advertises any goods or services in association with a confusing trademark or trade-name; (b) 
manufactures, causes to be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any goods in association 
with a confusing trademark or trade-name, for the purpose of their sale or distribution, (c) sells, offers for sale or 
distributes any label or packaging, in any form, bearing a trademark or trade-name if … (d) manufactures, causes to 
be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any label or packaging, in any form, bearing a 
trademark or trade-name, for the purpose of its sale or distribution or for the purpose of the sale, distribution or 
advertisement of goods or services in association with it, if …”). 
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7.2.1.1 Rights without End 
The first problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act has 10-year terms that can be renewed 
without end, unlike copyright and patents. This means that the rights are perpetual as long as the 
trademark is used, however lightly.
352
 Giving a perpetual right to a word is one thing; giving a 
perpetual right to a word, its synonyms, and its translations would be another. We must ask 
ourselves what is the public interest in doing the latter when the Supreme Court of Canada – 
commenting on BARBIE – observed that a novel benefit is not even required in exchange for the 
monopoly: “[Mattel] has merely appropriated a common child‟s diminutive for Barbara.”353  
A possible solution is to accept the fact that not every use must be valued or owned. This 
will leave some uses to the public: “Thus, it should be emphasized that expressive concerns 
could be equally well protected by simply cutting back on the scope of trademark law. Signaling 
capacity could, for example, be fully protected by insuring exclusivity in words and symbols 
only as they appear on labels. So long as the public understood that the label (as statutorily 
defined) was the only place to look for a designation of source or origin, trademarks could be 
made freely available for all other purposes.”354  
A labour-based justification for trademark rights may accept the solution above. This 
justification came from a Lockean natural rights theory that one is entitled to the fruits of one‟s 
labour, on the conditions that the entitlement (1) leaves enough and as good for others, and (2) is 
not wasteful.
355
 This entitlement suggests that traders cannot assume that they create all the value 
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 Vaver, supra note 21 at 547 (“Registrants are not readily deprived of their „property‟, however lax they may have 
been in creating or maintaining it. Light use of the mark – even a genuine single use or a use that tests the market – 
may save the registration.”) 
353
 Mattel, supra note 99 at para 21. 
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 Rochelle Dreyfuss, “Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation” (1989) 65 Notre 
Dame L Rev 397 at 399, n 14 [Dreyfuss]. 
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 Peter Drahos, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1996) at 
42-43 (“Locke‟s solution to the problem of the God-given commons and private appropriation starts with the 
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in their trademarks because there is scholarship to suggest that consumers also invest in 
trademarks,
356
 especially at the encouragement of trademark owners in this day and age of social 
media.
357
 Consider the examples where originally it was not the trader who used “its” trademark, 
but a news reporter who created the Chinese translation for JORDAN or the government who 
invested in Chinese translations for TRUMP. These examples are different from The Coca-Cola 
Company holding an international competition to find “its” Chinese-language mark. A corollary 
to the entitlement is that one should not reap where one has not sown. This can be a double-
edged sword for traders, as the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed Professor Vaver‟s 
observation that “One might as well say that the well-known mark owner is reaping where it has 
not sown when it stops a trader in a geographic or market field remote from the owner‟s fields 
from using the same or a similar mark uncompetitively.”358 The first condition suggests that 
traders cannot assume that they are entitled to foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks. 
Consider a reverse example of this assumption: subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing for Confusion” 
explained how a court finding that PEPSI-COLA did not infringe COCA-COLA (because COLA 
was descriptive in English) led to the incorrect conclusion that 百 事 可 樂 also did not infringe 
可 口 可 樂 (even though the Chinese equivalent was descriptive when first coined in 1933). 
Therefore, since a trademark claim does not automatically expand into claims for its synonyms 
or homophones, subject to evidence of confusion, an English-language mark should also be 
independent of its translations or transliterations. The second condition reinforces the suggestion 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual‟s labour also belongs to that individual. … The first [condition] states that labour only originates a 
property right to the object to which it is joined „where there is enough, and as good left in common for others‟. The 
second [condition states] … „As much as any one can make use of to the advantage of life before it spoils; so much 
he may by his labour fix a Property in.‟”) [Drahos]. 
356
 Steven Wilf, “Who Authors Trademarks?” (1999) 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 1. 
357
 Gerhardt, supra note 12. 
358
 Mattel, supra note 99 at para 22, quoting David Vaver, “Unconventional and Well-Known Trade Marks”, (2005) 
Sing JLS 1 at 16. 
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that traders cannot assume that they are entitled to foreign-language equivalents of their 
trademarks. Locke already recognized in the 17
th
 Century that the second condition has little use 
in a society where individuals are able to store wealth (e.g., money), so just imagine the 
uselessness of the second condition in a society were corporations are able to amass wealth (e.g., 
trademarks) faster and longer than individuals. In noting the inconsistency of the second 
condition, which would permit the hoarding of non-perishable stocks but not the wasting of 
perishable plums, Professor Drahos commented that Locke “glides over the connections between 
property, wealth, political and social power and the implications of this for a theory like his 
which claims that men are naturally equal and have a natural right to property.”359 Locke could 
have addressed the inconsistency by stating that the entitlement is conditional on being useful at 
and continuously after the time of taking, instead of being useful before it spoils.
360
 Such a 
philosophical theory would align better with the trademark doctrine, as even first-to-file 
trademark countries require that a trademark be used (eventually) in order to maintain a 
registration.  
An unjust enrichment-based justification for trademark rights will reject the solution 
above. This justification came from an Aristotelian corrective justice theory that one should not 
be enriched at the expense of another.
361
 This theory could be a reason why traders often assume 
that “free riding” is a wrong that needs a remedy. Consider again the examples where originally 
it was not the trader who used “its” trademark, but a news reporter who created the Chinese 
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translation for JORDAN or the government who invested in Chinese translations for TRUMP. 
But is it not unjust for these traders to enrich themselves with the translations at the expense of 
society? If the rebuttal is that there is no injustice because society‟s use of the translations was 
not use as a trademark, then the translations would be available to all as a potential trademark. 
This means that the first “free rider” to enrich itself with the translations as trademarks did not do 
so at the expense of the “rightful owner” of JORDAN or TRUMP. If the rebuttal is that the “free 
rider” is co-opting some sort of association with the “rightful owner”, then corporations should 
also be prohibited from co-opting social causes without compensating the charities and non-
profit organizations that started the social campaigns. This theory could also be a reason why 
traders assume that there should be compensation for using what is assumed to be foreign-
language equivalents of their trademarks. But what (if any) should the compensation be? Imagine 
a poor man who has nothing to eat but plain bread on a daily basis. Asked by a neighbour if he 
ever tired of his poverty, the man replied that he enjoyed each mouthful of plain bread with a 
deep sniff of the fragrant cooking from the restaurant next door. Overhearing this, the restaurant 
owner took the poor man to court and demanded to be paid the value of “sniffing the food”. The 
wise judge agreed, grabbed the restaurant owner‟s ear and rewarded him with the value of 
“hearing the coins”!  
A personality-based justification for trademark rights will reject the solution above. This 
justification came from a Hegelian natural rights theory that expressing one‟s will is fundamental 
to exercising one‟s freedom.362 Although traders cannot assume entitlement, this theory explains 
why traders may nevertheless need to claim the foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks. 
                                                 
362
 Drahos, supra note 355 at 77-78 (“The underlying reality is that „property is the first embodiment of freedom‟. … 
One suggestion has been that private property is the institution which allow the exercise of subjective freedom, … 
Another is that the making of property claims contributes to the development of personality. … Good for Hegel is 
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Consider the example of Michael Jordan. What if he had political objections to the Chinese 
translation created by the news reporter for JORDAN, because he feared that the meaning of “tall 
– red” evoked a negative image of him standing tall for red Communism? Although it may be 
objectionable for corporations to claim personality rights, Pfizer and The Coca-Cola Company 
are still useful as illustrations. What if Pfizer had moral objections to the Chinese translation 
given by the public to VIAGRA, because it was repulsed by the incestuous meaning of “great 
brother”? Before coming up with its winning Chinese translation for COCA-COLA, what 
recourse would The Coca-Cola Company have had to stop unflattering Chinese translations such 
as the random “female horse stuffed with wax” or “bite the wax tadpole”?  
An incentive-based justification for trademarks will reject the solution above. This 
justification came from Landes‟ and Posner‟s economic theory that legal protection for reducing 
search costs
363
 – and increasing words364 – is the incentive for doing so in the first place. (It 
should be noted that Dreyfuss disagreed that traders need incentives.
365
) This theory explains 
again why traders may need to claim the foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks. 
Consider the example of The Coca-Cola Company. Allowing multiple Chinese translations such 
as the random “female horse stuffed with wax” or “bite the wax tadpole” would increase search 
costs; whereas, creating the winning Chinese translation for COCA-COLA benefitted consumers 
looking for the product and benefitted society by enriching the Chinese language. 
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7.2.1.2 Rights without Exceptions 
The second problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act generally has no explicit 
exceptions, again unlike copyright and patents. Users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens 
are expected to know the internal limits to trademark rights means that there is no infringement 
unless there is (1) use in association with goods and services according to section 4, and (2) use 
as a trademark according to section 2.
366
 Is it reasonable to expect users to understand a 
limit/defence that legal experts struggle with? Consider the fact that “[m]any commentators and 
courts have misunderstood the difference between use as a trademark and trademark use.”367 
Even when limited exceptions are explicit,
368
 users are expected to keep calm and carry on with 
the limited defences when served with a cease-and-desist letter threatening civil and criminal 
liability.
369
 Unfortunately, many trademark applicants and letter recipients lack the financial 
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 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20 contains exceptions for any bona fide use at (1.1), any utilitarian feature at 
(1.2), and a spirit at (2). 
369
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frightened by subpoenas regarding third parties according to Chris Whipple, The Gatekeepers: How the White 
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resources for a legal opinion on the merits of such threats. Although such humble worries rarely 
make the news, we must pay attention to their unnecessary frequency.
370
 
It is understandable that traders with little understanding of the law may be overzealous 
in frightening other trademark applicants and users. Their lawyers, however, should be the voice 
of reason. Despite the fiduciary duty that lawyers owe their clients,
371
 is it reasonable to expect 
lawyers to self-monitor against four potential conflicts of interests? First, what if the lawyer is 
tempted by the financial rewards of easy billing that comes from issuing cease-and-desist 
letters?
372
 Second, what if the lawyer is desirous of the professional opportunities provided by 
increased publicity that comes from court litigation? Third, what if the lawyer is worried about 
client attrition for not creating-and-solving problems that maintain client dependency on the 
prescient-and-powerful lawyer? Finally, what if the lawyer is afraid of professional liability 
because what was reasonable at the time suddenly looks negligent after a problem arises? 
Consider the example of Metallica, the band that sued Napster for copyright infringement and 
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threatened a Canadian cover band with a cease-and-desist warning that was 41 pages too long.
373
 
When the warning led to a public uproar, Metallica blamed it on an overzealous lawyer who 
acted without the band‟s knowledge. It is overzealous indeed for a lawyer to do so much work 
without any client authority – with no likelihood of bill payment and every certainty of 
professional liability.  
A possible solution is to have Canada‟s Trademarks Act articulate the general principle 
that trademark rights are an exception to the public use of words. This should be reinforced by 
also articulating specific limits to trademark rights.
374
 Defences are already legislated for 
trademarks in the United States
375
 and already added for copyright in Canada.
376
 This would help 
traders whose fears of genericide lead to claims of a duty to police their trademarks, as they 
probably need statutory repudiation of the existence of such a duty.
377
 Such a general principle 
and specific limits might have protected a professor collecting consumer complaints against 
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United Airlines on www.untied.com, as the Federal Court of Canada ruled against him on the 
basis that “parody and satire are not defences to trademark infringement”.378 On the other hand, 
the existence of such defences in the United States did not protect a satirist who poked fun at 
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) with a website for People Eating Tasty 
Animals on www.peta.org, where a court stringently decided that the parody needed to be 
conveyed immediately via the website‟s domain name instead of being conveyed later via the 
website‟s content.379   
Another possible solution is to rely on a constitutional defence, such as Canada‟s freedom 
of expression
380
 and the United States‟ freedom of speech.381 Professors Craig and Scassa have 
cautioned that the many social costs of expanding trademark rights outweigh the one benefit to 
traders, as constitutional rights may be harmed.
382
 Professor Vaver warned against burdening the 
court system unnecessarily with undergoing such constitutional analysis.
383
 Courts themselves 
seem reluctant to adjudicate such trademark matters.
384
 Most importantly, the public does not 
understand a constitutional defence and regular Canadians cannot readily assess for themselves if 
their actions are legitimate, or are ripe for liability as often claimed by trademark owners in 
cease-and-desist letters. 
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379
 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 263 F (3d) 359 (4th Cir 2001) at 366. The same court, 
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 Craig, supra note 374 at 330. Teresa Scassa, “Trademarks Worth a Thousand Words: Freedom of Expression and 
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Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense” (1999) 108:7 Yale LJ 1687 at 1696 [Lemley]. 
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“Following the Signs: New Directions in Trademark Law” conference hosted by the Ottawa Centre for Law, 
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 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 412 (“Although somewhat opaque on this point, the Court managed to duck the 
constitutional issue.”). And see the Canadian court‟s reluctance in Compagnie Générale des Établissements 
Michelin, supra note 366. 
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7.2.1.3 Rights without Responsibilities 
The third problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act generally has no liability for 
trademark abuse by traders, even though civil and criminal liability exists for trademark 
infringement by users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens. Relying on injurious 
falsehood is tenuous, especially for users who are not businesses.
385
 Relying on vexatious 
proceedings is pointless, especially with traders who issue cease-and-desist letters without 
proceeding to court.
386
 Both approaches increase litigation by creating counter-claims in 
response to trademark abuse when what is needed are defences to discourage trademark abuse in 
the first place. The result is that there is little to discourage traders from making unfounded 
claims and much to encourage users to settle in order to avoid a fine or imprisonment.
387
  
A possible solution is to have Canada‟s Trademarks Act articulate civil and criminal 
liability for trademark abuse as it currently does for trademark infringement.
388
 After all, those 
who claim the right to keep a guard dog to discourage trespassers from their property should 
                                                 
385
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 7(a) (Unfair Competition and Prohibited Marks – “No person shall (a) make 
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 NG-LOY, supra note 65 at para [26.1.9] (“Section 35 [of Singapore‟s Trade Marks Act] provides a remedy for a 
person who is aggrieved by a groundless threat of infringement proceedings … The recipient of such threats can get 
a declaration that the threats are unjustifiable, an injunction against continuance of the threats, and damages in 
respect of any loss suffered by the threats.”). And see the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK), c 26, s 21 
on “Remedy for groundless threats of infringement proceedings”, as well as the Intellectual Property (Unjustified 
Threats) Act 2017 (UK), c 14. 
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assume the responsibility when it bites a passerby on the adjoining sidewalk. Are trademark 
rights being abused? Some courts seemed to think so: 
“… in the practical world powerful traders will naturally assert their rights even in 
marginal cases. … Registration will require the public to look to its defences. … 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the monopoly extends to confusingly 
similar marks. In any marginal case defendants, SMEs particularly, are likely to 
back off when they receive a letter before action. It is cheaper and more certain to 
do that than stand and fight, even if in principle they have a defence.”389 
 
The subsections above illustrate how trademark law is understood and used mostly by 
traders and rarely by consumers. Trademark law needs re-balancing immediately. The 
subsections below illustrate how the dual purposes of protecting consumers and traders
390
 have 
become even more unbalanced as a result of dilution and licensing, and why it must not be tilted 
further through foreign-language marks.  
 
7.2.2 Right against Depreciation 
As explained above, the dual purposes of protecting consumers and traders are 
accomplished by requiring that a trademark distinguishes the goods and services of one trader 
                                                 
389
 Nichols Plc’s Trade Mark Application, [2003] RPC 16 at para 14, aff‟d [2005] RPC 12 (ECJ). 
390
 Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 72 (“Second, the purposes of paragraph 12(1)(d) include the protection of 
consumers from being misled about the source of wares and services, and to enable providers and suppliers to 
identify their wares and services and to protect them from unfair competition.”). And see Re Spirits International, 
supra note 193 at 13 (“The purpose of the Trademark Act is two-fold: to protect business and to protect the 
consumer.”). 
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from another. This makes common sense since a trademark‟s distinctiveness depends on the 
goods and services to which the trademarks apply.
391
  
Or so it did until 1953.  
That was the year in which section 22 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act first prohibited 
depreciation of goodwill.
392
 The scope of depreciation of goodwill is unclear because the 
Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it could go beyond dilution by “blurring” and 
“tarnishing”,393 which means that the depreciation of goodwill could go further than American 
anti-dilution law to include “free riding” or even further than European anti-dilution law to 
include a fourth or fifth prohibition that has yet to be articulated.
394
 For this reason, the 
subsections below try to anticipate the possible limits of depreciation of goodwill – and its 
potential effects on foreign-language marks – by reviewing Frank Schechter‟s 1927 article on the 
rational basis of trademark protection.
395
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 NG-LOY, supra note 65 at para [20.3.3] (“The specification of goods/services is an important feature of the 
registration process. For example, it is by reference to this specification of goods/services that the Registry 
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392
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registered, presumably until such time that the lack of use results in the expungement of the registration. But if the 
court can grant both an injunction and an expungement per section 22, then the Trademarks Opposition Board 
should also be able to refuse an application per section 22. Otherwise, another strange scenario would occur where a 
mark cannot be used but can become registered, only to be expunged after registration for lack of use. 
394
 Even American anti-dilution itself could have gone beyond tarnishing and blurring, according to Graeme 
Dinwoodie, “(National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System” (2000) 21:3 U Pa J Intl 
Econ L 499 at 523 (“Indeed, this trend was so pervasive that some commentators started to reconceptualize dilution 
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395
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 156 
 
7.2.2.1 Dilution of Trademark 
The first thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of arbitrary, coined or 
fanciful marks. This is clear from his repeated statements that such trademarks deserve more 
protection than commonplace ones
396
 because they were “added to rather than withdrawn from 
the human vocabulary … [otherwise] these marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace 
words of the language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance,”397 as well as 
from his concluding principles: 
“(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power; (2) that this 
selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon 
the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness 
and singularity; (3) that such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired 
upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the degree of its protection 
depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its 
owner, it is actually unique and different from others.”398 [emphasis added] 
 
Cohen criticized Schechter‟s legal reasoning for being circular: “It purports to base legal 
protection upon economic value, when as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales 
device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected”399 and its opposite vicious 
circle “accepts the fact that courts do protect private exploitation of a given word as a reason 
why private exploitation of that word should be protected.”400 Another way to explain Cohen‟s 
                                                 
396
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 830, 832.  
397
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 829. 
398
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 831. 
399
 Felix Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35:6 Columbia L Rev 809 at 815 
[Cohen]. 
400
 Cohen, supra note 399 at 815. 
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criticism is his suggestion that we should not be assessing Schechter‟s legal reasoning based on 
the theory it defends but based on the question it propounds.
401
 This means not being distracted 
by Schechter‟s emphasis on the injury done to trademarks and staying focused on Schechter‟s 
assumption that “courts are not creating … but merely recognizing … a supernatural Something 
that is immanent in certain trade names and symbols”.402 This also means staying focused on the 
effects of Schechter‟s assumption, which range from quelling public opposition on the circular 
thinking
403
 to redistributing wealth: 
“Language is socially useful apart from law, as air is socially useful, but neither 
language nor air is a source of economic wealth unless some people are prevented 
from using these resources in ways that are permitted to other people.”404   
 
The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks because Schechter‟s approach 
suggests that transliterations that add to the vocabulary deserve more protection than translations 
that already exist in the foreign language. This could also be stretched to make the bizarre 
argument that foreign-language marks for which the courts do not recognize linguistic 
knowledge, by virtue of being deemed as an inarticulate design instead of being recognized as a 
word that already exists, deserve more protection than those which are understood by consumers. 
In this regard, Cohen‟s approach is preferable in that its application would remain the same for 
all foreign languages. 
It is important to note that Schechter did not actually advocate for the right against 
dilution of famous marks. After all, a trademark can be arbitrary, coined or fanciful without 
                                                 
401
 Cohen, supra note 399 at 829. 
402
 Cohen, supra note 399 at 815-816. 
403
 Cohen, supra note 399 at 816 (“The effect of this theory, in the law of unfair competition as elsewhere, is to dull 
lay understanding and criticism of what courts do in fact.”). 
404
 Cohen, supra note 399 at 816. 
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being famous (and vice versa). Beebe and others, however, seemed to interpret Schechter as 
advocating for famous marks. Beebe noted that “Cohen correctly identified the fundamental 
problem … that Schechter tried to hide from his realist readers by focusing to such an extent on 
the damage to the plaintiff‟s famous mark rather than the motives of the defendant – on the harm 
rather than on the misappropriation”;405 that “Wolff expressed his sympathy with Schechter‟s 
efforts to protect famous trademarks from dilution”;406 and that Schechter “spoke of the need to 
protect famous marks „against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection 
with which it has been used‟.”407 This interpretation could be due to Schechter‟s testimony to the 
United States Congress: “I have limited that notion of mine to marks of an arbitrary or fanciful or 
original nature … particularly a unique and fanciful mark such as ODOL or KODAK.”408 Both 
trademarks were mentioned in Schechter‟s article and were famous marks. But bolstering 
protection for distinctive marks by emphasizing their fame (and the subsequent harm) is different 
from advocating protection for famous marks even if they are non-distinctive. The fact remains 
that Schechter‟s concluding principles make no mention of famous marks. 
The analysis above is important to foreign-language marks because Beebe et al‟s 
interpretation is the current state of American anti-dilution law, which protects only trademarks 
that are “famous”.409 Even though fame is determined by considering a non-exhaustive list of 
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factors,
410
 there is scholarship to suggest that it is being applied haphazardly. Beebe conducted a 
study illustrating that the dilution doctrine is unnecessary in many cases.
411
 Lemley explained 
that the courts can be too quick to perceive or even to ignore fame based on local experiences.
412
 
This also raises the possibility of local experiences becoming an unintentional bias when it 
comes to recognizing the fame of foreign-language marks. For example, a court in the United 
States would likely be unimpressed by claims to fame for 乔 丹 or QIAO2 DAN1, which it has 
never heard of nor seen. But an American court would understand immediately once it is 
informed that those are the respective Chinese translation and pronunciation for JORDAN. 
Although it should not do so, the court will subconsciously superimpose Michael Jordan‟s fame 
onto the Chinese translation and pronunciation, thus equating them with JORDAN. Another 
example is how a judge in the United States would likely recognize the fame of OPRAH based 
on her average television viewership of 13 million. An American judge does not have to be a talk 
show fan to come across OPRAH‟s talk show while flipping American television channels or be 
                                                                                                                                                             
trademark dilution. On the other hand, the foreign trademark owner who does not use a mark in the United States 
must show more than the level of recognition that is necessary in a domestic trademark infringement case.”). 
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Dilution Revision Act Case Law” (2007-2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 449 at 450 (“antidilution 
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412
 Lemley, supra note 405 at 1698-1699 (“But courts applying the state and federal dilution statutes have been quite 
willing to conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is “famous” within the meaning of the Act. 
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exposed to OPRAH‟s billboard ads while driving on American roads. But the same court may 
not have heard of Graham Norton, the host of a 20-year-old British talk show with over 4 million 
viewers in the United Kingdom. Even though Graham Norton interviews America‟s most 
recognized and highest paid celebrities – Madonna, David Beckham, Justin Bieber, Emily Blunt, 
George Clooney, Hugh Jackman, Will Smith, Sir Elton John and Sir Patrick Stewart – on a 
weekly basis, his American counterpart in the same industry had never seen his show. This was 
obvious when Stephen Colbert interviewed Graham Norton and was surprised to hear that guests 
chatted over cocktails and drinks on the latter‟s show. And the same court would likely never 
have heard of LUYU, a Chinese talk show host who averaged more than 10 times the number of 
OPRAH viewers with 140 million viewers in China. LUYU‟s fame in the United States would 
only exist amongst those who watch Chinese satellite shows or read Chinese magazines. This 
helps us to understand why – incredible as it sounds – a court in China may not recognize the 
fame of JORDAN or TRUMP. While Chinese basketball fans who watch NBA games and 
Chinese businessmen who read FORBES magazines may recognize such fame, a Chinese judge 
may actually lack the local experiences to do so. This is also why few in China recognize 
America‟s most famous “Chinese” dishes: General Tso chicken, chow mein, beef broccoli 
(broccoli is not even a Chinese vegetable), chop suey, and Chinese fortune cookies.
413
 
Canada‟s depreciation of goodwill is more expansive than the American anti-dilution law 
because it does not require fame and it has no limits as defences.
414
 Regardless of the 
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terminology of, requirements for, and limits to this law, the inclusion of linguistic knowledge 
raises the question as to “what is the actual mark that needs to preserve its uniqueness and 
protect against vitiation?” 415  In other words, does the right to protect the mark JORDAN 
necessarily also mean a right to protect the Chinese translation 乔  丹  or the Chinese 
pronunciation QIAO2 DAN1? Although dilution does not require confusion and only assesses 
distinctiveness, the general recommendation to assume linguistic knowledge should still apply to 
dilution, and the specific recommendation to translate foreign-language marks into the official 
language(s) of the country assessing for distinctiveness should not apply to dilution. Why? When 
registrability and infringement assess for distinctiveness, their purpose is to prevent confusion by 
ensuring that a trader does not monopolize common words and prohibit others from their generic 
or clearly descriptive use. Contrast that with dilution, which assesses for distinctiveness with the 
completely different purpose of ensuring that others do not dilute or depreciate a trader‟s 
goodwill. 
 
7.2.2.2 Dilution of Goods and Services 
The second thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of goods and 
services. He began with the orthodox belief that a trademark identifies the origin or ownership of 
                                                                                                                                                             
linkage) and fourthly that the likely effect would be to depreciate the value of its goodwill (i.e. damage).”). See 
Craig, supra note 374 at 333-334 (“Section 22, however, threatens to offer more expansive control. In the United 
States, protection against the dilution of the distinctive quality of a famous mark is limited by section 1125(4) of the 
Lanham Act, which shields from liability non-commercial uses, uses in news reporting, and „fair use of a famous 
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or 
services of the owner of the famous mark.‟”). 
415
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 822, 825 (“It ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather than the 
designation of source, is the primary purpose of the trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or 
individuality of the trademark is of paramount importance to its owner.”) and (“It is the gradual whittling away or 
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. 
The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its 
need for protection against vitiation or disassociation from the particular product in connection with which it has 
been used.”) and (“… the preservation of the uniqueness of a mark should constitute the only rational basis for its 
protection.”). 
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goods, which he quickly dismissed by arguing that consumers no longer know the specific 
source of a trademarked good.
416
 He claimed instead that a trademark, in reality, creates and 
retains goodwill.
417
 The resulting consequence would be that trademark protection need no 
longer be limited to specific goods, but should be expanded to non-competing goods.
418
 His new 
basis for trademark protection is summed up in the much repeated passage: 
“The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the light of what has been 
said concerning the function of a trademark. It is the gradual whittling away or 
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by 
its use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the 
deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for 
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in 
connection with which it has been used.”419 [emphasis added] 
 
Brown agreed with Schechter that trademarks have a persuasive function in that “[t]hey 
not only reach over the shoulders of the retailer, they reach from a radio program on Sunday to a 
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419
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 825. 
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compulsive purchase on Friday”,420 as he also believed that “trade symbols may serve as a bridge 
between advertising and purchase, and that they may themselves be the vehicle of persuasion”.421 
Notwithstanding this, Brown still disagreed that such a function should be protected, as he 
maintained the traditional doctrine that only the informative function of trademarks should be 
protected. One reason could be Brown‟s criticism of Schechter for exaggerating the importance 
of a trademark guaranteeing satisfaction.
422
 Another reason could be Brown‟s disapproval of 
using trademarks for such a function.
423
 
It is important to note that Schechter only advocated for the right against dilution by 
“blurring”, 424 but did not actually advocate for the rights against dilution by “tarnishing” or “free 
riding”. Notwithstanding this, his article has resulted in a spectrum running from a restrictive to 
an expansive framework. In a simple and restrictive framework, the test for confusion is enough 
to serve the current purpose of trademark law because “the interests of trademark owners and 
consumers aligned perfectly. Trademark laws benefit both mark owners and consumers when 
they stop sales of counterfeit goods.”425 This is true regardless of whether consumers see the 
trademark as identifying source and giving traders a shortcut to communicate their goods and 
services, or whether consumers see the trademark as guaranteeing quality and giving traders an 
                                                 
420
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incentive to provide consistent and desirable standards.
426
 Either way, trademarks lower 
consumer search costs and promote market efficiency.
427
 Therefore, both consumers and traders 
benefit from a Canadian statutory prohibition against trademark infringement. Since Schechter‟s 
article, however, the trademark purpose of protecting consumers from confusion seems to have 
given way to and become disconnected from that of protecting traders from unfair 
competition,
428
 and may have even turned into a disguise for anti-competition. This has resulted 
in a complex and expansive framework, where “the actual alignment often breaks apart, 
especially when consumers seek to use marks as information tools. The expansion of trademark 
law is resulting in trends that ignore or harm consumer interests. The harm is especially apparent 
when trademark law is used to deny consumers the opportunity to use trademarks to find 
information.”429 This is because consumer confusion is not required for dilution by “blurring”, 
dilution by “tarnishing”, or “free riding”.  Therefore, the possible consequences flowing from a 
Canadian statutory prohibition against depreciation of goodwill prioritize traders over consumers. 
We must ask if such a priority means trademark law is unnecessarily and incorrectly overlapping 
with tort and contract law.
430
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quality which they associate with that particular trademark. Trademarks thus operate as a kind of shortcut to get 
consumers to where they want to go, and in that way perform a key function in a market economy. Trademark law 
rests on principles of fair dealing. It is sometimes said to hold the balance between free competition and fair 
competition.”). 
427
 Katz, supra note 15. 
428
 NG-LOY, supra note 65 at para [15.1.6] (“It has been argued that modern advertising and marketing strategies 
have allowed certain trade marks to acquire another function. This relates to a special category of trade marks 
known in different jurisdictions as „well-known trade marks‟ or „famous marks‟ or „marks with a reputation‟. These 
special trade marks have been so successfully promoted by their trade mark proprietors that the public no longer rely 
upon these trade marks merely as badges of origin and of quality. These trade marks have such a „selling power‟ that 
they have become icons in their own right: people buy goods bearing these trade marks, not really because of the 
origin or quality of these goods, but because of the trade marks themselves and the image and lifestyle they 
symbolise.”). 
429
 Gerhardt, supra note 12 at 430-431. 
430
 Vaver, supra note 21 at 432 (“Although the tort grew up to protect the interests of traders rather than consumers, 
the less it works to prevent consumer confusion, the more it becomes merely a law protecting traders from unfair 
competition.”) Although the author is speaking to passing off, the comment is also true for registered trademarks. 
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7.2.2.3 Dilution of Use 
The third thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of use in commerce. 
This is clear from his repeated statements that a trademark sells goods,
431
 which is why “it would 
lose in selling power if everyone used it as the designation of his goods,”432 as well as from the 
much quoted passage: 
“The true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory 
and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.” 433 
[emphasis added] 
 
Lemley disagreed with Schechter. Instead, he agreed with Brown by maintaining the 
traditional doctrine that the only function of a trademark is to identify source, as treating 
trademarks like property defeats the requirement that they be distinctive of the goods and 
services with which they are associated.
434
 He even repeated Brown‟s disapproval of having a 
trademark as an end in itself when consumers would be better off “with fewer brands clamoring 
for [their] scarce attention.” 435  Beebe would agree with them because he documented how 
Schechter‟s 1927 article on the rational basis of trademark protection – “the most cited law 
                                                                                                                                                             
And see Imperial Tobacco Co of India Ltd v Albert Bonnan, [1924] UKPC 38 (“The respondents, being unhampered 
by covenant, are selling goods manufactured by the British American Company as being what they are – namely, 
Will‟s Gold Flake cigarettes manufactured by that company. There is no untruth and no attempt to deceive. … There 
is nothing to prevent a tradesman acquiring goods from a manufacturer and selling them in competition with him, 
even in a country into which hitherto the manufacturer or his agent has been the sole importer.”). 
431
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 815, 819, 830, 831, 832.  
432
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 832. 
433
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 818. 
434
 Lemley, supra note 405 at 1695-1696 (“We give protection to trademarks for one basic reason: to enable the 
public to identify easily a particular product from a particular source. … Vesting trademarks with the mantle of 
property – and giving them some of the indicia of real property, such as free transferability – defeats the purpose of 
linking trademarks to goods in the first place.”). 
435
 Lemley, supra note 405 at 1695. 
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review article ever written on trademark law”436 – is actually misappropriation in disguise,437 
which is why “[i]t has managed over the years to mean many different things to many different 
people, all seeking some theoretical means to fill the void left in the absence of 
misappropriation.”438 
The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks because the approach of 
Schechter‟s dissenters suggests that a claim for a foreign-language mark should not include 
automatic claims for its translations. This is important because what is true for a trademark may 
not be true for its foreign-language equivalents. For example, subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing 
for Confusion” explained that although PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with 
COCA-COLA in English,
439
 百 事 可 樂 would have been confusing with and should have been 
stopped by the previous use of 可 口 可 樂 in Chinese. Likewise, the same explanation applied 
in subsection 6.3.2 on “Example of JORDAN” for why Michael Jordan can only claim the 
Chinese translation for JORDAN with respect to the writing (乔 丹) but not with respect to the 
pronunciation (QIAO2 DAN1). This means that although dilution does not require confusion and 
only assesses distinctiveness, the general recommendation to assume linguistic knowledge 
should still apply to dilution, and the specific recommendation to translate foreign-language 
marks into the official language(s) of the country assessing for distinctiveness should not apply 
to dilution. 
                                                 
436
 Beebe on Schechter, supra note 405 at 61. 
437
 Beebe on Schechter, supra note 405 at 63 (“What Schechter sought to obscure in „Rational Basis‟ is that the Odol 
case was not, strictly speaking, a trademark case. Rather, it was a misappropriation case that happened to involve a 
trademark. Schechter sought to suppress this basic truth – that the concept of trademark dilution is essentially a 
misappropriation concept – in order to sell his proposed doctrinal reforms to an American audience altogether 
suspicious of misappropriation doctrine and increasingly under the sway of American Legal Realism.”). 
438
 Beebe on Schechter, supra note 405 at 63. 
439
 Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102 at 617-618. 
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It is important to note that Schechter did not actually advocate for the right against 
dilution of other uses such as non-commercial or expressive uses. While it may seem fastidious 
to say that Schechter objected to using a trademark for its “uniqueness and singularity” or with 
“non-competing goods”, but not to using a trademark in a protest or a parody, the fact remains 
that every case he cited was an example of use in commerce.
440
 Although not writing about 
Schechter, Dreyfuss revealed what would happen if trader rights were expanded even more to 
prohibit expressive activities without a reciprocal expansion of user rights.
441
 She began by 
identifying how a trademark can have a signaling function that “stimulates further purchases by 
the consuming public” – as Schechter would say – and an expressive function that does not do 
so.
442
 While the former function is now prohibited, the latter function generally is still not.
443
 But 
this could change because hybrid uses of trademarks often invoke both functions,
444
 and traders 
are repeatedly litigating to prohibit the latter function, such as when the United States Olympic 
Committee persuaded the Supreme Court of the United States to prohibit a non-profit 
                                                 
440
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 829 (“Should the rule, still broadly enunciated by the Supreme Court, that a trademark 
may be used on different classes of goods, be literally adhered to, there is not a single one of these fanciful marks 
which will not, if used on different classes of goods, or to advertise different services, gradually but surely lose its 
effectiveness and unique distinctiveness in the same way as has STAR, BLUE RIBBON, or GOLD MEDAL. If 
KODAK may be used for bath tubs and cakes, MAZDA for cameras and shoes, or RITZ-CARLTON for coffee, 
these marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace words of the language, despite the originality and ingenuity 
in their contrivance, and the vast expenditures in advertising them which the courts concede should be protected to 
the same extent as plant and machinery.”). 
441
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354. 
442
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 400 (“… its central role to be that of identifying goods and services and 
distinguishing them from those manufactured or sold by others. I call this the “signaling” function of the mark. … In 
referring to BARBIE in order to indicate that she was treated like a beautiful by empty-headed accessory, Kennedy 
exploited a set of meanings that are quite different from the ones invoked by Mattel, and I label this use of the 
trademark “expressive”.”). 
443
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 400, 401 (“The first use would be protected – and, indeed, is protected by both 
federal and state law – because exclusivity is essential to an efficient marketplace. … Expressive uses of marks do 
not usually involve purchasing decisions. Accordingly, no prohibitions on such usages are generally necessary.”). 
444
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 401, 402 (“On the expressive side, these are cases like Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, and 
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, in which marks are utilized commercially, but not in the signaling sense. In 
Prestonettes, a reference to the trademark owner‟s business was made in connection with the sale of scented face 
powder in order to fully describe the product‟s ingredients; in Sanders, the original labels on rebuilt spark plugs 
were left in place to denote their history. … The easy cases on the opposite pole are ones that involve signaling uses 
of the mark, but not in the commerce of the trademark owner. … In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 
for example, the Second Circuit announced a series of factors that quantify the likelihood that consumers will be 
confused into thinking that Polaroid was the source of electronic devices manufactured by Polarad.”). 
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organization from raising public awareness through a sporting event called the GAY OLYMPIC 
GAMES.
445
 Contrast that with a South African court permitting a for-profit clothing company to 
parody trademark owners.
446
 Canadian courts might be in between because even though they 
prohibited a water bottler from depreciating the goodwill of a registered trademark to spoof then 
Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau,
447
 they might have permitted labour union use of an 
employer‟s trademarks.448 Dreyfuss used such situations to reveal the inconsistency of using 
competitive rights to evaluate expressive activities: 
“But [the non-profit organization‟s] failure to convince the Court of the genericity 
of OLYMPIC may hold the key to resolving the problem of public access to 
marks in a legal regime intent on expanding proprietary rights. Thus, the 
explanation for the Court‟s willingness to accept GAMES as a substitute for 
OLYMPIC may lie in the fact that it compartmentalized the vocabulary into 
expressive and competitive components. Since it took the genericity defense 
solely in its traditional form, as a claim about the competitive vocabulary, it 
evaluated the word in only the competitive context, as a word denoting athletic 
tournaments, and came to the conclusion that ample synonyms were readily 
available. Had it instead focused on the expressive significance of OLYMPIC, 
and looked for replacements that would evoke the tenets of the ancient Greeks, it 
might have reached a different result on the genericity issue.”449 
 
                                                 
445
 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc v United States Olympic Committee, 483 US 522 (1987). 
446
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v Sabmark International et al (2006) 1 SA 144 (CC). 
447
 Source Perrier SA v Fira-Less Marketing Co, (1983) 70 CPR 2d 61 (FCTD). 
448
 Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin, supra note 366. 
449
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 417. 
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In this regard, Schechter‟s rational basis for trademark protection can only be maintained 
if traditional intellectual property justifications for trademarks are kept for competitive uses, and 
expanded trademark rights are accompanied by an expanded analysis for expressive uses. How 
should this be done? Dreyfuss suggests “build[ing] upon the defenses that trademark has 
constructed for the competitive vocabulary a parallel set of principles to protect expressive 
speech.”450  
The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks, as they can also have 
expressive uses. For example, China‟s poor is reacting increasingly to the wasteful consumption 
of China‟s elite by co-opting luxury brands. These expressive activities threaten social stability 
because they highlight discontentment with and encourage discussion of the immense wealth gap 
(presumably from government corruption) in China.
451
 As the West celebrates China‟s increasing 
enforcement of trademark law,
452
 it must beware that China‟s reasons for enforcement may 
sometimes have nothing to do with trademark law or that such enforcement can have life-and-
death consequences in China. For example, China executed at least 14 infringers for 
counterfeiting trademarked goods in the 1990‟s.453 The inclusion of linguistic knowledge – along 
with the expansion of trademark rights – will only increase the value of Chinese-language marks 
here and abroad. We must reconsider our desire to litigate such rights in light of the fact that 
                                                 
450
 Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 418. 
451
 Barton Beebe, “Shanzhai, Sumptuary Law, and Intellectual Property Law in Contemporary China” (2014) 47 UC 
Davis L Rev 849 at 855 (“The important difference, of course, is that [the Chinese laws] are a reaction by social 
elites seeking to preserve social stability, while [the Chinese expressive activities] are a reaction primarily by the 
non-elite that is at least symptomatic of, if not an incitement to, social instability. The former attacks competitive 
consumption through top-down controls on consumption; the latter attacks competitive consumption through 
bottom-up appropriation and recoding.”). 
452
 Ibid at 854 (“A third recent development in China is the increasing number and effectiveness of intellectual 
property lawsuits and administrative enforcement actions brought by foreign luxury goods producers against 
Chinese defendants. … Hermes, Burberry, Cartier, and Coach have each recently won significant cases against 
infringers, with Coach making headlines for its award of $257 million in damages. Meanwhile, in a first for the two 
countries, the United States and China recently collaborated to shut down a massive counterfeiting operation in 
Guandgong province valued at $802 million.”).  
453
 Connie Carter, Fighting Fakes in China: The Legal Protection of Trade Marks and Brands in the People’s 
Republic of China (London: The Intellectual Property Institute, 1996) at 63. 
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China is “persuaded by the West to use a criminal system which is characterized by political 
interference and which in practice lacks even basic procedural safeguards. … In the two cases 
that have been reported in the West the defendants were sentenced under the provision of the 
Criminal Code prohibiting speculation, rather than under the specific offences relating to 
trademarks. … Such a sentence in China often means public humiliation or public execution, 
execution to order (so that the requirements of organ donors can be met) and a host of other well-
documented abuses.”454 Bently and Maniatis commented that “while economic motives explain 
such legal imperialism, the ethical dimensions of such strategies demand reflection … that the 
United States‟ refusal to engage with the existing structures of Chinese administration have 
caused the United States to advocate changes in China‟s law which are ethically 
objectionable.”455 
Ethical objections to the United States influencing China‟s law may increase if we 
remember that both the United States and China started as net importers of intellectual property 
which refused to sign international trade agreements recognizing foreign rights. For example, the 
United States neither protected British copyright owners in the 19
th
 Century nor joined the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works until 1988.
456
 Only a reversal in its 
economic motives led to the United States influencing Singapore‟s copyright legislation in 1987 
with the promise of trade benefits (which were terminated soon after the copyright legislation 
was enacted).
457
 And these economic motives resulted in the United States using trade sanctions 
in 1994 “to persuade more than 100 other countries that they, as net importers of technological 
                                                 
454
 Robert Burrell, “A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of Copyright on China by the West” in 
Lionel Bently & Spyros Maniatis, eds, Perspectives on Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property and Ethics 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) 197 at 219-220 [Bently & Maniatis]. 
455
 Bently & Maniatis, supra note 454 at ix of its Introduction.  
456
 Benly & Sherman, supra note 32 at 6. 
457
 NG-LOY, supra note 65 at paras [4.1.13]-[4.1.16]. 
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and cultural information, should pay more for the importation of that information.”458 But should 
intellectual property be limited to economic and international trade concerns? What of social and 
human rights causes? 
 
7.2.2.4 Dilution of Territory 
The fourth thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of territory. He stated 
his position in one long but much overlooked passage: 
“An equally apparent failure of the courts to keep pace with the necessities of 
trade and the functional development of trademarks, and a corollary to the 
principle that „if there is no competition, there can be no unfair competition,‟ is 
the rule that a trademark or trade name is only coextensive with its use and may 
be used by different firms in different localities. … Furthermore, such decisions, 
based upon an antiquated neighborhood theory of trade, fail to recognize the fact 
that through the existence of the telephone, the automobile, the motor bus, the 
high-speed interurban trolley, and the railroad, the consumer now projects his 
shopping far from home … ”459 [emphasis added] 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with Schechter.
460
 The passage of time, 
however, has vindicated Schechter with Dinwoodie‟s observation that the “geographic limit 
                                                 
458
 Peter Drahos, “Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT” (1995) 13:1 
Prometheus 6 at 7. 
459
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 824. 
460
 Hanover Star Milling Co v Metcalf, 240 US 403 (1916) at 415-416 (“But this is not to say that the proprietor of a 
trademark … can monopolize markets that his trade has never reached.”). And see United Drug Co v Theodore 
Rectanus Co, 248 US 90, 100 (1918) at 98 (“[T]he adoption of a trademark does not, at least in the absence of some 
valid legislation enacted for the purpose, project the right of projection in advance of the extension of the trade, or 
operate as a claim of territorial rights over areas into which it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the 
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became much less significant with the advent of federal trademark registration under the Lanham 
Act in 1946 because an application for federal trademark registration is, if successful, treated as 
nationwide constructive use.”461  
It is important to note that Schechter only advocated for the right against dilution within 
the United States, but did not actually advocate for the right against dilution beyond national 
borders. Does expanding trademark rights internationally include the responsibility to meet 
consumer expectations that the trademark functions to identify the source (and quality) of goods 
and services?
462
 For example, a Western consumer of KFC will be surprised to discover that its 
Chinese counterpart serves smaller chicken pieces and replaces fries with corn cobs. Likewise, 
an Asian consumer of 7-11 will be surprised to discover that its Canadian counterpart is not a 
place to pay utility bills, order train tickets, collect mail packages, send mail and faxes, or buy 
cellphones and SIM cards. We can only imagine what Schechter would think now that the 
Internet, planes, and televisions have produced “a new breed of global consumer called into 
existence by online shopping or international travel, or … global brands brought about by free 
trade”.463 Although ignored by most other academics, Schechter‟s passage above is relevant to 
foreign-language marks because of the discussions below on the right to license, the export of 
products, and the policy of international comity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
trade.”) [emphasis added]. This attempt to reap beyond the geographic limit where traders sow is similar to the 
attempt to reap beyond the goods and services where traders sow in Mattel, supra note 358. 
461
 Dinwoodie on Domain Name, supra note 394 at 508. Although Dinwoodie notes the exception to the rule for a 
good faith junior user, he repeats that the importance of geographic limit decreases as the national nature of trade 
increases in Graeme Dinwoodie, “Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State” 
(2004) 41:3 Hous L Rev 885 at 895 [Dinwoodie on Territory]. 
462
 Consider how traders once used consumer expectations to “halt parallel imports, exports, or resales of genuinely 
branded goods” and continue to use consumer expectations to “promote brands internationally and suggest identity 
of trade source, while simultaneously claiming in national courts that the brand is in fact locally produced by a 
different trade source” according to Vaver, supra note 21 at 523. Since traders are so cognizant of consumer 
expectations, they should “be held responsible for clarifying a confusion of its own making” and “[t]rademark law 
should not support such strategies where steps can be taken to prevent buyer confusion”. 
463
 Dinwoodie on Territory, supra note 461 at 900. 
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7.2.3 Right to License 
Although a trademark need not be registered in order to be licensed, a registered 
trademark is easier to license when there is a government certificate documenting the specifics of 
(1) the trademark, (2) the goods and services, and (3) the territory – as registered trademarks are 
valid throughout the entire country. 
Licensing a trademark used to be prohibited because “[t]he object of the (trademarks) law 
is to preserve for a trader the reputation he has made for himself, not to help him in disposing of 
that reputation as of itself a marketable commodity, independent of his goodwill, to some other 
trader.”464 In fact, it was so frowned upon that even a recent case remembers how it used to be 
characterized as “trafficking”: 
 “[T]rafficking in a trade mark has from the outset been one of the cardinal sins of 
trade mark law … The objection, the reason why it was a sin, was that it would, or 
might, lead to deception of the public … If Rolls-Royce decided to market the 
well-known Rolls-Royce badge of quality by granting licences for money to use 
the mark to a wide range of independent manufacturers of e.g. lawn mowers, 
motor boats, wristwatches, bicycles, transistors and other equipment, that would 
plainly, in my judgment, be trafficking in the mark, and might well lead to the 
confusion of the public …”465 
 
Or so it did until 1953.   
                                                 
464
 Bowden Wire Ltd v Bowden Brake Co Ltd (1913), 30 RPC 45. 
465
 Re American Greetings Corp’s Application, (sub nom Holly Hobbie Trade Mark) [1984] RPC 329 at 342-343, 
345. 
 174 
 
Again, that was the year in which section 50 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act first permitted 
trademark licensing with a registered user regime,
466
 which was replaced in 1993 with a quality 
control regime: 
“For the purposes of this Act, if an entity is licensed by or with the authority of 
the owner of a trademark to use the trademark in a country and the owner has, 
under the licence, direct or indirect control of the character or quality of the goods 
or services, then the use, advertisement or display of the trademark in that country 
as or in a trademark, trade name or otherwise by that entity has, and is deemed 
always to have had, the same effect as such a use, advertisement or display of the 
trademark in that country by the owner.”467 
 
The concept of licensing is important because it allows traders to claim ownership over 
another‟s use of a trademark, use in association with a good or services, and use in a territory. 
Doing so is a quick and profitable
468
 way for traders to expand their family of trademarks, 
collection of goods or services, and scope of territory. The corollary of licensing is that traders 
should be liable for their licensee‟s wrongdoing in connection to its trademark or – at the very 
least – traders who are either ignorant of their licensee‟s activities or unaware of outsourcing to 
sub-licensees should be deemed to have lost control over the trademark.
469
 This idea of 
                                                 
466
 Trademarks Act, SC 1953, 1-2 Eliz II, c 49. The United States already permitted trademark licensing in 1946, as 
did the United Kingdom in 1938. 
467
 Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 50(1). 
468
 Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Great Britain: Flamingo, 2000) at 7-8 (“It took several 
decades for the manufacturing world to adjust to this shift. It clung to the idea that its core business was still 
production and that branding was an important add-on. Then came the brand equity mania of the eighties, the 
defining moment of which arrived in 1988 when Philip Morris purchased Kraft for $12.6 billion-six times what the 
company was worth on paper. The price difference, apparently, was the cost of the word KRAFT.”) [Klein]. 
469
 Vaver, supra note 21 at 466 (“Still, sloppy practices can cause non-distinctiveness. Bell Canada‟s registrations of 
WATS, CALLING CARD, and 900 SERVICE for telephone services were expunged because Bell had not exercised 
control over the way regional telephone companies used the marks Bell had licensed to them.”). 
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trademark liability is not new, as trademarks historically was a basis for punishing craftsmen for 
defective work and confiscating foreign goods.
470
 Although Schechter would disagree, this ideal 
is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada‟s current position that a trademark “allows 
consumers to know, when they are considering a purchase, who stands behind those goods or 
services.”471 
The first question is whether the liability extends beyond the license to the benefit of 
third parties. Opponents could argue that there is neither statutory nor judicial authority for this 
position because “[Canada‟s Trademarks Act] does not provide for the liability of a trademark 
licensor … [and] Canadian courts have not imposed an affirmative obligation on a trademark 
owner in favor of a third party.”472 Supporters could counter that “[the statutory] requirement for 
control by a trademark owner of the activity by a licensee in association with a licensed mark … 
[and] Canadian decisions that have imposed liability on a trademark licensor for acts or 
omissions of its licensee.”473 For example, Canadian and American courts held traders liable for 
a consumer injured by a franchisee‟s hot soup,474 a house fire due to a lawnmower,475 a broken 
nose due to an umbrella,
476
 and a consumer injured by a licensee‟s taxi door.477 Although Singh v 
Trump
478
 recently contradicted the possibility of such liability, the summary judgment motions 
only stated that traders are not liable for a licensee‟s egregious negligence without actually 
discussing either the statutory requirement for a licensor to control or the licensor‟s duty to vet 
licensees. We must ask why traders should not be liable for their licensees‟ wrongdoing in 
                                                 
470
 Schechter, supra note 6 at 814. 
471
 Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 1. 
472
 Sheldon Burshtein, “„The Donald‟ Trumps Claim for Misrepresentations by Licensee” (2016) 106:4 INTA 
Trademark Reporter 783 at 785 [Burshtein]. 
473
 Burshtein, supra note 472 at 788. 
474
 LaFlamme v Group TDL Ltée, 2014 QCCS 312. 
475
 Automobile Insurance Co of Hartford v Murray, Inc, 571 F Supp (2d) 408 (WDNY 2008). 
476
 Kennedy v Guess, Inc, 806 NE (2d) 776 (Ind Sup Ct 2004). 
477
 Fraser v U-Need-A-Cab Ltd (1983) 43 OR (2d) 389 (Ont HCJ), aff‟d (1985) 50 OR (2d) 281 (Ont CA). 
478
 Singh v Trump, 2015 ONSC 4461, rev‟d 2016 ONCA 747. 
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connection to their trademarks when a licensor can be liable for a licensee‟s wrongdoing for 
infringement.
479
 A couple of scholars have suggested that consumers should be able to sue 
traders for false or deceptive advertising, for goods or services that fall short of the promised 
quality, and not controlling licensees.
480
 
The second question is whether the liability extends beyond defects in a product to the 
employment conditions and environmental standards of its production. Opponents could argue 
that there is no statutory authority for this position by contrasting section 50(1) on licensing with 
section 12(1)(b) on descriptiveness. The former was limited to the character or quality “of the 
goods or services” while the latter included the character or quality “of the goods or services in 
association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions or the persons 
employed in their production or of their place of origin”, which show that the drafters did not 
intend for the term “character or quality” to include circumstances. Supporters could counter that 
the employment conditions and environment standards under which the goods or services are 
produced form a part of the character or quality.
481
 Ask any Canadian who boycotts JOE 
FRESH‟s cheap clothing for exploiting child labour, and buys CANADA GOOSE‟s expensive 
coats for employing Canadians and supporting scientists (or so it did before selling its majority 
shares to an American company). 
                                                 
479
 Gill, supra note 367 at 7.2(c)(ii-iii) (“The licensor, even if not using the impugned trading indica, is nevertheless 
holding itself out as being able to use it and, whether to do so themselves or induce others, such as licensees, which 
would bring the licensor properly within the confines of a quia timet infringement action.”). 
480
 Maniat & Sanders, supra note 361. 
481
 Klein, supra note 468 at 198 (“Which is why many companies now bypass production completely. Instead of 
making the products themselves, in their own factories, they „source‟ them, much as corporations in the natural-
resource industries source uranium, copper or logs. They close existing factories, shifting to contracted-out, mostly 
offshore, manufacturing. And as the old jobs fly offshore, something else is flying away with them: the old-
fashioned idea that a manufacturer is responsible for its own workforce. Disney spokesman Ken Green gave an 
indication of the depth of this shift when he became publicly frustrated that his company was being taken to task for 
the desperate conditions in a Haitian factory that produces Disney clothes. „We don‟t employ anyone in Haiti,‟ he 
said, referring to the fact that the factory is owned by a contractor. „With the newsprint you use, do you have any 
idea of the labour conditions involved to produce it?‟”). 
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The third question is whether the liability extends beyond Canadian borders to other 
countries. The statute is clear in its reference to a “country” three times that it anticipates the 
licensing, use and subsequent enurement of trademark rights by the licensor in any country. This 
would be consistent with the rationale of joining international trade agreements.
482
 There is also 
American case law to support holding traders liable for an accident in China due to an elevator 
bearing an American trademark,
483
 as well as an accident in the United Kingdom due to a car tire 
bearing an American trademark.
484
 Can or should this be extended to human rights abuses 
involving trademarks? This question is especially relevant with respect to foreign-language 
marks because traders are less likely to use every language and more likely to have licensees in 
every country using the language of that country. Although he was not speaking on trademarks 
(much less on vicarious liability from its licensing), then Supreme Court of Canada Justice 
Binnie had given speeches and written articles stating that Canadian businesses in developing 
countries must beware of human rights abuses even though they have “no body to imprison, no 
soul to damn and no conscience to trouble.”485 
 
7.2.4 Right to Translate 
In his days, Schechter had no success persuading law makers
486
 to expand rights and his 
article was challenged by prominent writers such as Cohen
487
 and Brown.
488
 Ninety years later, 
                                                 
482
 For example, the Madrid Protocol extends a trademark registration in one member country to other countries. 
Likewise, the Paris Convention extends a trademark‟s application date in one member country to the other countries 
where the same applications are filed within six months. Finally, the Paris Convention protects a famous mark in all 
member countries. 
483
 Lou v Otis Elevator Co, 933 NE (2d) 140 (Mass App Ct 2010). 
484
 Torres v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 786 P (2d) 939 (Ariz Sup Ct 1990). 
485
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like wine that aged well or like Mozart‟s posthumous success, Schechter is celebrated as the 
Father of Anti-Dilution
489
 even as his article continues to be challenged by current scholars such 
as Beebe
490
 and Lemley.
491
 How did this change evolve? Was it the creation of corporations and 
recognition of their “human” rights?492 Was it the deregulation and privatization of basic services 
that are lucrative, such as education and healthcare?
493
 Was it the commercialization and 
“propertization” of words?494  
Regardless of how this change evolved, it is adding to the challenge of keeping trademark 
law from turning into unfair competition law. Ninety years after Schechter‟s article, we are faced 
now with a wide gap between traders and consumers as a result of dilution and licensing, and we 
must beware not to widen it further through foreign-language marks. Recognizing foreign-
language marks as meaningful words instead of inarticulate designs opens the door for traders to 
claim that a foreign-language mark is identical or similar to a registered trademark. This must not 
be allowed because the translation problems discussed in Chapter 3 – as well as the issues of 
trademark distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion discussed in Chapter 5 – illustrated that the 
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courts cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the 
translation will be. It is only too easy with hindsight for traders to claim that a translation 
naturally would be associated with a trademark and, therefore, its use infringes or depreciates the 
goodwill of a registered trademark. Such traders are like over-sensitive claimants of libel and 
slander: ♫ they‟re so vain ♫ they think everything is about them ♫. 
The comments above do not change the possibility of dilution applying to foreign-
language marks in the same manner that it applies to English-language marks. Dilution used to 
mean little to foreign-language marks. The spectrum running from a restrictive to an expansive 
framework had limited application when the case law always imagined the illiterate consumer. 
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the case law, however, means that foreign-language 
marks can also range from restrictive to expansive. The subsections below will continue to 
review the stories of The Coca-Cola Company and the two Chinese bakeries in Canada to 
illustrate how imagining the fluent consumer raises the possibility that traders may use an 
expansive framework to prohibit dilution by “blurring”, dilution by “tarnishing”, and “free 
riding”. 
 
7.2.4.1 Dilution by Blurring 
The SAINT HONORE marks were refused registration because they were used in 
association with similar products to the ANNA marks and were confusing with them. If 
linguistic knowledge is included in the test for confusion, such linguistic knowledge should 
eventually become relevant in other tests as well, including the test for dilution. As a result, it 
may be possible to claim that the SAINT HONORE marks dilute the ANNA marks by blurring 
them in the mind of the fluent consumer in two ways. 
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First, the SAINT HONORE marks may dilute the ANNA marks by blurring their 
meaning. The Chinese characters 安 娜 used to mean only ANNA, as arbitrarily chosen by the 
owners of the ANNA marks. Then they were given the new meaning HONORE, as arbitrarily 
translated by the owners of the SAINT HONORE marks. Support for this position comes from 
Visa International Service Ass’n v JSL Corp.495 The word “visa” used to be only a word in the 
English dictionary. The plaintiff made it famous as the VISA mark in association with credit card 
and financial services. The defendant used it as the EVISA mark in association with multilingual 
education and information services. Although the defendant was only doing what the plaintiff 
had done by using the word for a new purpose, the plaintiff still sued and won for dilution 
because the meaning of the VISA mark had been blurred: 
“This multiplication of meanings is the essence of dilution by blurring. Use of the 
word “visa” to refer to travel visas is permissible because it doesn‟t have this 
effect; the word elicits only the standard dictionary definition. Use of the word 
visa in a trademark to refer to a good or service other than a travel visa, as in this 
case, undoubtedly does have this effect; the word becomes associated with two 
products, rather than one. This is true even when use of the word also gestures at 
the word‟s dictionary definition.”496 
 
Second, the SAINT HONORE marks may dilute the ANNA marks by blurring their 
source. The Chinese characters 安 娜 used to refer only to the bakery owned by Cheung‟s 
Bakery. Then the variation 聖 安 娜 came to refer also to the bakery owned by Saint Honore 
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 181 
 
Cake Shop. Support for this position comes from Coca-Cola v Busch.
497
 The plaintiff advertised 
its products in association with the COCA-COLA mark, which the public abbreviated as COKE. 
Since the plaintiff never used the abbreviation, the defendant started using the variation KOKE 
to sell similar products. After persuading a court that use by others of the COKE abbreviation 
should enure to it as the owner of the COCA-COLA mark, the plaintiff then argued that the 
source of the abbreviation had been blurred by the variation. 
  
7.2.4.2 Dilution by Tarnishing 
It may also be possible to claim that the SAINT HONORE marks dilute the ANNA 
marks by tarnishing them in the mind of the fluent consumer. Comparing the Chinese characters
聖 安 娜 in one party‟s marks and the same Chinese characters 安 娜 in the other party‟s marks 
indicates a difference of only one Chinese character: 聖. The fluent consumer would know that 
the Chinese character 聖 means “holy” and is the root word of multiple Christian and Catholic 
terms in Chinese.
498
 If a trader is anti-religious, or strongly religious in a faith other than 
Christianity or Catholicism, then attaching the Chinese character 聖 to its trademark could be 
considered tarnishing. 
The same thing could easily happen to COCA-COLA‟s translation 可 口 可 樂 because 
the last character for “happy” can also mean “music”. A savvy karaoke bar could use the same 
four characters to suggest “happy mouth” or “music in the mouth”, or emphasize both food and 
entertainment with the translation “delicious music”. The Coca-Cola Company could claim 
dilution by tarnishing of its happy and wholesome reputation with evidence that karaoke bars are 
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frequented by jilted lovers and gangster wannabes. It may also claim blurring or confusion if the 
karaoke bar also sells COCA-COLA products, as such bars often do. The argument for blurring 
becomes even stronger once we realize that the last Chinese character for “happy” changes its 
pronunciation when it means “music”, so that COCA-COLA‟s priceless pronounciation KE3 
KOU3 KE3 LE4 would become the awkwardly pronounced KE3 KOU3 KE3 YUE4. 
 
7.2.4.3 Free Riding 
American anti-dilution law is limited to blurring and tarnishing, as it does not protect 
against free riding like European anti-dilution law.
499
 Canada‟s depreciation of goodwill is more 
expansive than the American anti-dilution law because it may possibly go beyond blurring and 
tarnishing, in addition to not requiring fame and not having any limits as defences. As a result, it 
may also be possible to claim that a Chinese-language mark is free-riding on the Chinese 
translation for COCA-COLA in the mind of the fluent consumer in three ways. 
First, initial interest confusion may prohibit the savvy karaoke bar described above from 
using its Chinese-language mark in order to attract Chinese clients. Although initial interest 
confusion is used to catch a consumer‟s attention, the confusion is only temporary in that there is 
no actual confusion by the point of purchase.
500
 The hybrid nature of initial-interest-confusion 
but no-actual-confusion raises uncertainty as to whether this is infringement or depreciation (or 
both). Although the United States accepts this to be infringement,
501
 Canada‟s Federal Court of 
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Appeal seems to reject this as an example of infringement and left open the possibility of this 
being an example of trademark depreciation.
502
 
Second, cybersquatting may prevent users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens 
from having websites that compare, comment on, or criticize COCA-COLA products.
503
 The 
Coca-Cola Company could claim free-riding even if there is no confusion with respect to the 
Chinese equivalents of www.Coca-ColaHasMoreCaloriesThanPepsi-Cola.com, www.Coca-
ColaSucks.com, or www.Coca-ColaViolatesLabourStandards.com. The users could counter-
argue that the websites are an exercise of their constitutional right to free speech. Such a defence 
would be unsuccessful, however, for the owner of www.kekoukele.com. This website is not 
owned by The Coca-Cola Company, and its only purpose is to redirect searchers to WeChat (the 
Chinese equivalent of Facebook & WhatsApp combined). 
Third, comparative advertising may prohibit a Chinese company from advertising itself 
as “the Chinese alternative to 可 口 可 樂” with a chart listing its Asian-flavoured counterparts 
to COCA-COLA, SPRITE, FANTA, VITAMINWATER, HONEST TEA, etc. This may sound 
implausible until one remembers that Western desserts like ice-cream and snacks like KitKat 
originally had limited appeal to Asian palettes. That appeal grew exponentially, however, with 
new Asian flavours such as “black sesame/ ginger/ green tea/ mango/ red bean” ice-cream and 
“aloe/ matcha/ taro/ sake/ wasabi” KitKats. Although the chart‟s information may be truthful and 
useful to consumers, such comparative advertising would be prohibited according to Clairol Int’l 
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Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.
504
 The plaintiff and the defendant there both sold hair 
dye. The defendant used colour comparison charts to show which of its hair dye corresponded 
with the plaintiff‟s hair dye. Although this was truthful information of use to consumers looking 
to switch brands but afraid to risk the possibility of an unexpected change in colour, the court 
still decided that such information depreciated the plaintiff‟s goodwill: 
“Depreciation of that value in my opinion occurs whether it arises through 
reduction of the esteem in which the mark itself is held or through the direct 
persuasion and enticing of customers who could otherwise be expected to buy or 
continue to buy goods bearing the trademark.”505 
 
It is clear from this chapter that assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language 
marks promotes the dual purposes of trademark law, as doing so focuses the evidence on the 
trademarks as they are and the association between them, which allows their distinctiveness and 
confusion to be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in the official languages. This stops 
the expansion of rights by minimizing claims that any and all foreign-language marks infringe or 
dilute a registered trademark. In this regard, protecting both consumers and traders is impossible 
nowadays without considering Canada‟s multicultural heritage. Even now, there are dissatisfied 
traders who advocate successfully for more recognition of well-known marks or new recognition 
of unconventional marks – such as scent, sound, colour and shape. 506  The obsession with 
expanding rights for well-known marks or creating rights for unconventional marks is strange, 
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especially when compared with the lack of attention paid to foreign-language marks that are 
more numerous and have a greater impact on Canadians. Canada‟s current trademark reforms 
continue to ignore foreign-language marks that are registered already or that are more significant 
by number and value, even as it expands the definition of a trademark to extend rights to 
unconventional marks.
507
 The judicial development of the test for confusion makes up for the 
legislative neglect. Otherwise, other traders would be expanding their trademark rights while 
foreign-language traders might not even be able to prove trademark infringement under the test 
for confusion. That is why the court‟s recognition of linguistic knowledge is welcomed, not 
because foreign-language traders wish to expand trademark law, but rather because multicultural 
consumers are now being acknowledged as relevant members of Canadian society whose 
languages and cultures matter.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The law has developed its legal fictions for the trademark consumer. Now that the social 
construct no longer ignores linguistic knowledge, the fictitious character of the newly fledged 
fluent consumer raises new challenges.  
These challenges are pressing matters administratively and judicially. This is clear from 
my discussion of the linguistic problems that impact trademark registrations and litigation. The 
problems highlighted by two Canadian case studies of Chinese-language trademarks give rise to 
my solutions, the general principles of which can also be applied in other countries and to other 
foreign languages. The solutions are tested through my application to the criteria for trademark 
registrability, as well as to the trader‟s rights against infringement, against depreciation of 
goodwill, to license, and to translate. This vertical analysis is done in a comparative setting that 
horizontally canvasses the alternative approaches taken by both Western and Asian countries 
with official languages that are only Romanized (the United States), both Romanized and not 
Romanized (the European Union and Singapore), and only not Romanized (China). 
These challenges can also be addressed legislatively. This is unlikely to happen since 
such discussions were absent during and continue to be absent after the 1953 Trade Mark Law 
Revision Committee. The absence is understandable in light of how little impact the linguistic 
problems had on trademark registrations and litigation back then. The growing awareness of 
international businesses and multicultural consumers may influence legislative members to take 
action now. But should such action be limited to economic and international trade concerns? 
What of social and human rights causes?  
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These challenges draw attention to why trademark law exists and, more importantly, 
whom trademark law benefits. Since one of the beneficiaries – and the focus of the test for 
confusion – is the consumer, this naturally involves drawing attention to social causes that are 
important to Canadian consumers: Aboriginal language rights, Constitutional freedom of speech, 
and safeguards against expanding trademark rights. I avoided using critical legal theory to 
advance a human rights discourse on how supposedly impartial administrative practices and 
judicial decisions produce preferential outcomes because I saw no point in preaching to choir 
members and I had no faith in converting business leaders. This is why I focused on business 
concerns that would serve as incentives for businesses to litigate or lobby for changes. Although 
I protested against businesses co-opting social causes, I had no qualms about myself co-opting 
business concerns because traders need consumers. The current business strategy is to invite, 
encourage, and depend upon consumers to respond to, participate in, and engage with 
trademarked mottos, slogans, or taglines. Having invited in the consumer, such businesses cannot 
keep out consumer causes. 
The answers to the new challenges may not be easy but they can affect outcomes on 
distinctiveness and confusion – with implications for traders investing in businesses, consumers 
awaiting recognition of their languages and cultures, and a country concerned with issues of 
international trade and multicultural heritage in a global economy. It is important to develop a 
workable model now for assessing the consumer in cases involving foreign-language marks to 
ensure the consistency and credibility of the legal fiction of the fluent consumer. 
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